Brad Setser Profile picture
Aug 22, 2019 9 tweets 3 min read Read on X
There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.

It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.

(thread)

1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.

(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)

2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.

(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)

3/x
E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs

4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens

(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)

5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.

Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)

6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...

7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...

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More from @Brad_Setser

May 11
China's auto sector is a near-perfect metaphor for China's economy -- domestic demand is down, quite significantly. But exports are on a rocket ship up -- vehicle exports should come close to reaching 12m this year, car exports 10-11m

1/ Image
Domestic demand for both ICEs and EVs is now shrinking -- and 22m cars, it falls well short of absorbing China's massive auto capacity (widely estimated to be over 50m)

2/ Image
The annual increase in exports (change in 12m rolling sum) is now ~ 2.5m cars. & with import volumes falling, net exports are up even more ...

For scale, peak German net exports were ~ 2m cars. A year. China's growth tops peak German net exports.

3/ Image
Read 4 tweets
May 7
Hauge to me and Pettis: "Don't hide behind the language of "imbalances." If you think China is a competitive threat and that wealthy nations should actively use industrial policy to keep it at bay, say so"

I object to the idea that arguing about imbalances is hiding ...
China's imports have grown in volume terms at an annual rate of ~ 1% over the last 5 years. China's exports have grown at a faster rare that world trade. that is a real imbalance, not a fake one ...
China's savings rate is exceptionally high (comparable to Norway which saves its oil and gas proceeds as a matter of policy and Singapore which hides its investment returns from its citizens and the budget) and China's consumption to GDP ratio is incredibly low
Read 9 tweets
May 6
Glenn's arrogance is incredible given his long history of clinging stubbornly to inaccurate arguments (no overcapacity in China's exports, China doesn't "really" have a trade surplus, SAFE produces accurate BoP that no one outside China should challenge ....)

1/
Glenn's comment to competence ratio is high -- for various reasons he recycles old work continuously and presents it as new insight (he doesn't seem willing to spring for a real data feed). seems clear domestic margins in China came under pressure in q1. Ask BYD
my comment was riffing on press reporting like that of the FT, which consistently mentions the much fatter margins on exports than on domestic sales Image
Read 8 tweets
Apr 30
There has been too much talk of petrodollars.

And not enough talk of Chinese dollars

China isn't really de-dollarizing. Rather the contrary.

A new blog

1/

cfr.org/articles/china…
SAFE's quarterly data shows that 70% of the external fx assets of the Chinese state commercial banks are in dollars -- and that almost all of their net external fx assets (external assets funded domestically) are in dollars

2/ Image
I don't love the SAFE quarterly data set -- it shows more external assets and way more external liabilities than the PBOC's data set. But the numbers on external assets at least line up, and the extra external liabilities are in CNY

3/ Image
Read 8 tweets
Apr 28
Really fun story; and unlike most of the mythology aroud the petrodollar -- accurate!

1/
Dollar pricing of Saudi oil predates Kissinger or Simon -- Aramco was the Arabian American oil company, and before that the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company! Standard oil of Californian (now Chevron) has the original Saudi concession

2/
Blustein confirms that the real deal was to mask Saudi purchase of Treasuries -- the Kingdom was worried about the optics of financing the US at a time when the US was supporting Israel ... 3/

ft.com/content/a65efb…
Read 6 tweets
Apr 27
The current inability of most of the GCC countries to get oil to market is a much bigger threat to the US economy than the possibility that some GCC countries (and not just sanctioned countries) might sell some oil to China for yuan ...

1/
selling China oil for yuan also doesn't immediately crete "euroyuan" -- not if the funds are only used to buy Chinese manufactures/ held on deposit in China (as Russia and Iran have sometimes been forced to do)

2/
Brendan Greely did us all a favor by reminding us that the surge in petrodollars came when the Gulf states oil revenues surged faster than their domestic spending -- creating funds that had to be parked offshore

3/

ft.com/content/be3459…
Read 6 tweets

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