It is pretty clear that the U.S. tax reform had a large impact on the U.S. BoP data: FDI flows reversed in 2019, as U.S. firms brought back past investments).
But it also may be mucking around with the global data. The fall in inward FDI to the EA correlates with US tax reform
The fit isn't perfect -- the EA data indicates that investment from the US fell off before the tax reform, and I don't understand the mechanism why investment from others into the EA would fall with the US tax reform
the BoP math is sort of straight-forward:
the "reinvested" (tax deferred) earnings of US firms used to count as an increase in US FDI abroad. So when those funds are returned, US outward FDI falls.
and conversely inward FDI into places like the EA and Bermuda should fall
basically, tax avoidance under the old U.S. law led to a buildup of US FDI abroad (technically), and that is now reversing.
Some will say this is globalization going backwards, but in a real sense it is not ...
in any case, help understanding the EA data would be most appreciated -- outward EA FDI has also gone done it seems, so the net swing is more modest that the change in gross flows over the last 6qs
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I am (obviously) a part of the "East Coast" think tank establishment Mr. Balding criticizes, & also served in the Biden Administration. But I would encourage Mr. Balding to read some of the work that I and my colleagues have done, as he paints with far too broad a brush
I would be the first to say that not enough was/ is being done on active pharmaceutical ingredients. But inside and outside of government I advocated for the 301 tariffs to be extended to rare earths/ magnets ... which was in the end done as part of the 301 review
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So if Mr. Balding's standard is forward progress, a bit was done there (tho not enough)
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The Treasury International Capital Data for September is now out -- China's Treasury holdings were constant during the data that was missed during the shutdown. Japan is up. UK and France are down a bit -- with a rise in the smaller EU custodial centers
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The runup in foreign holdings of Treasuries has all been "private" -- tho note that funds that China holds in private custodians in Europe register as private, so the split is imprecise
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The Treasuries that China holds in US custodians is clearly on a structural decline -- so estimating China's true holdings requires making a guess about China's holdings in custodians outside the US/ funds handed over to private managers
Crazy current account numbers for Taiwan in q3 -- a 20% quarterly surplus, and q4 looks like it will be bigger. That pushed the trailing 4q surplus up to 16% of GDP -- a record.
(and yet the TWD is weak, after hefty intervention in q3 changed the BoP dynamics)
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Taiwan's soaring surplus though hasn't translated into soaring demand for bonds in the last 4 quarters -- bond purchases picked up in q3, but no longer are on the scale needed to match the huge current account surplus
A big new report from @AidData sheds insight into one of the mysteries of global capital flows, namely how does China's large/ growing current account surplus fund the US external deficit. The answer, in part, is lending by the state banks
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The disaggregated data shows that China isn't just funding publicly guaranteed infrastructure projects in frontier economies/ Africa. Its state banks also do a lot of lending to "private" firms, including loans that back Chinese firms going out
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That includes funding a lot of China's strategic acquisitions -- Kuka in Germany, Nexperia in the Netherlands, Nexperia's (subsequently reversed) purchase of a chip wafer facility in the UK, etc
The explanation for Taiwan's exceptionally weak currency (on the big Mac index & pretty much any other indicator) is Taiwan's central bank "as Taiwan has exported its way to prosperity, the CBC has tried to avoid such a fate by suppressing the value of the local currency"
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And China's net auto exports far exceed the 1.3 m cars Germany exported on net in 24 ...
Michael Dunne and others put China's production capacity at ~ 50m cars. EV production capacity by the end of the year should approach 25m cars, so the right answer depends on how much ICE capacity has been retired. Huge v the 25m internal market and 30+ m in current output