It is pretty clear that the U.S. tax reform had a large impact on the U.S. BoP data: FDI flows reversed in 2019, as U.S. firms brought back past investments).
But it also may be mucking around with the global data. The fall in inward FDI to the EA correlates with US tax reform
The fit isn't perfect -- the EA data indicates that investment from the US fell off before the tax reform, and I don't understand the mechanism why investment from others into the EA would fall with the US tax reform
the BoP math is sort of straight-forward:
the "reinvested" (tax deferred) earnings of US firms used to count as an increase in US FDI abroad. So when those funds are returned, US outward FDI falls.
and conversely inward FDI into places like the EA and Bermuda should fall
basically, tax avoidance under the old U.S. law led to a buildup of US FDI abroad (technically), and that is now reversing.
Some will say this is globalization going backwards, but in a real sense it is not ...
in any case, help understanding the EA data would be most appreciated -- outward EA FDI has also gone done it seems, so the net swing is more modest that the change in gross flows over the last 6qs
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Hallelujah. The IMF has recognized that China's weak real exchange rate is a problem, and that it has contributed to China's export surplus and growing trade tensions. From @KeithBradsher in the NYT
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The IMF has lagged on this issue, not led ... and it still isn't quite calling for a nominal appreciation (though Georgieva may have hinted at the need for nominal appreciation to offset inflation differentials). The EU Chamber is more explicit (from the FT)
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The IMF's formal press statement attributes the Yuan's real depreciation to inflation differentials (nominal moves v the USD also played a role in 22/23)
Brutal -- but accurate -- assessment of the results of Trump's year one policies by @wsj_douglasj and @JonathanEmont of the WSJ
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"Strip out imports of energy, food and raw materials, and China is on track this year to post a surplus in manufactured goods of around $2 trillion, a huge sum that is on a par with the annual national income of Russia or Italy" 2/
Exports are a big enough share of China's economy (~ 20%) that two years of 10% or more export volume growth can drive an overall increase in manufacturing output even if the domestic economy is the in doldrums
"China is now the world’s ... largest exporter, but ... It has never believed in balanced trade nor comparative advantage. Even as it imported critical technology from the West, its long-term goal was always self-sufficiency
Nice chart too
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Very much agree with his overall thesis, and with his policy prescription
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The title of Ip's piece more of less speaks for itself
One feature of today's global economy: the incredible concentration of the global goods surplus in East Asia (using customs data). Way more so than in Trump one
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Implicit in the chart is the observation that the rest of oil-importing East Asia has maintained its goods surplus even as China's surplus has soared (helped by demand for Korean and Taiwanese chips)
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There is another point here -- one relevant for both @imfnews and France as they think about global trace and macro imbalances -- the current account surplus of East Asia ex China far exceeds their customs goods surplus ....
I am (obviously) a part of the "East Coast" think tank establishment Mr. Balding criticizes, & also served in the Biden Administration. But I would encourage Mr. Balding to read some of the work that I and my colleagues have done, as he paints with far too broad a brush
I would be the first to say that not enough was/ is being done on active pharmaceutical ingredients. But inside and outside of government I advocated for the 301 tariffs to be extended to rare earths/ magnets ... which was in the end done as part of the 301 review
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So if Mr. Balding's standard is forward progress, a bit was done there (tho not enough)
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