Brad Setser Profile picture
Aug 22, 2019 9 tweets 3 min read Read on X
There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.

It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.

(thread)

1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.

(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)

2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.

(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)

3/x
E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs

4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens

(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)

5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.

Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)

6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...

7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...

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More from @Brad_Setser

Feb 20
The Trump administration is sure to use other authorities (122 maybe, 232, 301) to raise tariffs now that the court has struck down the IEEPA tariffs.

But striking down IEEPA still matters, particularly for China/other countries that aren't heavily hit by existing 232s

1/
Consider the structure of Korea's trade with the US v that of China. Korea export a ton of autos, which are still subject to the 232 auto tariff. Its steel is still subject to the 232 tariff there. & its chip exports could potentially be targeted by the semiconductor 232. 2/
Korea thus doesn't get a huge benefit from striking down the "reciprocal"/ IEEPA tariffs. Europe and Japan (autos, pharma, specialty steel) are in somewhat similar positions -- tho of course they are thrilled to see the broad tariff rolled back. 3/
Read 11 tweets
Feb 19
The latest IMF analysis of China (The staff report/ Article IV) highlights that China's export driven growth has come at the expense of its trading partners.

That is welcome, and very necessary message

1/many Image
James Mayger and Jorgelina Do Rosario of Bloomberg reminded me that the 2024 staff report didn't mention external imbalances at all -- so there has been an important evolution in the IMF's thinking in the last couple of years

2/

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
The IMF's fiscal policy advice has also shifted. back in the summer of 2024, the Fund was pushing for the rapid initiation of a big fiscal consolidation. Not anymore

3/ Image
Read 27 tweets
Feb 16
Goldman got a bit of attention by forecasting that China's 2026 current account surplus will top 4% of GDP.

I need a better publicist! The GS forecast is still too low

1/ Image
Goldman's forecast -- which is almost certainly better than the IMF's forthcoming forecast -- isn't that bold. The customs surplus net of tourism (travel) is already 5% of GDP, and that should be a reasonable estimate of the surplus of a country with a positive NIIP!

2/ Image
In fact, China now has a position net international investment position of close to $4 trillion, and a pretty balanced FDI position (so no more compositional effects) which should translate into an income surplus of say $100b!

3/ Image
Read 12 tweets
Feb 15
My periodic reminder that the US TIC data doesn't measure China's holdings of US Treasuries. It only measures China's holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. The real question is how many Treasuries Chinese entities hold in non US custodians Image
The total offshore assets of SAFE, the CIC, the SCBs (over $1.5 trillion now) and the policy banks likely approaches $7 trillion. SAFE's securities holdings top $3 trillion & other investors hold ~ $700b in foreign securities ...
I personally don't think it is plausible that all these entities combined hold only ~ $700b of LT Treasuries. They likely have some in offshore custodians. And the anks clearly help fund the purchases of US bonds by hedge funds and other global investors -- Image
Read 4 tweets
Feb 9
Bloomberg reports that China's regulators have warned China's state banks about the risk of holding too many Treasuries --

The Chinese regulators must know something that the Treasury doesn't, as the Treasury data doesn't suggest that China has been buying any Treasuries

1/ Image
The official US data on foreign holdings doesn't show any basis for Chinese concern -- China's Treasuries in US custodianship (in theory state accounts as well as state bank accounts) are heading down not up

2/ Image
That is of course inconsistent with the warning that the regulators provided to the state banks! They seem to be warning about nothing ...

3/

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Read 10 tweets
Feb 3
The Treasury has indicated that it will look at the activities of China's state banks in its next assessment of China's currency policies--

It is hard to see how this doesn't become a bit of an issue ... unless of course summitry gets in the way of analysis 1/ Image
It is quite clear that state bank purchases (and in 23/ early 24 sales) of fx have replaced PBOC purchases and sales and the core technique China uses to manage the band around the daily fx -- i.e. settlement looks like an intervention variable

2/ Image
My latest blog looks both at how fx settlement (a measure that includes the state banks) has displaced the PBOC's own reported reserves as the best metric for Chinese intervention & lat some of SAFE's balance sheet mysteries

3/

cfr.org/articles/the-p…
Read 10 tweets

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