There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
(thread)
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The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
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The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
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I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
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The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
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and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
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p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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The IMF needs to take a serious look at its methodology for forecasting the current account balance in key countries -- the current approach is yielding somewhat absurd outcomes that forecast real problems (notably China's surplus) away
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The WEO forecast for China's 2025 surplus is 3.3% of GDP (the h1 surplus) so an upward adjustment from the absurd $370b surplus in the ESR. That surplus is forecast to fall to 2.8% of GDP in 26, and then down to 2% of GDP in 2020. No problem here worth global concern ...
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The basis for the forecast seems to be Chinese policies that now support domestic demand ..
"China and Germany have recently announced and expanded spending measures to boost domestic demand, which will lower net savings and reduce external surpluses"
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Building out capacity (including refining capacity) for rare earths/ other critical minerals should indeed by a real priority now, and the risk of weaponization of this this and other supply chains should have been taken more seriously in the past. But it won't be easy
Just as an example of how far the political debate has come -- Bob Lighthizer (no China dove) excluded rare earths and permanent magnets from the 301 tariffs back in 18 and 19 ...
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Pharmaceuticals from China too (why raise the price of meds ... )
For rare earths and magnets there was essentially no US supply, so the tariffs just raised costs (absent a plant o build out capacity over time)
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China -- per the excellent reporting on the WSJ/ @Lingling_Wei -- appears to be pursuing a strategy of applying maximum pressure in pursuit of maximum concessions ... full tariff rollback, rollback of export controls, relaxation of nat'l security review on Chinese investment
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China though may have miscalculated -- Trump's "Truth" suggested real frustration. Betting on an even bigger (and more publicly visible TACO) has its own risks
China really has put its full economic toolkit on the table -- using its control of grain and oil seed imports (COFCO) to zero out orders for beans (having a bit of a stockpile helps), and rolling out an extraordinary set of export controls ...
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There are rumors -- based on material reported in the Argentine press -- that suggest the US lifeline to Argentina will be funded using Special Drawing Right certificates, and that the BCRA will on lend some funds to the MoF to do bond buybacks ...
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The logic of using the SDRs (The Treasury technically borrows dollars from the Fed using SDR certificates as collateral) is simple: the ESF has $173b of SDRs, and only ~ $23b of dollars ...
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So if the US is thinking that the $20b may not be enough (and if it is financing bond buybacks as well as a peso defense it may not be enough ... ) using SDRs opens a path to an even bigger program
The real story isn't that Kenya is saving ~ 200m in debt service costs by restructuring into CNY --
It is that China has already gotten $1.5 b of the principal on the original railway loan back
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It is well known in sovereign debt circles (but not among the foreign policy world) that the amortization structures on Chinese policy bank loans are super steep, and that China has taken big $$$ off the table between 22 and 25 ...
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I am working on a piece on Ecuador that will show that IMF support (and a bond restructuring) effectively allowed Exim and CDB to dramatically reduce their exposure ...
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Argentina's governemtn has two pools of fx assets. The Treasury fx account -- which can be sold "inside" the band agreed with the IMF, and the BCRA's fx. The Treasury account is close to being empty
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The Treasury bought ~$2b in fx from the ag exporters when the ag export tax was dropped (irritating US farmers) ... but that pool of funds is about gone. The BCRA also has a bit of cash but that can only be sold at the edge of the band
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The BCRA's actual cash position is much lower than its reported fx reserves b/c $13b of the reported reserves is from the PBOC swap, & that cannot really be used (open question as to whether it should be counted toward gross reserves as it isn't really available to the GoA)
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