There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
(thread)
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The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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The explanation for Taiwan's exceptionally weak currency (on the big Mac index & pretty much any other indicator) is Taiwan's central bank "as Taiwan has exported its way to prosperity, the CBC has tried to avoid such a fate by suppressing the value of the local currency"
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And China's net auto exports far exceed the 1.3 m cars Germany exported on net in 24 ...
Michael Dunne and others put China's production capacity at ~ 50m cars. EV production capacity by the end of the year should approach 25m cars, so the right answer depends on how much ICE capacity has been retired. Huge v the 25m internal market and 30+ m in current output
The old exportweltmeister has been dethroned -- and its economy is suffering at the hand of the new exportweltmeister (China).
That is the story told by both a new ECB paper and the FT in an excellent new piece
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Put simply, Germany is the most exposed large G-7 economy to the second China shock (Japan has been buffered by an incredibly weak yen).
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The impact of the second China shock is in all the relevant data sets -- & it reflects a clear Chinese policy choice: “As a country, the Chinese have been in the last years much better, more proactive, more consistent in going after the big technologies and conquering them”
3/
Germany needs to fully wake up (it is happening but too slowly)
China's auto export growth did not slow in October.
825K vehicle exports (an annualized pace of close to 10m), likely over 700K passenger car exports (8.5m annualized). Crazy numbers
1/
Overall export growth slowed in October, but auto exports were surprisingly strong (2024 forecasts that China's export book was set to fizzle out haven't been born out, export growth actually reaccelerated)
The vehicle surplus now exceeds $100b
2/
The acceleration in exports is clearest in volume terms, but it shows in dollar terms as well -- and imports are being pushed out of the Chinese market (auto imports are now less than 2% of Chinese domestic sales ... )
The first relatively weak Chinese trade data release in a while -- October is usually down v September, but y/y growth in exports and imports also stalled. If October is a leading indicator for q4, the goods surplus will stabilize at (gulp) around $1.2 trillion
1/
There is a standard seasonal fall in export in October tied to the mid-autumn festival -- and that dip may be a bit pronounced this October. But y/y volume growth looks close to flat (after a surprisingly strong 11-12% increase in Sept)
2/
Averaging the monthly data (October is an estimate) would suggest export volumes are growing ~ 5% -- still faster than global trade, but a deceleration from most of 2024 and the first part of 2025
Somehow, the US has ended up with a tariff structure for many goods that doesn't really encourage a shift in production out of China. Quote is from Sean Stein of the US-China Business Council, in a new piece from @AnaSwanson
To be sure, the legacy 25% 301 tariff on lists 1-3 does discourage final assembly of those goods in China -- but the term 2 tariffs haven't added to that penalty ...
The bulk of current US imports from China have a 301 tariff of either 7.5% (many household/ consumer goods) or zero (electronics) and now face a 20% tariff (10 reciprocal, 10 fentanyl) -- which isn't much different from the 19 or 20% tariff on SE Asia.
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