There will be a lot written about financial deglobalization when folks pour over the 2018 data. But it is a mistake to fit last year's financial deglobalization into a Trump trade driven narrative.
It is basically a function of the shift in U.S. tax policy.
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The fall in U.S. outward FDI is entirely a function of a fall in U.S. direct investment in the world's tax havens; there was not real change in the pattern of investment in other economies.
(under the old law profits reinvested abroad could defer paying US tax)
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The fall in U.S. FDI "reinvested" abroad in low havens had a host of other effects - firms building up assets in low tax jurisdictions were buying U.S. debt, inflating gross flows in both ways.
(there is actually a good fit in the BoP data here,using flows over last 4qs)
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E.g. a lot of US FDI abroad was in practice the rising "cash" of a Techco (Ireland or Bermuda) sub, and a lot of foreign demand for US debt was coming from the same Techcos (or Pharmacos) offshore subs
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I think I have found this in the BoP - the fall in cumulative FDI in a set of tax havens was mirrored by a fall in the cumulative purchases of U.S. debt of a slightly different set of tax havens
(cumulative flows = proxy for the stock" of offshore claims)
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The match here isn't "pure." The debt holdings line for example includes Russia (which moved its reserves out of the US). But other Europe is the breakdown in the US data alas. & I couldn't include the Caribbean's holdings of U.S. debt b/c that was picking up something else ...
but I don't think it is totally spurious. here is the same plot for the set of EA countries that includes Ireland.
Both US FDI in Ireland & Irish holdings of US debt have gone into reverse (the fall in FDI tho is just a fall in the cash held by the Irish subs of US firms)
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and since so much of this involved or touched a euro area country, it has similar implications for the euro area's balance of payments. FDI into the EA fell (US firms were "reinvesting" less in tax havens) and European demand for US debt fell ...
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p.s. will do a blog on this too, but likely not til after labor day ...
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I see that the pre global financial crisis Chinese fears about "Plaza" (meaning a negotiations that results in a coordinated currency appreciation to reduce imbalances and trade tensions) hasn't disappeared ...
Fair enough -- call a deal Shanghai accord ...
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The name doesn't really matter. And if China doesn't see value in an agreement that tries to raise the value of all the big Asian currencies together and wants to get points at home for rejecting a "plaza" and instead chooses to appreciate I certainly won't complain
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The notion that China cannot accept any appreciation is absurd. From the end of 2006 to the end of 2011 China's currency appreciated by ~ 20% v the dollar even with a two year pause during the global financial crisis.
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As @Aligarciaherrer has already observed, May's data shows ongoing domestic weakness (even increasing domestic weakness) even as China's exports continue to outperform global trade. It is an explosive combination.
The retail sales numbers speak for themselves -- tho there is a goods v services distinction, and the rolloff of some of last year's incentives for durables purchases matters.
The investment numbers also aren't good
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China's property market slump is now 5 years old and there is no sign that it has bottomed ... which it in and of itself remarkable. clearly time to clean up and recap the property developers, painful as that will be. on this I fully agree with the IMF
Korea's won is incredibly weak (global financial crisis or Korean BoP crisis levels ... ) even though Korea's fundamentals are sound (BoP has a massive surplus, fiscal debt is modest, etc).
Will be interesting to see if the Koreans can mount a defense this week ...
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A bit of background: Korea is experiencing a massive, positive terms of trade shock (chip prices are up so much that it has overwhelmed the rise in price of oil) and Samsung and Hynix are generating massive profits that have pushed the KOPSI way up
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Korea's fiscal position is solid too - not much government debt (thanks to a still stingy system of retirement benefits) and there will be a massive tax windfall from Samsung and Hynix. KRW weakness is all flow driven
For a few months now I have been hearing from folks close to the PBOC that the outflow from the state banks was driven by fx deposit growth, not by backdoor intervention. The blog takes that argument VERY seriously
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One is that onshore fx deposits themselves are a bit funky -- and have been for a long time. They don't move with rate differentials or any other obvious economic variable, so they could be (but I have no smoking gun proof) policy driven
The argument that China has a comparative advantage at industrial policy is a bit like the argument that the US has a comparative advantage at exporting debt. It is a good line, but even quips need a limiting principle ...
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I am not sure this week's Free Lunch column came up with that limiting principle; the notion that "the west might be better off simply leveraging the benefits of Chinese scale" suggests getting out of China's way across the board
But China has -- in Greg Ip's phrase (based on Rhodium's analysis) -- an "industrial policy for everything," which would imply that China is on track (with its comparative advantage at industrial policy) to dominate most industrial sectors
Germany's goods and services surplus has collapsed, and its surplus is now down to 2.5% of its GDP -- about half the level of China's far larger economy
Germany unlike China does report that its accumulated surpluses have generated an investment income surplus -- and China's reported deficit by all accounts (even that of the IMF, which grades China on a very generous curve) makes no sense
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I have criticized Germany for overly restrictive budgeting and excess surpluses in the past -- but fiscal has changed (thanks to the defense budget) and the surplus has fallen substantially ...
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