There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
(thread)
1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
3/x
E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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US imports are on track to be up modestly for the year
(with strong electronics imports driven by the AI boom and the tariff exclusion for chips offsetting weakness in vehicle trade)
2/
Set aside the craziness in pharmaceuticals and gold -- which drove enormous volatility in the reported trade balance in both q1 and q2 -- and the monthly trade data looks surprisingly normal
Probably time for China to try a different strategy
The IMF article IV is due this fall. Shouldn't the IMF be recommending that the central government use its obvious fiscal space to directly support household spending?
1/
The FT stated the obvious "Beijing has relied on exports in recent years to meet its ambitious annual growth targets" - the IMF should too ...
The IMF staff, in an excellent 2023 working paper, found that the central government doesn't really have any net debt (unlike some of the more indebted local governments). Time for the IMF to start reflecting those findings in its policy advice ...
A chart that I always find interesting -- global reserves v Treasury notes and bonds (reserve managers generally don't buy bills) as a share of US GDP
Period between 03 and 08 notable for reserve growth w-o // increase in supply of US classic reserve assets
1/
Always striking to me that there is a lot more talk about the dollar as a reserve currency now, when the impact of reserve holdings on markets is waning, than there was talk of the market impact massive reserve growth back when it was happening
2/
A similar chart for the euro area -- there haven't been enough euro area securities to meet all global reserve demand since 2006!
Not a fan of most of the Miran paper (and the Treasury restructuring proposals), but also not a fan of Employ America's claim that dollar strength doesn't impact the US manufacturing sector
This argument in particular has two particular problems --
a) it ignores lags, and treats 02 to 08 as one period of dollar weakness
b) it doesn't look at petrol and non-petrol trade
2/
In reality, dollar strength impacts trade flows with long lags (8 to 12qs on exports is standard), so the dollar's exceptional strength in 2000 and 01 and still relatively strong levels in 02 and 03 were weighing on exports for some time (see graph)
Set aside politics for a moment (which no one in Argentina ever does) and focus on the numbers. Milei's core problem is that fiscal adjustment hasn't generated balance of payments adjustment. Net out IMF lending and Argentina has been burning through its reserves
1/
and set aside funds borrowed from the IMF and SDR conversion -- even so Argentina's net fx reserves are flat (data through July). And ~ half of that fx more or less is CNY from the PBOC swap line which isn't freely convertible into USD ...
2/
A strong harvest (plus Chinese buying as China isn't buying from the US) actually brought the current account deficit down this summer -- but those inflows aren't expected to last, and the real problem is that there is once again a deficit ...
Some additional detail on China's trade surplus, which is up about $400b since the IMF (in)famously declared imbalances were receding back in the summer of 2024 ...
1/many
First things first -- don't obsess too much about the slowdown in exports relative to July. That is mostly a base effect. Exports in dollar terms have been pretty constant the last few months, at levels (in USD terms) a bit higher than last year
2/
The interesting stuff is all under the hood - the relentless rise in exports to Europe even as China's imports of European goods are weak for example ...