I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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the US net international investment position continues to deteriorate, largely because the market value of foreign holdings of US stock keeps on rising --
1/x
The US income balance (interest and dividends paid to the world v interest and dividends received) is heading toward deficit -- but isn't there yet
2/x
The US has a lot more external debt than it has external lending (80% of GDP v 35% of GDP), which generates net interest payments to the rest of the world of about 1.3% of US GDP
Excellent FT Alphaville piece on the money flowing into China -- to get a higher dollar yield than available in the dollar market (by holding Chinese yuan hedged back to dollars)
1/
The key insight here is that Chinese banks (for some reason) more on that below are paying a premium to borrow dollars -- so this isn't really a trade that takes a direct directional view on the yuan (if the currency swap is held to maturity)
The puzzle in some sense is why are the state banks borrowing fx in the market (to fund backdoor intervention to support the currency). The PBOC has plenty of dollars, and could intervene directly -- or lend directly to the state banks ...
3/
One of the most common (in elite circles) misperceptions about the US balance of payments is that the US borrows externally to invest in equities abroad & thus acts a bit like PE fund or a hedge fund.
It isn't true. US external debt just covers US current spending --
1/
Folks get misled by higher debt share in US external liabilities and the higher equity share in US external assets. The right way to do this (imo) is by summing BoP flows over time -- there hasn't been enough debt inflows to the US to fund the CA deficit & equity outflows
2/
it shocks many folks to learn this, but FDI inflows and FDI outflows in the BoP match over the last 35ys. There is a return differential, but that is b/c foreign firms in the US report low profits. The return differential is all from US investment in tax havens (sadly)
Interesting but difficult to try to figure how China is managing its currency in real time.
There has been more movement in the fix (& thus the band) than in the recent past (during CNY weakness), but also less willingness to let spot appreciate to strong edge of the band
1/
The state banks have apparently been active keeping spot close to the fix --
"On Friday, China’s major state-owned banks were seen buying dollars in the onshore market to prevent the yuan from appreciating too fast."
The US FDI income balance (US firms profits abroad net of foreign firms US profits) goes away once the excess profit US firms earn in low tax jurisdictions is stripped out ...
Joint work with @Mike_Weilandt
1/x
the US income balance is about to fall into a deficit (likely in 2025) -- which should get a bit of attention.
In fact, the investment income balance would be in a sizable deficit already if not for US excess FDI income in tax havens
2/
Blog on all of this is coming soon(ish) --
Hard tho to overstate how much attention the positive US income balance has received over the years in international economics. The swing toward a deficit ought to get a bit of attention!
3/
Lots happening in the world, and the US balance of payments isn't front and center.
But the US current account deficit is not receding ...
In fact it is rocketing up, on the back of private inflows
1/
The overall current account deficit is back to close to 4% of GDP -- all driven by the non oil current account deficit, which is close to its pre global financial crisis peaks (relevant for thinking about USD valuation imo)
2/
The quarterly balance of payments data contains multitudes -- to state the obvious the non-petrol goods deficit is growing again (which folks like the IMF should have anticipated, but didn't!).
But I want to focus on the income balance, which is heading toward a deficit ...