It is pretty clear that the U.S. tax reform had a large impact on the U.S. BoP data: FDI flows reversed in 2019, as U.S. firms brought back past investments).
But it also may be mucking around with the global data. The fall in inward FDI to the EA correlates with US tax reform
The fit isn't perfect -- the EA data indicates that investment from the US fell off before the tax reform, and I don't understand the mechanism why investment from others into the EA would fall with the US tax reform
the BoP math is sort of straight-forward:
the "reinvested" (tax deferred) earnings of US firms used to count as an increase in US FDI abroad. So when those funds are returned, US outward FDI falls.
and conversely inward FDI into places like the EA and Bermuda should fall
basically, tax avoidance under the old U.S. law led to a buildup of US FDI abroad (technically), and that is now reversing.
Some will say this is globalization going backwards, but in a real sense it is not ...
in any case, help understanding the EA data would be most appreciated -- outward EA FDI has also gone done it seems, so the net swing is more modest that the change in gross flows over the last 6qs
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Looks like Japan's Ministry of Finance is getting ready to realize some of its massive profits, selling dollars bought at 80-100 at well over 150 ... and in the process reducing Japan's debt (Japan carries its reserves on the MoF's balance sheet)
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Rate differentials (at least at certain tenors) are more yen supportive than in the past, which bolsters the case for intervention --
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Lots of reasons for yen weakness -- frozen balance sheets b/c of underwater bonds, Ueda was slow, hedging is still costly and it hasn't paid for a long time and private institutions have been rewarded for under-hedging (or not hedging)
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Since the big move in the Taiwan dollar in May, "Taiwan’s life insurers ... have cut their currency hedging to a record low" and resumed buying foreign bonds ...
Not exactly the response expected!
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So how could the lifers cut their hedges just after taking big losses on their unhedged positions in May?
Tis a good question ...
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Part of the answer is that hedges are costly, and thus the lifers would rather not have them on unless they need them ... the hedged book right now almost certainly loses money
Korean won incredibly weak right now -- at risk of overshooting fundamentals. US return exceptionalism has generated outflows, but Korea underlying financial position remains solid
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Korean memory chips aren't selling at the same premium as Taiwanese made GPUs, but Korea's current account surplus is huge again -- $110b plus
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Korean FX reserves are amply at $400b -- and they would be a lot bigger if Korea hadn't more or less decided to let the NPS accumulate a massive foreign equity portfolio
The IMF has been struggling with the apparent contradiction between the policies needed for internal balance (monetary easing, weaker currency) and external balance (a stronger currency)
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But the contradiction is apparent not real -- it hinges on assumption that China lacks fiscal space, and thus fiscal policy is off the table.
Hallelujah. The IMF has recognized that China's weak real exchange rate is a problem, and that it has contributed to China's export surplus and growing trade tensions. From @KeithBradsher in the NYT
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The IMF has lagged on this issue, not led ... and it still isn't quite calling for a nominal appreciation (though Georgieva may have hinted at the need for nominal appreciation to offset inflation differentials). The EU Chamber is more explicit (from the FT)
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The IMF's formal press statement attributes the Yuan's real depreciation to inflation differentials (nominal moves v the USD also played a role in 22/23)
Brutal -- but accurate -- assessment of the results of Trump's year one policies by @wsj_douglasj and @JonathanEmont of the WSJ
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"Strip out imports of energy, food and raw materials, and China is on track this year to post a surplus in manufactured goods of around $2 trillion, a huge sum that is on a par with the annual national income of Russia or Italy" 2/
Exports are a big enough share of China's economy (~ 20%) that two years of 10% or more export volume growth can drive an overall increase in manufacturing output even if the domestic economy is the in doldrums