There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
(thread)
1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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Germany's goods and services surplus has collapsed, and its surplus is now down to 2.5% of its GDP -- about half the level of China's far larger economy
Germany unlike China does report that its accumulated surpluses have generated an investment income surplus -- and China's reported deficit by all accounts (even that of the IMF, which grades China on a very generous curve) makes no sense
2/
I have criticized Germany for overly restrictive budgeting and excess surpluses in the past -- but fiscal has changed (thanks to the defense budget) and the surplus has fallen substantially ...
3/
I wanted to highlight this chart, as it is the chart that best illustrates why the available data points to active Chinese state management of the exchange rate. it shows that there is a predictable pattern to fx settlement --
1/
When spot is at the weak edge of the 2% band defined by the PBOC's daily fix, there are predictably sales in settlement (someone is defending the band) and when spot is at the midpoint, there are predictably purchases (esp. when the fix is appreciating)
2/
That is of couse the pattern one would expect from central bank intervention (apart from buying at the mid point not the strong side of the band) -- and for 17 years settlement was basically equal to changes in the PBOC's f. assets
Handelsblatt has -- on its front page -- an article summarizing my new paper with Sander Tordoir on Germany's need to find policies to actually fight back against the second China shock
China's industrial structure -- as the ECB and others have noted -- increasingly overlaps with that of Germany ... with autos being the most obvious case.
And the China shock there won't go away on its own; Chinese auto export growth accelerated in the last 12ms
2/
The China shock is also visible in the global data -- an undervalued Chinese currency propelled Chinese exports to grow much faster than global trade. China is now big, so that meant someone else's exports had to grow more slowly than global trade ...
The net foreign asset position of China's state banks (in both dollars and RMB) is now $1.5 trillion -- a rather big sum (close to 1/2 China's formal reserves, a sum bigger than Japan's reserves ... )
1/ many
These are mostly funds that the state commercial banks have raised domestically (whether from real deposits, from "fake" deposits from SoEs helping out the PBOC, or swaps with PBOC). Total foreign assets are $1.7 trillion v $200b of external liabilities
2/
This leaves out the policy banks (CDB, Exim) and the investment banks (CICC etc) -- which is why (I assume) the BIS data shows over $3 trillion in external Chinese bank assets (v under $1 trillion in liabilities) and ~ $2.5 trillion net position
China's auto sector is a near-perfect metaphor for China's economy -- domestic demand is down, quite significantly. But exports are on a rocket ship up -- vehicle exports should come close to reaching 12m this year, car exports 10-11m
1/
Domestic demand for both ICEs and EVs is now shrinking -- and 22m cars, it falls well short of absorbing China's massive auto capacity (widely estimated to be over 50m)
2/
The annual increase in exports (change in 12m rolling sum) is now ~ 2.5m cars. & with import volumes falling, net exports are up even more ...
For scale, peak German net exports were ~ 2m cars. A year. China's growth tops peak German net exports.
Hauge to me and Pettis: "Don't hide behind the language of "imbalances." If you think China is a competitive threat and that wealthy nations should actively use industrial policy to keep it at bay, say so"
I object to the idea that arguing about imbalances is hiding ...
China's imports have grown in volume terms at an annual rate of ~ 1% over the last 5 years. China's exports have grown at a faster rare that world trade. that is a real imbalance, not a fake one ...
China's savings rate is exceptionally high (comparable to Norway which saves its oil and gas proceeds as a matter of policy and Singapore which hides its investment returns from its citizens and the budget) and China's consumption to GDP ratio is incredibly low