There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
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1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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You can sort of see why folks talk about a China shock -
Very clear swing in Europe's trade balance in autos, engines and batteries with China
The first inflection point isn't the pandemic but rather the summer of 21, the second is in 2024 ...
1/
The swing in bilateral trade in autos, engines and batteries is almost 0.4 pp of EU GDP on its own
Gavekal argues that Europe's trade has held up well if China is excluded. That's one big exclusion!
The auto, engines and batteries balance ex China has also turned down
2/
The euro value of EU auto exports globally has also been held up by the increase in auto prices (proxied by the rise in export proceeds per kilo of vehicle exports here)
Chinese domestic auto sales remained weak in June. EV sales are now right at 12m cars (over the last 12ms). ICE sales have dipped below 10m
1/
22m in domestic sales and ~ 55m in capacity.
Michael Dunne
"this year China has capacity to build about 55 million cars. Their domestic demand is 25 million. They’ll export another 10 million that leaves 15 to 20 million in excess capacity idle"
Sometimes you just have to admire how strange the world can be -- Korea's May current account surplus was over $38 billion or $450 billion annualized
Absolutely massive number, the trailing 12m sum hasn't yet caught up
1/
What's more, the massive surplus was offset by massive equity outflows. Primarily foreigners selling Korean equities (presumably to avoid concentration limits ...)
2/
I never expected this kind of surplus (Korea and Taiwan are on a trajectory where they could post a surplus the size of China's reported surplus, i.e ~ $700b, this year) could be balanced by equally large net equity flows --
Happy to review the evidence that some of China's exchange rate management results in change to the balance sheet of the state financial sector -- not just changes to the PBOC's formal reserves.
The most important evidence is that fx settlement -- which historically has been an intervention variable (and purchases and sales still correlate with how spot trades inside the band) is no longer showing up on the PBOC's balance sheet (Black and red lines have diverged)
2/
We can debate where that FX is being warehoused - the PBOC doesn't tell us. But in the past it has been moved to both the SCBs and the policy banks. Swaps moved lots of fx over to the state commercial banks before the GFC, and entrusted loans ($95b of which were converted to equity) funded the policy banks
3/
The most important thing to know about the international financial system right now is that the dollar's share of a global equity market index is higher than the dollar's share of official fx reserves
One manifestation of the "profit dollar" and a global financial system built around the hope that US will deliver exceptional returns (not safety or necessarily liquidity): an unusual share of the US external deficit has been funded by return seeking flows
2/
state asset accumulation hasn't disappeared -- I estimate $600b in flows from reserve managers/ Chinese state banks and global SWFs into dollar assets.
But most of the flow is into institutions that seek return not just safety and liquidity
"This economic logic is flawed—China is suffering a property bust similar to Japan’s all on its own, without Plaza-like constraints"
1/
Despite the protests from the Global Times and its echo chamber on this and other sites, I am a bit more optimistic about the possibility that China may agree to allow the CNY to appreciate than the Economist
China won't agree to a "Plaza" deal (any deal will certainly have a different name) but it has allowed its currency to appreciate in the past. The CNY depreciation from 01 to 06 was a big reason for the first China shock & its 07 to 13 appreciation a big part of the solution