Medicaid is only one of the glaring omissions in this @washingtonpost article.
The other is a misleading portrait of a "struggling rural hospital." It is simply incorrect to present this hospital (Poplar Bluff) as an example of the challenges facing rural facilities.
Start with a reality check on hospital closures. In recent years, we've seen 15-25 hospitals close each year (18 in 2017, 15 in 2018), and 5 - 15 new hospitals open each year.
Which is to say, the number of American hospitals declines, on net, by about 0.2 - 0.3% each year.
It is debatable whether rural areas actually see a disproportionate share of those closures. In 2017, for example, rural counties hosted 48% of the general acute care hospitals in the U.S. and saw 44% of the closures (8 out of 18).
**To be fair, none of the five new hospitals opened in rural areas in 2017, and of course there is a big difference between a community that goes from 1 hospital to zero, and a city going from, say, 5 hospitals to 4.
So, @elisaslow's point of departure here is flawed.
Regardless, it is entirely misleading to suggest that Poplar Bluff exemplifies a rural facility "on the brink of insolvency...[fighting] to squeeze whatever money they’re owed from patients who don’t have it."
Let's dig in...
First, Poplar Bluff Regional Medical Center is not small, not under any unusual financial pressure, and the facility is quite profitable.
To be precise, Poplar is a ~220 bed facility with ~60% occupancy. Average across the U.S. is closer to 150 beds and 45-50% occupancy.
And, on the hospital's own data,* Polar enjoys a very healthy 13.8% operating profit margin on >$200M in revenue. A typical 200-250 bed for-profit hospital runs at an 8-9% operating margin.
*See HCRIS, as compiled by RAND.
Second, Poplar is part of Community Health Systems, a for-profit chain with some of the highest prices in the country.
Considering both inpatient & outpatient, CHS charges private patients 305% of Medicare, which is nosebleed territory. Nationwide, that beats all but 9 chains.
Now, this gets really interesting when you consider that Poplar itself states that it enjoys a 4% profit margin on Medicare patients.
Take that in... We serve 70 yr-olds profitably at $100, but we charge 50-year olds $300. And then take them to court if they don't pay in full.
Finally, while there is clearly no need for Poplar/CHS to "squeeze whatever money they're owed from patients who don't have it," it is also unlikely that these lawsuits will even have a material impact on CHS financials, where only ~1% of revenue comes from patients themselves.
To be sure, rural residents often struggle to access high quality care. But we are not going to understand those problems by focusing on the travails of a large, highly profitable hospital w/ monopoly pricing power, which has decided to sue its own patients for no good reason. /n
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The prospectus draws some parallels to Oak & Agilon, but I read it more as a look under the hood of a traditional fee-for-service business, with a bit of (apparently successful) VBC layered on top. 1/n
Privia dates to 2007, but the real push started in 2014, with a $400M investment round led by a Goldman Sachs vehicle (Brighton Health) and Pamplona Capital. They've since expanded to 6 states and rolled up >2,500 "providers."*
*Defined in S-1 to incl MDs, DOs, NPs & PAs.
Structurally, Privia owns some medical groups outright, where that is allowed under state law, and operates as a management services organization (MSO) in others, collecting admin fees and (it seems) operating some ACO vehicles in which those affiliated groups participate.
A follow-up thread on the Medicare Advantage analysis in the March MedPAC rerport.
There's a lot here which should be useful and interesting to those tracking the wave of MA-focused IPOs and SPACs (Agilon, Oak, Cano, Clover, Alignment, etc).
MedPAC's headline chart is a reminder that MA is so attractive and profitable (in part) because CMS pays private plans more for each member than it would cost to cover the same person under traditional Medicare.
Not an ideal outcome for taxpayers.
That markup fell sharply after the ACA's reforms, but has since ticked back up.
And, at the same time (and probably not by coincidence), insurers have piled into this market. The median enrollee can now choose among 30+ plans, from 7-8 different companies.
A low-profile healthcare IPO on Thursday (@InnovAge) probably deserves a bit more attention, both as a case study in value-based care and given recent research on private equity investment in nursing homes.
Headline: $3.2B market cap, for just 6,600 patients under mgmt. 🧐
1/n
InnovAge is a PACE program, a form of capitated care for frail, elderly patients w/ extensive needs. PACE grew out of care models pioneered in San Francisco in the 1970s, and became a CMS program in 1986, but remains a niche model, with just ~55K enrollees nationwide.
In the late '90s, legislation opened PACE to for-profit players, pending a review of quality & access
In 2015, HHS delivered a rather “lightly powered” study (seemingly of just one for-profit operator in PA), found no significant differences, and…voila.
Interesting batch of data from Cano Health this morning, for those following the risk-bearing provider segment (or Medicare Advantage in general).
>110K patients under management, with a clear focus on the Hispanic population. And (twist!), the company is highly profitable.
Cano might be the clearest example I've seen of a large risk-bearing provider focused on a specific demographic group: elderly Hispanic patients.
In practice, that means that, per Cano, 80% of patients *and staff* come from minority groups, and 85% of employees are bilingual.
That focus fits pretty nicely in the MA segment, and it clearly tracks with their geographic expansion from a Florida base to Texas, Nevada, California and Puerto Rico. All very large MA markets.
MA penetration in PR exceeds 70%, which dwarfs the 40-45% in FL, CA etc.