There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
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The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
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The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
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I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
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The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
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and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
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p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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"This economic logic is flawed—China is suffering a property bust similar to Japan’s all on its own, without Plaza-like constraints"
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Despite the protests from the Global Times and its echo chamber on this and other sites, I am a bit more optimistic about the possibility that China may agree to allow the CNY to appreciate than the Economist
China won't agree to a "Plaza" deal (any deal will certainly have a different name) but it has allowed its currency to appreciate in the past. The CNY depreciation from 01 to 06 was a big reason for the first China shock & its 07 to 13 appreciation a big part of the solution
Adam Tooze has highlighted work from the CF40 that attributes the shift in China's trade balance with Germany entirely to autos. Using the Chinese data I get a different result (autos are big, but only ~ 1/3 the change)
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The detailed data shows that most of China's surplus categories (let by electronics -- a broad category that includes phones and car batteries and chips) are growing, while most of Germany's surplus categories are shrinking. Machinery flipped into a deficit last year
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For the EU as a whole, autos are a bit more than a third of the swing (Germany imports relatively few autos from China, so for Germany it is mostly an export swing) and transportation equipment is about half the swing
The first error is that it is an unreasonable ask from uncompetitive economies. That uncompetitiveness is a function in part of price, and China is the one actively intervening in the market to hold the yuan down. the settlement numbers should this clearly
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nominal and real appreciation was also part of the solution to the first China shock -- if China doesn't want a negotiated deal, fine ... the PBoC already knows how to manage the yuan stronger on its own and China doesn't need big surpluses to generate fx reserves these days
Trade diplomats the world over tend not to be the best macroeconomist --
"It [Chinese state media] said Chinese companies were no longer as concerned about the European market because they now had options such as south-east Asia or the Middle East."
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As the FT notes, China's surplus with SE Asia is a derivative of US tariffs/ low cost assembly of components in SE Asia ... basically it is a reflection of US demand
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in the Chinese data, the US, ASEAN and the EU general bilateral surpluses equal to about three quarters of China's global surplus (with some Asian netting of HK)
-- So the real statement is that the US market is still an alternative to the EU market right now
The jump in China's surplus since the start of 2024 is actually understated in dollar terms -- as Chinese export prices have fallen/ volume metrics show a bigger rise. But there has been a huge shift since 2018
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I do think I was among the first to talk of a second China shock -- I was among the first to notice the acceleration in China's auto exports, and I also observed that the rise in China's surplus in manufacturing after 19 was as big as the rise after WTO accession
I gather that in the eyes of some of the leader writers at the Economist the collapse of German exports to China (down a pp of German GDP led by autos) doesn't have anything to do with today's announced layoffs at VW ...
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It is quite clear in the data that Europe's auto exports to China tanked over the course of 2024 and 2025, and imports from China soared in 25 ...
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and that, combined with competition with China in third party markets across a range of manufactured goods, is an important reason why euro area export growth has stalled