Brad Setser Profile picture
CFR senior fellow. Views are my own. Retweets are not endorsements. Writes on sovereign debt and capital flows.
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Dec 18 9 tweets 3 min read
Somewhat less than exorbitant privilege?

The q3 US current account deficit reached 4.2% of US GDP, and, in a milestone of sorts, the US balance on investment income turned negative ...

1/ Image Now the US still has a bit of privilege -- with a net external debt position of 45% of GDP (depends a bit on bond market valuation) and a negative net equity position, the income balance should be negative ... the world owns more US assets than the US owns global assets

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Dec 17 7 tweets 3 min read
Documentation that China's 2024 export growth has wildly exceeded global trade growth -- with important consequences for the global economy.

A joint blog with @Mike_Weilandt

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cfr.org/blog/chinas-st… As in the pandemic (and for that matter some periods in 2012 and 2013, and most of the period before the global financial crisis) Chinese export growth is far in excess of global trade growth, and thus the export growth of other large economies

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Dec 16 7 tweets 3 min read
The proxies for Chinese intervention for November are out -- and they tell a somewhat surprising story.

China didn't have to sell much fx to keep the CNY stable after the election of Donald J. Trump.

1/ Image The Chinese state banks were buying fx (limiting appreciation) earlier this fall (during the carry unwind), and they stopped buying in November -- but there is no real evidence of selling (I expected modest sales)

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Dec 13 18 tweets 5 min read
This comment explains perfectly why it is important for the IMF to get China's "true" current account surplus right.

The reported surplus is only 1.5% of GDP (even with the high reading for q3). But that low surplus is a function of the methodology China adopted in 22

1/ China's customs surplus is ~ $1 trillion, or 5-6% of China's GDP. It runs a services deficit of a bit more than 1 % of GDP. But given its massive reserves/ state bank foreign assets (~$6 trillion) it should be running a surplus in investment income too ...

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Dec 13 20 tweets 4 min read
The "Money Talks" podcast of the Economist focused on Argentina this week, and I was part of the conversation.

I focused on reserves & the BoP -- so I hope I provided some balance to discussion.

Milei and his team still have work to do

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economist.com/podcasts/2024/… There is no doubt that Milei and co delivered an enormous (5 pp of GDP, no fudging ... ) fiscal adjustment, and that more or less crushed domestic demand (down close to 10 pp of GDP from its peak) & helped reduce inflation

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Dec 12 9 tweets 3 min read
A few comments on the Treasury market based on the latest Fed flow of funds data.

To start, Treasury coupon issuance has increased relative to the fiscal deficit, and now covers about 2/3rds of the deficit ...

1/ Image Net note (coupon) issuance was about 4% of GDP, and if you add in the increase in privately held marketable Treasuries from the Fed's balance sheet contraction, the net "supply" of notes to market mapped to the fiscal deficit

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Dec 12 10 tweets 4 min read
I am leery of relying on a stable nominal exchange rate and strong real exchange rate to drive disinflation; in many emerging economies it creates externa debt problems.

But for now, Turkey is pulling it off --

1/x Image Turkey's balance of payments is currently, well, pretty healthy -- as the chart above shows, the current account deficit is falling and for now is fully funded by (admittedly expensive for Turkey) lira inflows.

And reserves have been rebuilt

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Dec 10 6 tweets 2 min read
Set aside the tariff threat for a moment. The common view that China needs a depreciation (a view shared by the IMF this summer as well as zero hedge) with a $1 trillion customs surplus and 12% y/y export volume growth is somewhat strange ...

1/ Image Chinese exports have been on fire (rising at 12% or more in volume terms ... ) while import growth has decelerated (suggesting a weak domestic economy)

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Dec 8 12 tweets 4 min read
China, cars, capacity and the possibility that China could come to dominate a new sector of the global economy ...

A new blog

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cfr.org/blog/will-chin… The blog is a bit of a documentary -- it pulls together charts that I have put on twitter but not more formally, and links to many of the articles that have shaped my own thinking on the sources of China's export success

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Dec 6 7 tweets 2 min read
The stunning thing about this chart from the FT's Big Read on Chinese manufacturing dominance?

It predates China's emergence as an auto exporter (started in 21), the huge pandemic surge in China's exports and the 12% or so increase in China's export volumes in 24 ...

1/ Image This is one of the most important charts for summarizing the global economy -- after 2020, Chinese export volume growth has consistently outpaced its reported import volume growth (and overall global trade)

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Dec 4 12 tweets 2 min read
President elect Trump promised (in his 20 points platform) to preserve the dollar as the world's reserve currency ...

However the biggest threat to the dollar's current global role (I don't like the "reserve" currency framing for a host of reasons) is likely to be Mr. Trump

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To start, the dollar's current global role is not under any real threat (despite some of the zero hedgy type arguments). Folks still want to denominate their savings in dollars, and an awful lot of global trade that doesn't touch the US is still invoiced in dollars.

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Dec 3 11 tweets 3 min read
As @Lingling_Wei highlighted today, China will soon have to decide whether or not it wants the yuan to weaken ahead of Trump's inauguration/ any actual change in US tariffs.

1/ Image A central issue for China is that the yuan is currently at a quite weak level -- basically it is at its post 2008 lows -- prior to Trump's arrival in office. Any further move takes it into more or less uncharted territory.

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Dec 2 14 tweets 5 min read
China's current account surplus jumped from $50b (about 1% of GDP) in q2 to around $150b (about 3% of GDP) in q3.

The funny thing is that neither China's customs surplus or its services deficit changed at all between q2 and q3.

A new blog

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cfr.org/blog/why-did-c… This particular blog is both wonky & a bit speculative, as I suggest that the otherwise inexplicable increase in China's surplus could be linked to a desire by SAFE to limit reported errors ...

to be clear, that is just a theory -- there is no proof, as the blog makes clear

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Nov 30 9 tweets 2 min read
Curious how former President elect Trump ever became convinced that the nowhere close to happening BRICs currency was a threat to the dollar ...

It isn't a good look, as it indirectly elevates the stature of a non-threat and suggests a lack of confidence in the dollar

1/x Image My personal view is that trying to coerce countries into using the dollar (which they voluntarily do now, apart from those facing serious sanctions) is actually a long-run threat to the dollar's global role. It makes the use of the dollar appear to be a favor to the US ...

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Nov 29 5 tweets 2 min read
A lot of great reporting in the FT's Big Read on Elon Musk and China, including confirmation that Tesla Shanghai's supply chain is basically all Chinese (Tesla reportedly had "localization" targets in return for various financial incentives)

1/ Image Tesla also got financing at the "SoE" rate from the state banks ...

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Nov 25 8 tweets 2 min read
. @Shahinvallee has an interesting piece in the FT tossing around the notion the Scott Bessant (Trump's choice for Treasury Secretary) might be interesting a deal with China centered around CNY appreciation.

A few additional thoughts



1/x ft.com/content/cf6fde…Image First, such a deal is possible only because China's does in fact manage its currency -- so I would view it as a less of a step toward "flexibility" and more of a recognition of the reality of ongoing management.

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Nov 22 4 tweets 1 min read
Happy to see that the impact of Ireland on the US corporate tax base is slowly becoming a point of general consensus -- Image Apple's decision to put on a Green Jersey back in 2014 (and have its Irish unit purchase its Jersey unit to get a big depreciation allowance) set a precedent that many companies followed when the so called double Irish was phased out ...

wsj.com/world/europe/t…
Nov 19 7 tweets 3 min read
Yesterday's TIC data showed a nice jump in China's broad holdings of US assets in September -- assuming, of course, that China still uses Euroclear's custodial facility in Belgium

1/ Image One part of the TIC data requires no interpretation -- China's holdings of short-dated US paper and US bank deposits are up

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Nov 15 6 tweets 2 min read
Excellent Paul Krugman column on China

Here is the most important bit Image I obviously agree with this point

nytimes.com/2024/11/14/opi…Image
Nov 10 6 tweets 2 min read
Not all trade stories should be viewed through a Trump lens -- Chinese steel exports (in tons) are at record levels, and they aren't going to the US.

1/x Image What's more, China's investment in new steel capacity -- which did fall from 2014 to 2017 -- has stayed near its 2021 highs even with the collapse in real estate demand

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Nov 6 9 tweets 2 min read
A new Trump administration will have to figure out how it balances its broader policy agenda with its undeniable desire for balance in trade.

1/x A strong domestic economy will naturally pull in imports, the currently strong US dollar is already weighing on exports -- even without new tax cuts the trade deficit is set to continue to widen

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