It is pretty clear that the U.S. tax reform had a large impact on the U.S. BoP data: FDI flows reversed in 2019, as U.S. firms brought back past investments).
But it also may be mucking around with the global data. The fall in inward FDI to the EA correlates with US tax reform
The fit isn't perfect -- the EA data indicates that investment from the US fell off before the tax reform, and I don't understand the mechanism why investment from others into the EA would fall with the US tax reform
the BoP math is sort of straight-forward:
the "reinvested" (tax deferred) earnings of US firms used to count as an increase in US FDI abroad. So when those funds are returned, US outward FDI falls.
and conversely inward FDI into places like the EA and Bermuda should fall
basically, tax avoidance under the old U.S. law led to a buildup of US FDI abroad (technically), and that is now reversing.
Some will say this is globalization going backwards, but in a real sense it is not ...
in any case, help understanding the EA data would be most appreciated -- outward EA FDI has also gone done it seems, so the net swing is more modest that the change in gross flows over the last 6qs
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Three big picture observations about the oil surplus (petrodollars/ petroeuros/ petroequities are all downstream of this) pre Hormuz
A) The oil surplus is modest relative to the surplus in Asia. Chinese state banks and offshore deposits of Chinese exporters are way bigger
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B) Most oil exporters are in deficit or run only modest surpluses with oil in the 60s or 70s. That importantly includes Saudi Arabia, which now has a BoP break even in the 90s
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C) The remaining surpluses are concentrated in Russia (tho its surplus has fallen), frugal Norway and the GCC countries with large SWFs -- who tend to invest most of their surplus in equities (Kuwait is a bit of an exception, recent bond inflows
The risk of an escalation in the Gulf seem reduced for at least a few days. So maybe there will be a bit of interest in my (somewhat novel) reevaluation of the relative contribution of Europe and China to global imbalances
Bottom line: The second China shock has eliminated Europe's imbalance -- it all migrated to the east.
Consider the contribution of net exports to Chinese growth and to German growth over the last few years ...
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Chinese exports have outperformed global trade. That can only happen if someone else's exports under-perform. & the big underperformance has come from Europe
Petrodollars! Nothing produces more heated discussion and, in my experience, less insight. Myths trump facts, because the actual data is a bit obscure --
But here is the most important thing to know. Before the Hormuz crisis, the flow of petrodollars had more or less dried up
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At $60-70 a barrel, the oil exporters just weren't generating large surpluses --
Saudi Arabia's external deficit offset Russia's surplus, so the two biggest oil exporters (~ 15mbd of exports together) were not generating petrodollars, petroeuros or petroyuan
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And the GCC countries (no quarterly data for the Emirates, but its surplus is roughly the size of Qatar and Kuwait combined) no longer really stash away their oil surplus in liquid dollar reserves --
Back before the bombardment of Iran, China's currency was under considerable appreciation pressure -- the settlement data showed $70b in fx purchases by the PBOC/ SCBs ($840b annualized). A huge sum for a holiday month ...
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Over the last 12ms of data, settlement (my preferred intervention measure) shows purchases of $500-600b ... or more than enough to trigger the Treasury "manipulation" thresholds
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And for whatever reason, in both January and February a small fraction of that total (~$10b) did show up on the balance sheet of the PBOC -- so it isn't all flowing through the state banks right now (tho most of the flow is still via the state banks)
Some basic oil shock math, focusing on the impact on global trade ...
Remember that we are starting from an unusually low surplus in the fuel exporting economies ...
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And also an unusually large surplus in East Asia.
Core east Asia looks to (per the old BP data) import ~ 20 mbd on net, so each $10b/ barrel change in the oil price reduces East Asia goods surplus by ~ $75b
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a $20 a barrel shock knocks $150b off their surplus -- a manageable sum for a region that has a $1.5 trillion surplus (and rising fast on AI chip demand). 60% of that is China, and China can definitely manage ...
A day that was a long time coming -- TSMC's dominance of chip manufacturing led Taiwan to post a $70b quarterly current account surplus in q4. That is $280b annualized, or a surplus of ~ 33% of GDP
Never though that would be possible for a non-tax haven without oil
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And there is of course a capital flows story -- as the TWD depreciated in q4 in the face of this massive surplus (2x its level in 24), and Taiwan technically sold reserves too!
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For the year as a whole Taiwan's surplus was $180b (gulp, a sum not much smaller that the, artificially low to be sure, surplus that China was reporting mid 2024)! Reserve outflows and foreign bond purchases were only $20b each, leaving $140b to flow out in other ways