Brad Setser Profile picture
CFR senior fellow. Views are my own. Retweets are not endorsements. Writes on sovereign debt and capital flows.
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Apr 1 5 tweets 2 min read
Martin Wolf seems to think China's recent export surge has reached its natural limits: "investing even more in manufacturing just guarantees ever more excess capacity and thus protection aimed against the inevitable surges of Chinese exports"

nice chart too ;) Image Wolf confirms that China seems a real upside in Trump's global trade war --

ft.com/content/80ab4a…
Mar 31 9 tweets 3 min read
The Saudi balance of payments for q4 is out, and it confirms that Saudi Arabia ran a current account deficit in 2024 -- and (per my estimates), the balance of payments "breakeven" for Saudi Arabia is around $90 a barrel.

1/ Image One implication, of course, is that the Saudis are on track to run a substantial external deficit in 2025 --

(@Rory_Johnston can improve the estimated breakeven with a better net oil exports number for 2024!)

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Mar 31 4 tweets 1 min read
I haven't loved those trade offs to be honest --

Say a US firm gets access to Korea's local market to sell insurance. It won't employ Americans to run that business ... the firm's global business benefits, but there is little impact on the US economy

1/ The classic example is TPP, where the US would have liberalized the US auto market (the 'TPP" content requirement was lower than the "NAFTA" content requirement) in exchange for stronger protection of offshore pharmaceutical IP

2/
Mar 31 13 tweets 5 min read
One sign of "American exceptionalism" (US equity outperformance + sustained demand for US debt through thick and thin) is that the US has a lot more external liabilities than external assets.

A lot more!

1/ Image I have focused heavily on the net external debt position precisely because it doesn't hinge heavily on stock market valuations (and the FDI position is a bit problematic as foreign FDI is valued using the US stock market). 2/ Image
Mar 31 11 tweets 3 min read
I usually focus on non-petrol trade because oil has its own unique dynamics. But if there really is an across the board 20% tariff on all imports, the pre-tariff baseline is imports of 11% of GDP ...

1/ Image Some simple tariff math. The "just pay it" cost is thus 2.2% of GDP. But actual tax revenue from the tariff will be lower. If the short-term elasticity is 1, imports fall by a little more than 2% of GDP, to around 9 pp of GDP & the direct tax revenue is 1.75 pp of GDP. 2/
Mar 29 9 tweets 3 min read
The most important fact about China's q4 balance of payments is that the surplus is still way below what it should be -- a $1 trillion in goods surplus, $200-250b deficit in services and positive $3 trillion net investment position should generate a surplus of over $750b ...

1/ Image But even if the current account surplus is understated, it isn't quite as understated as it was in the first half of 2024 ... the reported surplus, FDI flows and portfolio inflows do imply that Chinese residents should be accumulating about $125b a quarter in foreign assets. 2/ Image
Mar 28 10 tweets 4 min read
A large US pharmaceuticals company decided that its relationship with the tax breaks provided by the Government of Singapore was more important that its relationship with the Ranking Member (then Chairman) of the Senate Finance Committee.

1/ Image That is well, a rather bold move -- one that rises questions about what exactly firms like Pfizer are hiding ...

But we do know from their own disclosure that they typically don't report earning any money in the US (even tho the US generates most of their sales)

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Mar 26 12 tweets 3 min read
A few thoughts on the 25% tariff on imports of finished automobiles.

Imports are just under $275b (2024), or just over 0.9 pp of US GDP. The "just pay it" cost of the tariff is about 23 bp of 2024 GDP ...

1/ many Image The "just pay it cost" of the 20% tariff on China (30 bp of GDP) and "finished autos" (23 bp of GDP) already exceed the "just pay it cost" of the Section 301 tariffs of Trump's first term (15% on 2.6 pp of GDP, or 40 bps of GDP) -- and that is before the RECIPROCAL tariffs

2/
Mar 26 11 tweets 4 min read
Gearing up for April 1 (the release of China's detailed 2024 balance of payments data ... not tariff day)

In q2 China's reported* current account surplus was about 1/2 the combined surplus of the east of "surplus" east Asia; it then rose a bit in q3 and q4 ...

1/many

* I have doubts about the reported data)Image The roughly $400b Chinese current account surplus in the last 4qs isn't as extreme an outlier as $200b in the 4qs to q2 but it still puts China's current account surplus well below the rest of East Asia. &the goods data tells another story all together

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Mar 25 7 tweets 2 min read
Per the FT, China's expanded "trade-in" subsidy for goods consumption (and domestic production) is less that 1/4 of a percentage point of China's GDP --

Better than nothing, but not a lot

1/ Image I take Andrew Batson's point that the signal matters, not just the details -- and the signal recently is that China is more keen on promoting consumption. But the details (and scale of support) still matter!

2/

ft.com/content/2bb951…
Mar 24 5 tweets 1 min read
Happily, European banks are much less reliant on dollar wholesale funding than they were before the global financial crisis -- and with new opportunities developing in Europe, don't necessarily need a big dollar book going forward

1/3 The COVID shock (and for that matter, balance of payments analysis and Japan's excellent Financial Systems Report) showed that the bid dollar funding need now is in Japan, as Japanese banks have a big dollar book. But the MoF has lots of dollars ...

2/
Mar 23 9 tweets 3 min read
Will be very interested in seeing if the IMF program for Argentina (which Bloomberg reports the Board will discuss this week) provides net new financing in 2025 and 2026 for what looks like an obvious peso overvaluation

1/

ft.com/content/09616c… The standard analysis of Milei focuses on the undeniable fiscal adjustment (helped by very low debt service costs, but still real). But the external balance is going the wrong way -- Argentina now runs a sizable current account deficit

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Mar 21 8 tweets 3 min read
The current discussion of a Mar-a-Lago accord presumes substantial inflows into US financial assets from governments seeking to hold safe global assets --

But there were no such flows in the US balance of payments in the fourth quarter.

1/ Image And the fourth quarter isn't an outlier -- the runup in the US current account deficit in 2024 (please take note @IMFNews) was financed privately, official (official = foreign central bank and SWF) demand for US assets was modest!

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Mar 19 12 tweets 4 min read
One of the biggest global flows right now is the increase in the foreign assets of China's commercial banks -- it has been running at a pace of about $100b a quarter/ $400b a year for the last two plus quarters ... 1/ Image That's real money. The net global current account (or trade imbalance, if you don't trust the current account numbers right now) is something like $1.5 trillion, so $400b is 1/4 of the total net financial flow that sustains trade imbalances. 2/ Image
Mar 17 5 tweets 2 min read
Trump seems serious about introducing a sectoral tariff on pharmaceutical imports --

But there is a better way to bring the trade deficit down: get rid of the pro-offshoring provisions of the Trump-Ryan Tax code

1/

cfr.org/blog/american-… There 2017 TCJA clearly failed to bring the pharmaceutical industry back home -- in fact, it encouraged the complete opposite, as imports and the trade deficit in pharmaceuticals soared after the 17 tax reform

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Mar 16 11 tweets 4 min read
One fact about the global economy should not be subject to debate any more -- the US is more than meeting global demand for reserve assets (a significant change from 2002 to 2014 ... )

1/ many Image And since China has had a policy of limiting its Treasury holdings (and shifting fx reserves over to the SCBs and policy banks) since around 2010, China's share of the Treasury market has shrunk radically ...

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Mar 11 5 tweets 2 min read
The US runs a surplus in manufacturing trade with Canada, so if the goal of the tariffs is to reindustrialize the United States, the trade war with Canada is doubly counter-productive

1/ Image Canada is the wrong target, as it is in fact a good market for US manufactures. The best in fact. And raising the price of industrial inputs (like Canada's low carbon aluminum) makes US downstream industry less competitive ...

2/
Mar 11 7 tweets 3 min read
I see that President Trump has said (again) that the only way to get the pharmaceutical industry back to build a tariff wall.

There is a actually another way -- change the provisions of the TCJA that incentivized offshoring.

1/ Image I have been baning on about this for a while. That's because it is obvious in the data. Pharma imports were $112b before the TCJA. They are now $260b.
the deficit in pharma has also exploded ...approaching $260b.

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Mar 9 5 tweets 2 min read
Good thread. A couple of additional thoughts.

A) China's central government has essentially no net debt. Let me repeat that no net debt (its financial assets match its liabilities). It could be doing a lot more to support consumer demand.

1/ B) Gerard mentions the importance of all components of domestic demand not just consumption. Fair enough. What worries me is that manufacturing investment has held up the investment component of demand, and it is unlikely that it can be sustained at current levels

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Mar 8 7 tweets 3 min read
My regular reminder that foreign governors haven't been the marginal buyer of Treasuries for the last decade, and certainly not the last 3 years ...

1/ Image Official demand has been extremely flat the last two years -- with Chinese sales offset by other countries purchases. China is adjusted for Euroclear -- and Chinese sales were stronger in 23 and early 24 than in recent months ...

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Mar 6 10 tweets 3 min read
US import dominance is unchallenged!

Tariff front running seems sure to make the trade deficit great again ... January was a case in point

1/ Image Surging imports led the trade deficit (sign reversed) to pop off the page (the annualized run rate is something like $1.8 trillion ... )

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