A thread on supply and prices - more to follow later on home ownership and affordability.
2. Policymakers are in almost unanimous agreement on what's behind the housing crisis: as @mhclg said in 2017 "the cause is very simple: for too long we haven't build enough homes." But this doesn't fit the evidence.
3. Supply has in fact been sufficient to put downward pressure on house prices, but that effect has been outweighed by much larger forces pushing in the opposite direction. Here's why...
4. First on additions to the housing stock. Since house prices hit a low in 1996, we've added 3.7 million houses in England, but just 3.2 million households. As a result the 'surplus' housing stock has almost doubled to over 1.1 million
5. And the surplus is still growing. Last year, early indications are that we added over 240,000 homes. But the ONS anticipates that only about 160,000 households formed
6. What if high rents are choking off households formation? It doesn't look like they are. On the best data we have, private rented sector rents are up about 20% in real terms since 1996, while median household incomes have risen by closer to 50%
7. That *doesn't* mean affordability is fine for everyone. For young and low-income people, slow wage growth, erosion of social housing and housing benefit cuts have hammered affordability - but more market supply won't solve those problems, they need to be tackled directly
8. So if we have enough houses, why are prices so high? The answer is (mostly) the collapse in mortgage rates that has allowed people to borrow ever more money chasing prices upwards (...it's more nuanced than that, so read the report!)
9. Could building 300,000 per year cut prices anyway? Not much. The academic consensus suggests that sustaining that rate for 20 years could reduce prices by roughly 10%. But that's peanuts set against the 160% real terms increase seen since 1996, and no help to this generation
10. So contrary to @Jacob_Rees_Mogg housing supply is not a 'catastrophe'. Raising it well beyond its current healthy rate won't do much to bring down prices, but will create lot more empty homes - more later on why it won't do anything for home ownership either.
The £28bn row crystallises a big economic policy dilemma facing the UK
Debate around how to fire up growth seems unable to reconcile two mutually inconvenient truths. But a meaningful growth plan depends on doing so 🧵
Inconvenient truth #1.
We have a large national debt and it's risky to allow it only to flatline between crises and ratchet ever upwards
For all the fiscal rule haters, fiscal sustainability is a real thing. We can't just wish it away
Related to that, the current set of fiscal rules - especially the supplementary target of borrowing <3% GDP - is the most lax we've had since fiscal rules became a thing in 1997
There's been some hyperbole about today's +670k immigration and housing costs. But DONT PANIC! Here's why:
1st look at the past 24 years. Generally population has grown slower than housing stock. Houses per person are +2.7% over 2000-22
Today's immigration numbers were well above the ones in the ONS population projections, so that's caused pop per dwelling to rise in 2022-23 (blue line), but not by much.
And experts see these numbers dropping back to previous projections (method/sources at the end)
That would take the change in population per dwelling since 2000 from -2.7% to about -2.5%.
What would that do to rents? Well there's an interesting recent paper from the New Zealand Government that looks at this treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/…
After the election there's going to be a fiscal hole to fill. How big though?
A *very* fag-packet calculation suggests whoever wins needs £30-40bn just to keep the show on the road - unless something turns up
Some thinking aloud...🧵
1st some assumptions. In March HMT had just a £6.5bn margin against its debt falling target
For simplicity, assume no change to that in 2028-9. Assume too that the next gov keeps the 5-yr debt rule. Also assume nothing changes in the underlying forecast or debt service costs
This week's @TheIFS green budget has an excellent run down of some of the tax/spending risks. Some things not yet accounted for:
- £6bn to keep fuel duty frozen
- ~£6bn for full expensing (assumes half way between the £10bn up-front cost and £2bn long-term cost - here's the IFS)
High and converging levels of concern about the problem across social classes, age groups and urban/rural.
Not obvious what anti-climate electoral strategy works from that
Then there’s the values divide. Brexit was a deep divide between socially conservative and socially liberal people that cut across economic left/right. Climate isn’t that stark.
Good to speak @CommonsTreasury about wealth and intergen inequality today with David Willetts and Resham Kotecha of @SMCommission. An edited 🧵of my comments
First up is the likely impact of last year's events on aggregate UK household wealth: it will be big
My paper for the LSE wealth tax commission on the drivers of the huge surge in wealth of the past 25 years gives some pointers as to what we can expect
Haldane's proposal of dumping government debt rules and letting borrowing be constrained only by public sector net worth surely right in principle.
But is it viable in practice? Are there simpler ways to get to a similar destination?
Four drivers of changes in assets/liabilities are worth thinking about: 1. Natural assets 2. Countercyclical fiscal policy 3. Land 4. Fixed assets like transport, energy, health infrastructure
1. Haldane's suggestion of taking natural assets into account highlights the question of how broad you take the definition of assets.
Including natural assets like the biosphere is much broader than the conventional definition of PSNW.