1/ The report cited below is flawed. It is akin to a report finding the UCP cutting spending by 50% would have a devastating effect on public services--regardless of whether that is actual policy.
In short, the report does NOT analyze actual Fed carbon policy.
2/ The report assesses the cost impact of a $50 carbon tax and assesses the competitiveness effect on energy-intensive trade-exposed industries. It mentions Fed policy includes an “output-based pricing system” to mitigate these concerns, but *excludes* it from the analysis.
3/ Report: “firms make decisions based on marginal costs whereas the OBPS rebate will be a lump-sum transfer and thus will not have much effect at the margin”.
This is wrong. Output-based allocations depend on… output! By their very nature they affect decisions at the margin.
5/ The report attempts to value the OBPS, but only in an App'x, not in the main text.
Appx B correctly includes OBAs in the marginal decision (contradicting the earlier description as lump-sum) but the analysis relies heavily on a subtle assumption: increasing marginal emissions
6/ What does this mean? As you produce more, you emit more to produce 1 more widget than the last 1. This would be true for a coal plant going from 90->100%, but not likely when going 60->70%. Also not likely true for SAGD oil sands, where scale can lower marginal emissions.
7/ The numerical analysis relies on a specific functional form of the emissions curve: E=a*Y^b. When b>1, this is increasing marginal emissions (think of a curve starting flat and bending higher). When b<1, the opposite is true: more output means decreasing marginal emissions.
8/ To make the arg against OBPS, the report uses 7 b’s that are ALL>1. In other words, the marginal emissions are always increasing.
To be fair, this is a ripe area to look at, but it’s a *very strong* assumption that ALL industries, ALL firms are increasing marginal emissions
9/ Without this assumption OBPS would dampen most of the cost increase from the carbon price, fully obviating the headline findings of this report.
Ignoring OBPS and using a skewed example does a disservice to those wanting to better understand the real effects of carbon pricing
10/ One thing I will say is the report notes many caveats:
- carbon pricing would be less costly than alternative actions
- behavioral changes in response to higher energy prices such as input substitutions, technology adoption, or production process changes are excluded
11/ Yet, sadly, these nuanced caveats don’t make it to headlines, nor the politically motivated retweets.
In sum: This report ignores the core policy to deal with competitiveness concerns, leading to conclusions that grossly exaggerate those of actual policy.
/end.
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The AB govt has issued its "Rate of Last Resort" regulations. These amend how the default rate for electricity consumers in Alberta that don't opt for a competitive (fixed or floating) rate is set.
Let's take a look at the details... 🧵 #ableg #abpower
First, what is the "RoLR"?
It replaces the "RRO" as the default rate for Albertans who don't select a competitive plan.
The big change: Rather than being set monthly, the rate will be fixed for 2 years. The idea is to provide more stability, less volatility.
The RoLR is meant to be stable, remaining fixed for 2 years, with a maximum 10% adjustment into the next 2 year period. But wait...
Second, the "fixed vs float" decision has switched.
Going forward, floating prices (based on forward RRO markets) look cheaper than current fixed offers.
And if you're on a market floating plan, i.e. not the "RRO", you'll avoid the ~3c "cap adder" for the balance of 2024.
Of course the caveats: lots can change, floating is volatile, this isn't advice, yadda yadda
I do expect low prices to lead to retirements, which should raise prices again. But if that happens, you can switch back to fixed as most retailers are slow to update their offers.
Today the AB govt announced changes to the default "Regulated Rate Option", including a name change ("Rate of Last Resort!") and moving from monthly pricing to 2-year fixed price terms.
Some initial thoughts from someone who has followed this closely for a while (me, i mean me):
First, i'll acknowledge the good intentions.
- the name has always misleading suggested stability, when it's not at all stable
- trying to create more stability to default plans is a good thing for the many Albertans who don't have the time nor interest to shop for better rates
But ... some critiques:
1. Timing
Making these changes now, especially in the name of affordability, is a little like showing up to a streetfight and telling your bloodied friend: "i've got your back!"
It's too late. The crisis has passed. The time for changes was 3 years ago.
Some thoughts on a wild night for Alberta power yesterday…
[thread]
First, @theAESO operators deserve a shout out. They managed the grid smoothly through a tense situation.
Also, HUGE shout out to the thermal fleet operators. Only 1 plant (Milner) tripped during this cold snap. That’s incredible performance given the conditions.
Second, the emergency alert looks to have triggered a 150MW response. That’s inline per capita with the 2100MW Cali got from a similar event in 2022. Well done, Albertans. This highlights the capability of demand flexibility but emergency alerts are not a sustainable solution.
For those wondering how long this might last, expect the emergency alert to continue until at least 10pm, if not later if we see another plant go offline
Milner is still struggling to get back online and wind remains very low. Also BC imports are 1/4 of yesterday’s.
Load (demand) falls from here. The only question is whether we don’t see a plant trip. There’s nothing left in the AB supply stack to call on right now and looks like reserves are being fully dispatched.