CFR senior fellow. Views are my own. Retweets are not endorsements. Writes on sovereign debt and capital flows.
The low level of US fiscal deficit prior to the global crisis + the small stock of Treasury debt prior to the crisis, especially relative to reserves, are 2 things that many have forgotten; constantly surprised by folks who think US fiscal was an pre crisis issue
The IMF doesn't find that "micro" industrial policy has a big impact on global imbalances, only economy wide "macro-industrial policies" 
Going into the current conflict, the Saudis were borrowing $100b a year from the rest of the world (that's a form of reverse petrodollars so to speak)
I think I know why nominal exports look so strong -- 
That was true in q4 -- most of China's foreign bond purchases are done by the banks, so there was $170b or so outflow via the banks in q4 alone. That is about 2/3rds of China's reported q4 current account surplus
B) Most oil exporters are in deficit or run only modest surpluses with oil in the 60s or 70s. That importantly includes Saudi Arabia, which now has a BoP break even in the 90s
At $60-70 a barrel, the oil exporters just weren't generating large surpluses --
Over the last 12ms of data, settlement (my preferred intervention measure) shows purchases of $500-600b ... or more than enough to trigger the Treasury "manipulation" thresholds
And also an unusually large surplus in East Asia.
And there is of course a capital flows story -- as the TWD depreciated in q4 in the face of this massive surplus (2x its level in 24), and Taiwan technically sold reserves too!
It is clear from the Senate report on the legislation that the authors were concerned about trade and payments surplus countries (Germany and Japan at the time) & the equitable sharing of balance of payments adjustment responsibilities across surplus and deficit countries
What's more, the slightly faster pace of appreciation v the dollar only drives an appreciation in the inflation adjusted CNY if the dollar itself isn't depreciating v other currencies, and if the pace of appreciation is bigger than the inflation differential
Seems like the median outcome for the US is that the efforts of Biden (CHIPS act) and Trump ("deals" negotiated with the threat of semiconductor tariffs) will just keep the US share of global chip production stable. 
A statement from the heart --
Obviously, this is because Germany's once substantial exports of autos, aircraft and machinery to China have plummeted. Those sectors used to generate a substantial surplus for Germany -- but not any more
One meaning of a balance of payments deficit is a current account deficit in excess of financial inflows, and thus a draw on reserves -- something that happens in emerging economies, but not generally in advanced economies with floating exchange rates.