I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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Looks like Japan's Ministry of Finance is getting ready to realize some of its massive profits, selling dollars bought at 80-100 at well over 150 ... and in the process reducing Japan's debt (Japan carries its reserves on the MoF's balance sheet)
1/
Rate differentials (at least at certain tenors) are more yen supportive than in the past, which bolsters the case for intervention --
2/
Lots of reasons for yen weakness -- frozen balance sheets b/c of underwater bonds, Ueda was slow, hedging is still costly and it hasn't paid for a long time and private institutions have been rewarded for under-hedging (or not hedging)
3/
Little Belgium is in the news right now, and not entirely for the best of reasons.* But judging from the US TIC data, Belgium doesn't have much to worry about
*Belgian politics seem to have been captured by a custodian, which is a bit strange --
1/
For what it is worth, nothing much showed up in the OCtober TIC data, foreign private and foreign official holdings were more or less flat
2/
I am sympathetic to the Belgian argument that Euroclear is part of Europe's financial infrastructure, and that Euroclear specific risks should not be born by Belgium alone (even tho the Euroclear tax windfall was initially enjoyed by Belgium alone)
Since the big move in the Taiwan dollar in May, "Taiwan’s life insurers ... have cut their currency hedging to a record low" and resumed buying foreign bonds ...
Not exactly the response expected!
1/
So how could the lifers cut their hedges just after taking big losses on their unhedged positions in May?
Tis a good question ...
2/
Part of the answer is that hedges are costly, and thus the lifers would rather not have them on unless they need them ... the hedged book right now almost certainly loses money
Korean won incredibly weak right now -- at risk of overshooting fundamentals. US return exceptionalism has generated outflows, but Korea underlying financial position remains solid
1/
Korean memory chips aren't selling at the same premium as Taiwanese made GPUs, but Korea's current account surplus is huge again -- $110b plus
2/
Korean FX reserves are amply at $400b -- and they would be a lot bigger if Korea hadn't more or less decided to let the NPS accumulate a massive foreign equity portfolio
The IMF has been struggling with the apparent contradiction between the policies needed for internal balance (monetary easing, weaker currency) and external balance (a stronger currency)
2/
But the contradiction is apparent not real -- it hinges on assumption that China lacks fiscal space, and thus fiscal policy is off the table.
Hallelujah. The IMF has recognized that China's weak real exchange rate is a problem, and that it has contributed to China's export surplus and growing trade tensions. From @KeithBradsher in the NYT
1/
The IMF has lagged on this issue, not led ... and it still isn't quite calling for a nominal appreciation (though Georgieva may have hinted at the need for nominal appreciation to offset inflation differentials). The EU Chamber is more explicit (from the FT)
2/
The IMF's formal press statement attributes the Yuan's real depreciation to inflation differentials (nominal moves v the USD also played a role in 22/23)