I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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Some basic oil shock math, focusing on the impact on global trade ...
Remember that we are starting from an unusually low surplus in the fuel exporting economies ...
1/
And also an unusually large surplus in East Asia.
Core east Asia looks to (per the old BP data) import ~ 20 mbd on net, so each $10b/ barrel change in the oil price reduces East Asia goods surplus by ~ $75b
2/
a $20 a barrel shock knocks $150b off their surplus -- a manageable sum for a region that has a $1.5 trillion surplus (and rising fast on AI chip demand). 60% of that is China, and China can definitely manage ...
A day that was a long time coming -- TSMC's dominance of chip manufacturing led Taiwan to post a $70b quarterly current account surplus in q4. That is $280b annualized, or a surplus of ~ 33% of GDP
Never though that would be possible for a non-tax haven without oil
1/
And there is of course a capital flows story -- as the TWD depreciated in q4 in the face of this massive surplus (2x its level in 24), and Taiwan technically sold reserves too!
2/
For the year as a whole Taiwan's surplus was $180b (gulp, a sum not much smaller that the, artificially low to be sure, surplus that China was reporting mid 2024)! Reserve outflows and foreign bond purchases were only $20b each, leaving $140b to flow out in other ways
I actually don't think Mark and I are that far apart
(tho I wouldn't start by arguing that a BoP deficit is meaningless, as I certainly find value in some cuts of the balance of payments + get annoyed when the IMF ignores the components of the BoP)
The most policy relevant question is whether the courts will strike down the 122 balance of payments tariffs & I think the answer to that is likely to be no, for the reasons that Peter Harrell (an actual lawyer) laid out today
The court of international trade more or less invited a case in its initial IEEPA ruling (rejecting the notion that there no BoP deficits/ surpluses b/c everything ultimately balances) & it seems likely the courts will defer to the administration on what constitutes an international payments problem
3/
This is a thread that only Adam Tooze, a few international economist and a couple of very well paid trade lawyers are likely to enjoy …
The basic question is what did Congress mean back in 1975 when they wrote about payments problems and balance of payments deficits
1/
It is clear from the Senate report on the legislation that the authors were concerned about trade and payments surplus countries (Germany and Japan at the time) & the equitable sharing of balance of payments adjustment responsibilities across surplus and deficit countries
2/
But the Senate report is written in the balance of payments equivalent of old English – it doesn’t use IMF BPM 6 standard terms. There isn’t much discussion of the current account, there is a lot of discussion of the official reserve balance and the net liquidity balance
3/
The mandarins at the PBOC are in a difficult spot -- a faster pace of CNY appreciation against the dollar has convinced Chinese exporters to bring funds back home, and driven the need to buy $100b a month (give or take) to control the pace of appreciation ...
1/
What's more, the slightly faster pace of appreciation v the dollar only drives an appreciation in the inflation adjusted CNY if the dollar itself isn't depreciating v other currencies, and if the pace of appreciation is bigger than the inflation differential
2/
So unless China slows the pace of appreciation (and lets the rate differential incentivize offshore dollar holdings) it isn't clear how the PBOC can get out of an equilibrium that requires hefty monthly intervention
Great story in the New York Times highlighting the difficulties that the US government has faced in getting the world's most profitable companies to take supply chain security seriously, and reduce their exposure to a crisis in the Taiwan straights
1/
Seems like the median outcome for the US is that the efforts of Biden (CHIPS act) and Trump ("deals" negotiated with the threat of semiconductor tariffs) will just keep the US share of global chip production stable.
it has been an uphill battle to convince firms to give up on the combination of TSMC's skill & low costs
"The U.S. tech industry has stubbornly refused to shift where it gets most of its chips, which power things like ... the giant data centers that run artificial intelligence."