There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
(thread)
1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
3/x
E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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As I mentioned on Wednesday, there is a $3 trillion gap between China's accumulated current account surplus since the pandemic and China's unchanged reserves (and a corresponding gap in visible flows into the US)
Bank flows make up most of the difference
1/
That was true in q4 -- most of China's foreign bond purchases are done by the banks, so there was $170b or so outflow via the banks in q4 alone. That is about 2/3rds of China's reported q4 current account surplus
2/
The biggest components of that flow were outward deposits (likely funding for the global banks in dollars given the banking data) and purchases of foreign securities
Three big picture observations about the oil surplus (petrodollars/ petroeuros/ petroequities are all downstream of this) pre Hormuz
A) The oil surplus is modest relative to the surplus in Asia. Chinese state banks and offshore deposits of Chinese exporters are way bigger
1/
B) Most oil exporters are in deficit or run only modest surpluses with oil in the 60s or 70s. That importantly includes Saudi Arabia, which now has a BoP break even in the 90s
2/
C) The remaining surpluses are concentrated in Russia (tho its surplus has fallen), frugal Norway and the GCC countries with large SWFs -- who tend to invest most of their surplus in equities (Kuwait is a bit of an exception, recent bond inflows
The risk of an escalation in the Gulf seem reduced for at least a few days. So maybe there will be a bit of interest in my (somewhat novel) reevaluation of the relative contribution of Europe and China to global imbalances
Bottom line: The second China shock has eliminated Europe's imbalance -- it all migrated to the east.
Consider the contribution of net exports to Chinese growth and to German growth over the last few years ...
2/
Chinese exports have outperformed global trade. That can only happen if someone else's exports under-perform. & the big underperformance has come from Europe
Petrodollars! Nothing produces more heated discussion and, in my experience, less insight. Myths trump facts, because the actual data is a bit obscure --
But here is the most important thing to know. Before the Hormuz crisis, the flow of petrodollars had more or less dried up
1/many
At $60-70 a barrel, the oil exporters just weren't generating large surpluses --
Saudi Arabia's external deficit offset Russia's surplus, so the two biggest oil exporters (~ 15mbd of exports together) were not generating petrodollars, petroeuros or petroyuan
2/
And the GCC countries (no quarterly data for the Emirates, but its surplus is roughly the size of Qatar and Kuwait combined) no longer really stash away their oil surplus in liquid dollar reserves --
Back before the bombardment of Iran, China's currency was under considerable appreciation pressure -- the settlement data showed $70b in fx purchases by the PBOC/ SCBs ($840b annualized). A huge sum for a holiday month ...
1/
Over the last 12ms of data, settlement (my preferred intervention measure) shows purchases of $500-600b ... or more than enough to trigger the Treasury "manipulation" thresholds
2/
And for whatever reason, in both January and February a small fraction of that total (~$10b) did show up on the balance sheet of the PBOC -- so it isn't all flowing through the state banks right now (tho most of the flow is still via the state banks)
Some basic oil shock math, focusing on the impact on global trade ...
Remember that we are starting from an unusually low surplus in the fuel exporting economies ...
1/
And also an unusually large surplus in East Asia.
Core east Asia looks to (per the old BP data) import ~ 20 mbd on net, so each $10b/ barrel change in the oil price reduces East Asia goods surplus by ~ $75b
2/
a $20 a barrel shock knocks $150b off their surplus -- a manageable sum for a region that has a $1.5 trillion surplus (and rising fast on AI chip demand). 60% of that is China, and China can definitely manage ...