There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
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1/x
The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
2/x
The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
4/x
I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
5/x
The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
6/x
and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
7/7
p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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Trade diplomats the world over tend not to be the best macroeconomist --
"It [Chinese state media] said Chinese companies were no longer as concerned about the European market because they now had options such as south-east Asia or the Middle East."
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As the FT notes, China's surplus with SE Asia is a derivative of US tariffs/ low cost assembly of components in SE Asia ... basically it is a reflection of US demand
2/
in the Chinese data, the US, ASEAN and the EU general bilateral surpluses equal to about three quarters of China's global surplus (with some Asian netting of HK)
-- So the real statement is that the US market is still an alternative to the EU market right now
The jump in China's surplus since the start of 2024 is actually understated in dollar terms -- as Chinese export prices have fallen/ volume metrics show a bigger rise. But there has been a huge shift since 2018
2/
I do think I was among the first to talk of a second China shock -- I was among the first to notice the acceleration in China's auto exports, and I also observed that the rise in China's surplus in manufacturing after 19 was as big as the rise after WTO accession
I gather that in the eyes of some of the leader writers at the Economist the collapse of German exports to China (down a pp of German GDP led by autos) doesn't have anything to do with today's announced layoffs at VW ...
1/
It is quite clear in the data that Europe's auto exports to China tanked over the course of 2024 and 2025, and imports from China soared in 25 ...
2/
and that, combined with competition with China in third party markets across a range of manufactured goods, is an important reason why euro area export growth has stalled
Ut oh. The Economist is at risk of making the mistake the IMF made in the 2025 External Sector Report and not looking through the headline current account numbers ...
1/
The Economist leader makes the mistakes I argued that the IMF makes -- thinking that the full current account presents a better picture than customs goods (when in fact the services numbers and income numbers are distorted heavily by Ireland on the European side)
And the income numbers are distorted by China's wrong way investment income deficit -- which has a big impact on the comparison with Germany (which has the expected investment income surplus)
I see that the pre global financial crisis Chinese fears about "Plaza" (meaning a negotiations that results in a coordinated currency appreciation to reduce imbalances and trade tensions) hasn't disappeared ...
Fair enough -- call a deal Shanghai accord ...
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The name doesn't really matter. And if China doesn't see value in an agreement that tries to raise the value of all the big Asian currencies together and wants to get points at home for rejecting a "plaza" and instead chooses to appreciate I certainly won't complain
2/
The notion that China cannot accept any appreciation is absurd. From the end of 2006 to the end of 2011 China's currency appreciated by ~ 20% v the dollar even with a two year pause during the global financial crisis.
3/
As @Aligarciaherrer has already observed, May's data shows ongoing domestic weakness (even increasing domestic weakness) even as China's exports continue to outperform global trade. It is an explosive combination.
The retail sales numbers speak for themselves -- tho there is a goods v services distinction, and the rolloff of some of last year's incentives for durables purchases matters.
The investment numbers also aren't good
2/
China's property market slump is now 5 years old and there is no sign that it has bottomed ... which it in and of itself remarkable. clearly time to clean up and recap the property developers, painful as that will be. on this I fully agree with the IMF