Brad Setser Profile picture
Aug 22, 2019 9 tweets 3 min read Read on X
There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.

It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.

(thread)

1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.

(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)

2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.

(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)

3/x
E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs

4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens

(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)

5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.

Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)

6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...

7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Brad Setser

Brad Setser Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Brad_Setser

Jan 30
Obviously overshadowed by the news about a Fed nomination, but the Treasury released its delated October 2025 FX report today and it is worth reading -- not the least b/c of a clear warning to SAFE.

1/ Image
This seems clear

"An economy that fails to publish intervention data or whose data are incomplete will not be given any benefit of the doubt in Treasury’s assessment of intervention practices."

2/

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
This report only covers the period between July 24 and June 25, so it misses the bulk of the 2025 surge in fx settlement (December = $100b plus). But this chart suggests the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques than those used in past reports --

3/ Image
Read 21 tweets
Jan 27
Can a country artificially weaken its currency by changing how it regulates its life insurance industry?

I think the answer is yes.

A new blog, one certain to increase my popularity with the Central Bank of China (Taipei)

1/

cfr.org/articles/taiwa…
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion

2/ Image
Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)

3/ Image
Read 13 tweets
Jan 26
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --

1/ Image
Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings

2/ Image
That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians

3/ Image
Read 14 tweets
Jan 23
More pressure to export?

Monthly exports of passenger cars increased from a 6m cars a year pace to 10m car a year pace over the course of 2025 ...

Project that would at exports will reach 14m cars at the end of next year! Image
14m cars would be roughly 1/4th of the global market for cars outside China (the Chinese market is ~ 25m cars) ... no way that doesn't have a disruptive impact.

China would go from 6 to 14m cars in a two year period if 2025 isn't an outlier ...

2/
Not clear that German/ European politics can caught up to the scale of China's export tsunami. And some European firms think they can profit from China's subsidies and strong local supply chain by producing in China for the European market

3/

ft.com/content/02a52b…
Read 4 tweets
Jan 23
For some reason I decided to look at the external financial of investments of the main Scandinavian countries in a bit more depth --

Big surpluses, and tend to split the outflow equally between bonds and stocks

1/ Image
For the big 3 collectively, portfolio flows map well to the current account surplus -- which is a common outcome now that there is less intermediation via the central bank. Denmark's portfolio flows tho are now a bit smaller than its accumulated surplus

2/ Image
The Danes hold about $40 billion (per the IMF's coordinated investment survey) of US bonds, and $260 billion in US equities. The teacher's pension fund played the news well -- in aggregate, it would be hard for the Danish public funds to move the US bond market

3/ Image
Read 13 tweets
Jan 20
China's premier says China wants to be a market for the world, not just a source of supply.

He might want to get get started.

China exported over 7m passenger cars in 2025, and the pace of growth accelerated at the end of the year

1/ many Image
Passenger car imports are down to half a million, and falling fast ... no market for the world there

2/ Image
As an aside the pace of China's (N)EV exports doubled over the course of 2025 -- huge, huge growth ... China is still a source of global supply there, not a source of global demand

3/ Image
Read 9 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(