2019 will probably be the first year in #Iran's modern history where non-oil export revenue will exceed that of oil exports, reaching >$40bn.
Iran's non-oil exports have doubled in the last 10 years under sanctions. This is the future of Iran's economy. datawrapper.de/_/a36Es/
For comparison, total exports in 1995:
Pakistan: $8bn
Egypt: $3bn
Iran: $4bn
In 2018, total exports were:
Pakistan: $23bn
Egypt: $29bn
Iran: $33bn
Iran arguably faced greater geopolitical headwinds, but it's non-oil exports now exceed total exports for both Egypt/Pakistan.
State policy is prioritizing non-oil growth. Iranian companies are learning how to be exporters. The rial is cheaper and so are Iranian goods. Iraq and Afghanistan are more stable. Transport links emerging to Far East and Central Asia. There's a case for optimism here.
The narrative is that Iran is a total economic basketcase, but Egypt and Pakistan are sitting there having had years of US aid, no sanctions, support from the IMF and have let their total exports fall below Iran’s non-oil exports.
Iran is well behind the likes of Russia, Turkey, Thailand, and Vietnam in terms of non-oil exports. But the reorientation of the economy away from oil is something not many energy-rich countries have managed.
Basically, Iran’s economy is a mess, but not a lost cause.
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1. I learned today that the mountains of South Tyrol are dotted with "Venetian sawmills," which were set up in the 16th century to fuel the insatiable lumber demand of Venice, more than 150km away.
Learning about the sawmills totally changed the way I see Venice.
2. No city has depended on wood more than Venice.
Karl Appuhn wrote a book explaining how Venice's extensive use of lumber to build foundations, wharfs, warehouses, and boats, forced the rulers of "La Serenissima" to get serious about forest management.
3. I knew that Venice and its buildings were built on timber piles driven into the bottom of the lagoon, but I never really thought about the massive industrial infrastructure that was necessary to supply millions of mature trees to Venice over the course of centuries.
1. Once again, a state funeral in Iran has led to a debate about how much political support the Islamic Republic enjoys.
Here's the thing...
Participation in collective mourning is a deeply embedded cultural custom in Iran.
It's not an *inherently* political act.
2. The motivation to participate in a funeral, whether for Soleimani or Raisi, is far less about the individual that has died and far more about the shared social custom.
Authorities take advantage of this cultural impulse and imbue state funerals with political iconography.
3. It's worth recalling the crowds that came out for Rafsanjani's funeral in 2017.
Did all those people take to the streets to express their political loyalty to a president whose second term ended way back in 1997?
1. Sanctions have had a very significant negative effect on aviation safety in Iran.
But the idea that they contributed to the recent crash and the deaths of Raisi and Abdollahian makes little sense.
Recent reports by FT, NYT, and others taking that line miss some key details.
2. Old aircraft are not *necessarily* unsafe. The helicopter carrying Raisi was built in 1994.
Until a few years ago, the fleet of Marine Helicopter Squadron One, which transports the US president, included old Sikorsky VH-3Ds, including one from late 1970s.
3. The maintenance and refurbishment of the aircraft are what really matter.
Here, sanctions may have had an impact by making it more difficult for Iran to procure parts for the Bell 212, which is an American-made helicopter.
1. Russia and Iran have adopted "war economies" in response to sanctions. But the aims differ.
In Iran, the aim is to boost the military by allowing it to expand its economic activities.
In Russia, the aim is to boost the economy by smartly leveraging military spending.
2. Iran has faced tougher sanctions and a more acute security dilemma.
In turn, Iranian leaders were eager to give the military (namely the IRGC) a larger piece of a shrinking pie, sustaining military spending and enabling rentierism while otherwise embracing fiscal austerity.
3. Iran's military has been the great winner in the distributional conflict that began when sanctions thrust the country into a period of economic malaise.
To win the battle over resources, the IRGC became more politically active and began to take charge of Iran's technocracy.
1. Today, President Biden issued an executive order authorizing sanctions to block foreign banks that facilitate transactions related to Russian "technology, defense... construction, aerospace, or manufacturing."
Will these new secondary sanctions hobble Putin's war economy?
2. Coinciding with the new executive order, @wallyadeyemo has an op-ed in the @FinancialTimes explaining what Treasury aims to achieve.
Banks that are found to be supporting Russia's "war machine" will "risk losing access to the US financial system." ft.com/content/f1fe5e…
3. This is a big deal because the US is finally set to use its most powerful sanctions authorities to try to hurt Russia's war effort. There remains a widespread impressions that the Russia sanctions are the strongest ever imposed. That's not quite right!