CFR senior fellow. Views are my own. Retweets are not endorsements. Writes on sovereign debt and capital flows.
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Some obvious reasons for the spike, which maps to ongoing reports of SCB purchases in November:
Even adjusting for Euroclear (part owned by the PBOC incidentally) and short-term holdings, there is no visible net flow from China into the US bond market over the last 8 years ... 
The balance of payments data doesn't provide any detail on hedging -- but the total flow into US bonds has been pretty stable at a $600-700b annual pace. And (net) inflows into US equities have been unusually strong (and equity flows typically are not hedged)
The export numbers are so big that they obscure the fall in imports -- but that has also been impressive.
China's total surplus with Europe, in dollar terms, topped the pandemic surplus ... as Europe's exports to China have stalled and China's export to Europe keep on rising ...
for the year, Taiwan's surplus will more than double -- from ~ $50b to over $100b. and the q4 surplus annualized is WAY higher, at around $175b. That is a crazy number for a country that already had a bit external surplus and has a lot of investment income
Net all the pharma noise out and imports remain flattish (up a bit in October v September) at a high level and exports are more or less flat too -- maybe there is a tiny upward trend since May but it is tiny
It isn't like the yuan's appreciation against the dollar has been particularly fast. But it has been steady. And a predictable no volatility appreciation that exceeds the loss from the rate differential is bound to get attention
A reminder -- the external break even is calculating using reported oil export revenues, the non-oil current account, and net exports (my numbers there are dependent on getting regular updates from @Rory_Johnston )
Venezuela's oil is heavy and sour, so it trades at a discount to sweet light.
Rhee also emphasized the foreign exchange implications of Korea's investment pledge (part of its "deal" with Lutnick and Trump). Rhee "vowed to oppose any US investment decisions that could threaten the stability of the foreign-exchange market"
This is a reversal of inflows from back in 2023 ... and as my earlier thread notes, I think the change in direction factors into the reported current account surplus (even though it should not technically) given China's error minimization formula post 2022 ...
Let's start with the current account -- $200b or so in q3. That is still a bit smaller than it should be. But it is has jumped from an implausibly low $50b a quarter in late 23 and early 24 to a number that is much closer to reality.
Rate differentials (at least at certain tenors) are more yen supportive than in the past, which bolsters the case for intervention --
For what it is worth, nothing much showed up in the OCtober TIC data, foreign private and foreign official holdings were more or less flat
So how could the lifers cut their hedges just after taking big losses on their unhedged positions in May?
Korean memory chips aren't selling at the same premium as Taiwanese made GPUs, but Korea's current account surplus is huge again -- $110b plus
The IMF has lagged on this issue, not led ... and it still isn't quite calling for a nominal appreciation (though Georgieva may have hinted at the need for nominal appreciation to offset inflation differentials). The EU Chamber is more explicit (from the FT)