The only conclusion I would draw from last few days is that Johnson rapidly losing enthusiasm for no deal. His best chance of avoiding this now appears to be warmed up version of May's deal. 1/
Lot less bravado at moment about bracing benefits of crashing out, clever manoeuvres to get round HoC, and early gen elec. Slight poss of new deal with EU in a month complicates all of these (as it does early VONC).2/
Offer of talks on backstop helps EU avoid appearance of intransigence but whatever views of Macron or Merkel in the end it will still be largely Varadkar's call. 3/
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There will be times when US/NATO and Ukrainain interests are not identitical. That has already happened with Kyiv's pleas for non-fly zone. Some things they want we won't be able to give and there may well be differences of opinion should serious peace negotiations start. 1/
But it is really silly to have anxious debates over whether Ukraine should be restrained in its war aims. It is engaged in tough and painful resistance against a brutal aggressor. It has not acted recklessly and is preparing its counter-offensives carefully. 2/
It might be possible eventually for Ukraine to retake Crimea but thats not a current option. For the moment its focused on liberating Donbas. If it fails to do that the result will be continual instability in the region so it should be helped as much as possible to succeed.3/
A persistent theme among commentators who will not go as far as supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine but have to find a reason why it is also the West's fault, is that this is really a war between NATO/US and Russia in which the poor Ukrainians are victims of both. 2/
Thus claims that the West is 'prepared to fight to the last Ukrainian' or is being used as 'a battering ram' by both sides, picking up on US references to 'proxy wars'. The basic problem with these claims is that they deny Ukrainians agency in their own war. 3/
A lot of US commentary on Russo-Ukrainian war assumes it is US responsibility to define terms for a settlement. This is reflected in discussions about the concessions Ukraine meeds to make and now whether the overthrow of Putin should be a war aim. 1/
The negotiations are between Ukraine and Russia, not US and Russia. The Russian objective was regime change in Ukraine. In these circumstances, and Russia’s brutal conduct of war, a Ukrainian demand for regime change in Moscow would not be unreasonable.2/
But it is also unrealistic. Any peace settlement will deal with other matters. But it is also the case that Putin’s personal position is at stake here because he has made a massive blunder. 3/
What are we to make of this Russian statement that a first phase of the operation is complete so that the intention now is to concentrate on its main objective and take the Donbas? 1/
1/ First, we are reluctant to accept Russian statements at face value, but this makes some strategic sense. However they seek to dress it up, past month represents a major failure. Away from the Donbas all its offensives are stalled, and Ukrainian counter-attacks underway. 2/
The article does not preclude returning to the task of 'storming' the main Ukrainian cities once it has completed its primary task. This begs the question of what it has been trying to do the last few weeks (it suggests defeating the Ukrainian air force and navy). 3/
As the Russia war scare rumbles on I remain struck by the number of claims being made about the high quality of Putin's military options, demonstrating how any Ukrainian (or other potential victim) resistance will be crushed and how little NATO can do to help.2/
These claims tend to suffer from the fallacy of the first move, by which confidence in the ability of a military operation to achieve its initial objectives leads to a neglect of all the possible - and often more difficult - consequential moves to follow. 3/
With the current attention being given to Russia's menacing military buildup there is a lot of discussion about how seriously the threat should be taken and how to respond.1/
Inevitably at times like this we get the two favourite historical analogies - rapid mobilisation in the summer of 1914 or Munich in 1938. One warns about ambitious military moves; the other too many diplomatic concessions. 2/
Trouble with both analogies is we know they each led to war, and so 'lessons' can get overdrawn and by now are cliched. And also they come from pre-nuclear age. Risks of war are different now. 3/