There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
(thread)
1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
3/x
E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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I might quibble with a couple of Adam's points, just as he sometimes pushes back on a few of my arguments
But Adam gets the big picture right, unlike the IMF --
What's radically new is the scale of the surplus in manufacturirng Asia/ China
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That's true in dollar terms, that is also true as a share of WGDP (the Asian surplus is 2x its level in the pre-Plaza 80s, and 2x its level before the GFC -- when imbalances were more disbursed and the oil surplus was bigger)
Taiwan's willingness to do absolutely anything and everything to keep the chip boom from putting pressure on the wildly undervalued Taiwan dollar is unw=matched ...
1/
the preference for a structurally undervalued currency is very deeply entrenched. Why should Taiwanese companies pay dividends in local currency -- best to keep the chip windfall all offshore ...
And why do Taiwan's lifers -- who hold foreign bonds against TWD policies -- need to hedge if that just creates unwanted pressure on the currency to appreciation ...
Interesting WSJ story about the Emirates request for a swap line --
the UAE hasn't reported its end March reserves but it went into the conflict with tons of reserves and no shortage of liquid bills in US custodians
1/
Given the central bank's ample apparent liquidity, the immense assets of Abu Dhabi's sovereign funds and the UAE/ Abu Dhabi's clear ability to borrow dollars, I am not sure there is a realistic prospect that the UAE will ever run short of dollars
2/
But the fact that they have asked is interesting -- and they clearly think the threat of using yuan is a way to get the attention of the United States (my sense is that the Trump Administration is a bit too concerned about this ... )
Fx settlement is in my view the single best proxy for China's true intervention. It looks like China, Inc bought about $35b in fx in March even with all the turmoil in the oil market. That's down from the (crazy) $100b in purchases in Dec/ Jan but still big
1/
The magnitude of the purchases over the last 12ms of data $460b spot, $580b including forwards creates the basis for a Treasury finding of manipulation if it so desired --
2/
The Treasury would have to look to a period other the calendar 2025 in the April report -- but if it decided to base its determination of activity in h2 2025 (and q1 2026) the scale of intervention (measured by fx settlement) clears the existing threshholds
"The country’s protracted property slump and weak social safety net have curbed consumer spending, resulting in zero inflation last year and an increasing reliance on external demand to prop up growth."
Joe Gagnon (@GagnonMacro) should take a victory lap; the IMF has conceded intervention does have a real impact --
"A growing empirical literature finds that such intervention can systematically generate real exchange rate depreciation and raise current account balances"
1/
I also take a bit of satisfaction in this conclusion; it explains why I have been systematically tracking official asset accumulation for close to 20 years!
2/
The next step is for the IMF to rethink how intervention & official asset accumulation enters into its current account model. The current variable only uses formal central bank intervention & interacts it "optimal" v realized capital controls. So it has no practical impact
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