I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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Bottom line upfront: this chart is my best guess as to China's true holdings at SAFE and the CIC (~ $ 2 trillion in US assets). The state commercial banks have additional dollar assets, but they aren't as easy to find in the US data
1/many
This is of course the set of numbers that many use -- the Treasuries (and Agencies) that are held in US custodians and register as "China" in the monthly TIC data release. Those now well under $1 trillion/ well below China's traditional allocation to safe US assets
2/
This is closer to what I think China's true allocation to relatively safe US assets is ( a bit over 40% of total reserves). SAFE and the CIC also have a risk tranche that includes US equities (it is known as they say)
You can sort of see why folks talk about a China shock -
Very clear swing in Europe's trade balance in autos, engines and batteries with China
The first inflection point isn't the pandemic but rather the summer of 21, the second is in 2024 ...
1/
The swing in bilateral trade in autos, engines and batteries is almost 0.4 pp of EU GDP on its own
Gavekal argues that Europe's trade has held up well if China is excluded. That's one big exclusion!
The auto, engines and batteries balance ex China has also turned down
2/
The euro value of EU auto exports globally has also been held up by the increase in auto prices (proxied by the rise in export proceeds per kilo of vehicle exports here)
Chinese domestic auto sales remained weak in June. EV sales are now right at 12m cars (over the last 12ms). ICE sales have dipped below 10m
1/
22m in domestic sales and ~ 55m in capacity.
Michael Dunne
"this year China has capacity to build about 55 million cars. Their domestic demand is 25 million. They’ll export another 10 million that leaves 15 to 20 million in excess capacity idle"
Sometimes you just have to admire how strange the world can be -- Korea's May current account surplus was over $38 billion or $450 billion annualized
Absolutely massive number, the trailing 12m sum hasn't yet caught up
1/
What's more, the massive surplus was offset by massive equity outflows. Primarily foreigners selling Korean equities (presumably to avoid concentration limits ...)
2/
I never expected this kind of surplus (Korea and Taiwan are on a trajectory where they could post a surplus the size of China's reported surplus, i.e ~ $700b, this year) could be balanced by equally large net equity flows --
Happy to review the evidence that some of China's exchange rate management results in change to the balance sheet of the state financial sector -- not just changes to the PBOC's formal reserves.
The most important evidence is that fx settlement -- which historically has been an intervention variable (and purchases and sales still correlate with how spot trades inside the band) is no longer showing up on the PBOC's balance sheet (Black and red lines have diverged)
2/
We can debate where that FX is being warehoused - the PBOC doesn't tell us. But in the past it has been moved to both the SCBs and the policy banks. Swaps moved lots of fx over to the state commercial banks before the GFC, and entrusted loans ($95b of which were converted to equity) funded the policy banks
3/
The most important thing to know about the international financial system right now is that the dollar's share of a global equity market index is higher than the dollar's share of official fx reserves
One manifestation of the "profit dollar" and a global financial system built around the hope that US will deliver exceptional returns (not safety or necessarily liquidity): an unusual share of the US external deficit has been funded by return seeking flows
2/
state asset accumulation hasn't disappeared -- I estimate $600b in flows from reserve managers/ Chinese state banks and global SWFs into dollar assets.
But most of the flow is into institutions that seek return not just safety and liquidity