I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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I am (obviously) a part of the "East Coast" think tank establishment Mr. Balding criticizes, & also served in the Biden Administration. But I would encourage Mr. Balding to read some of the work that I and my colleagues have done, as he paints with far too broad a brush
I would be the first to say that not enough was/ is being done on active pharmaceutical ingredients. But inside and outside of government I advocated for the 301 tariffs to be extended to rare earths/ magnets ... which was in the end done as part of the 301 review
2/
So if Mr. Balding's standard is forward progress, a bit was done there (tho not enough)
3/
The Treasury International Capital Data for September is now out -- China's Treasury holdings were constant during the data that was missed during the shutdown. Japan is up. UK and France are down a bit -- with a rise in the smaller EU custodial centers
1/
The runup in foreign holdings of Treasuries has all been "private" -- tho note that funds that China holds in private custodians in Europe register as private, so the split is imprecise
2/
The Treasuries that China holds in US custodians is clearly on a structural decline -- so estimating China's true holdings requires making a guess about China's holdings in custodians outside the US/ funds handed over to private managers
Crazy current account numbers for Taiwan in q3 -- a 20% quarterly surplus, and q4 looks like it will be bigger. That pushed the trailing 4q surplus up to 16% of GDP -- a record.
(and yet the TWD is weak, after hefty intervention in q3 changed the BoP dynamics)
1/
Taiwan's soaring surplus though hasn't translated into soaring demand for bonds in the last 4 quarters -- bond purchases picked up in q3, but no longer are on the scale needed to match the huge current account surplus
A big new report from @AidData sheds insight into one of the mysteries of global capital flows, namely how does China's large/ growing current account surplus fund the US external deficit. The answer, in part, is lending by the state banks
1/
The disaggregated data shows that China isn't just funding publicly guaranteed infrastructure projects in frontier economies/ Africa. Its state banks also do a lot of lending to "private" firms, including loans that back Chinese firms going out
2/
That includes funding a lot of China's strategic acquisitions -- Kuka in Germany, Nexperia in the Netherlands, Nexperia's (subsequently reversed) purchase of a chip wafer facility in the UK, etc
The explanation for Taiwan's exceptionally weak currency (on the big Mac index & pretty much any other indicator) is Taiwan's central bank "as Taiwan has exported its way to prosperity, the CBC has tried to avoid such a fate by suppressing the value of the local currency"
2/
And China's net auto exports far exceed the 1.3 m cars Germany exported on net in 24 ...
Michael Dunne and others put China's production capacity at ~ 50m cars. EV production capacity by the end of the year should approach 25m cars, so the right answer depends on how much ICE capacity has been retired. Huge v the 25m internal market and 30+ m in current output