Emeritus Professor of War Studies King's College London. just published Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (UK Penguin, US OUP)
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May 20, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
There will be times when US/NATO and Ukrainain interests are not identitical. That has already happened with Kyiv's pleas for non-fly zone. Some things they want we won't be able to give and there may well be differences of opinion should serious peace negotiations start. 1/
But it is really silly to have anxious debates over whether Ukraine should be restrained in its war aims. It is engaged in tough and painful resistance against a brutal aggressor. It has not acted recklessly and is preparing its counter-offensives carefully. 2/
Apr 24, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
A thread on proxy wars 1/
A persistent theme among commentators who will not go as far as supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine but have to find a reason why it is also the West's fault, is that this is really a war between NATO/US and Russia in which the poor Ukrainians are victims of both. 2/
Mar 26, 2022 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
A lot of US commentary on Russo-Ukrainian war assumes it is US responsibility to define terms for a settlement. This is reflected in discussions about the concessions Ukraine meeds to make and now whether the overthrow of Putin should be a war aim. 1/
The negotiations are between Ukraine and Russia, not US and Russia. The Russian objective was regime change in Ukraine. In these circumstances, and Russia’s brutal conduct of war, a Ukrainian demand for regime change in Moscow would not be unreasonable.2/
Mar 25, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
What are we to make of this Russian statement that a first phase of the operation is complete so that the intention now is to concentrate on its main objective and take the Donbas? 1/
1/ First, we are reluctant to accept Russian statements at face value, but this makes some strategic sense. However they seek to dress it up, past month represents a major failure. Away from the Donbas all its offensives are stalled, and Ukrainian counter-attacks underway. 2/
Dec 8, 2021 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
The fallacy of the first move. A thread. 1/
As the Russia war scare rumbles on I remain struck by the number of claims being made about the high quality of Putin's military options, demonstrating how any Ukrainian (or other potential victim) resistance will be crushed and how little NATO can do to help.2/
Dec 2, 2021 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
With the current attention being given to Russia's menacing military buildup there is a lot of discussion about how seriously the threat should be taken and how to respond.1/
Inevitably at times like this we get the two favourite historical analogies - rapid mobilisation in the summer of 1914 or Munich in 1938. One warns about ambitious military moves; the other too many diplomatic concessions. 2/
Mar 16, 2021 • 21 tweets • 3 min read
Thread on UK nuclear weapons policy. Be patient. Quite long.
The statement in the review on UK nuclear policy is the most comprehensive for some time, although it requires careful reading. It largely reaffirms existing policy. 1/
Jun 11, 2020 • 18 tweets • 5 min read
The paper I tweeted yesterday was not the one to which Channel 4 referred (apologies) but one actually discussed at SAGE (which is why i assumed one mentioned). I have done a bit more research to work out how Prof Riley’s paper fitted into pattern of decision-making. 1/
This is what Channel 4 said. channel4.com/news/uk-govern…
Professor Riley’s paper warned that is measures were not taken then the UK faced a Covid-19 catastrophe. Channel 4 say they don’t know how it was evaluated and they don’t say why it was written. 2/
May 20, 2020 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Lots of papers put on SAGE website - up to meeting on 12 May. haven't had a chance to review yet. gov.uk/government/gro…
These are largely statistical analyses of cases rather than scientific advice. It is mainly updated versions of this paper - Dynamic CO-CIN report to SAGE and
NERVTAG - from later March to last week. This is the most up to date version. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
May 11, 2020 • 13 tweets • 2 min read
This article describes UK decision-making on Covid-19, covering the period up to full lockdown on 23 March. It is largely but not solely based on primary sources, including the documents on the SAGE web-site. iiss.org/blogs/survival…
1/13
It is preliminary in that while much is available on policy inputs and outputs the material is more speculative on how one influenced the other. I’m afraid its extremely long and hard to reduce to a series of bullet points. Here are a few headlines. 2/13
Apr 2, 2020 • 13 tweets • 2 min read
‘Although we have had 30 years to prepare for what should be done in the event of an influenza pandemic, I think we have all been rushing around trying to improvise investigations with insufficient time to do it properly.' 1/n
This was a comment from J Corbett McDonald of Public Health Laboratory Service to Ian Watson, Director of the College of General Practitioners' Epidemic Observation Unit in the autumn of 1957, referring to that year’s Asian Flu epidemic. 2/n
Mar 27, 2020 • 28 tweets • 4 min read
Given allegations about early UK response to Covid-19 I’ve been looking at minutes of the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG). This to the main Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). The minutes can be found here app.box.com/s/3lkcbxepqixk…
Its chaired by Peter Horby of Oxford University. Professor Neill Ferguson of Imperial among its members. Clearly not the only advisory group meeting and not where decisions are taken but it has a lot of academic firepower and addresses some big question for the government.2/n
Mar 23, 2020 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
I am posting this again. To be clear not advocating official inquiry into HMG’s response, at least not now. That would be enormous distraction for those trying to cope with this situation. 1/n
My main point is that for those interested it is possible to look at primary sources rather than just what appears in media. However we only have one set of papers for now (not COBRA minutes for example).2/n
Mar 22, 2020 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
I've long had a theory that if the government wants to keep a secret its best course is to publish the information in an official document because then you can be sure no one will read it. Information is far more interesting when it is leaked through a 'Whitehall source'. 1/n
There are now call for a public inquiry into the government response to Covid-19. Well I know a bit about what an inquiry involves and you normally go to the archives to find out what was going on. 2/n
Jan 3, 2020 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Some speculative thoughts. Following the assassinations in Baghdad we can expect protests and violence against US assets and individuals in areas of Iranian influence. At some point, somewhere (not necessarily an obvious place) Iran will try to take its revenge.1/
There is no straightforward tit-for-tat response for Iran, for example taking out senior member of US Administration. They will still have to assume that their actions will lead to further US response. They may try revenge assassination but they have other options.2/
Sep 20, 2019 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
I have no doubt missed many examples of how the dreaded #Reviewer2 would have responded to some of the great works of the past but these are the result of an idling mind on a Friday afternoon.
I would recommend that Mr Plato takes out the section on caves. Hard to see what this adds to his argument. While considerations of outreach and impact are to be encouraged his suggestions on an academic role in political leadership may invite controversy. #Reviewer2
Sep 16, 2019 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Core claim from cross Leavers is that only determination of Remainers to frustrate the results of referendum has prevented us actually leaving. A better explanation however points to the failure of Leavers to unite on a clear plan for Brexit and their subsequent divisions 1/.
Now Johnson having veered towards no deal to become leader is veering even more sharply towards May's deal to stay PM. If he succeeds this will be one of the most egregious case of 'grand-old-duke-of-yorkism'. 2/
Sep 12, 2019 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Let us assume that a) Johnson now realises why his erstwhile colleagues were so opposed to no deal and doesn't relish the idea of fighting an election just after one, and b) therefore genuinely now wants a deal with EU, but 1/
c) also finds that the only deal available is going to be pretty similar to the one he has campaigned against for past year. Current negotiations are intended to provide a functional equivalent to the backstop, even if called something different. 2/
Aug 28, 2019 • 8 tweets • 1 min read
Following explains why I believe Johnson/Cummings have made strategic error. It may not be fatal because their opponents perfectly capable of making comparable errors of their own. 1/
Cummings is known to have a fascination with John Boyd's OODA (observation-orientation-decision-action) loop derived from Boyd's experience as a fighter pilot (so tactical rather than strategic) 2/
Apr 11, 2019 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
We have six months to sort out Brexit one way or the other. The starting point is that if the aim is an orderly Brexit then the WA must be approved by the Commons. The EU will not budge on this. The Cabinet and Parliament looked at a disorderly Brexit and swerved away.1/
All the WA does is get us into the transitional stage where the big issues concerning the future relationship must be addressed. These are covered in the aspirational political declaration which is full of items which by definition are yet to be decided.2/
Apr 2, 2019 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
Some random thoughts on May's statement.
1) It really would help if she took questions. It would save a lot of energy as twitter gets deep into theorising about her real intentions.
