I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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Fx settlement is in my view the single best proxy for China's true intervention. It looks like China, Inc bought about $35b in fx in March even with all the turmoil in the oil market. That's down from the (crazy) $100b in purchases in Dec/ Jan but still big
1/
The magnitude of the purchases over the last 12ms of data $460b spot, $580b including forwards creates the basis for a Treasury finding of manipulation if it so desired --
2/
The Treasury would have to look to a period other the calendar 2025 in the April report -- but if it decided to base its determination of activity in h2 2025 (and q1 2026) the scale of intervention (measured by fx settlement) clears the existing threshholds
"The country’s protracted property slump and weak social safety net have curbed consumer spending, resulting in zero inflation last year and an increasing reliance on external demand to prop up growth."
Joe Gagnon (@GagnonMacro) should take a victory lap; the IMF has conceded intervention does have a real impact --
"A growing empirical literature finds that such intervention can systematically generate real exchange rate depreciation and raise current account balances"
1/
I also take a bit of satisfaction in this conclusion; it explains why I have been systematically tracking official asset accumulation for close to 20 years!
2/
The next step is for the IMF to rethink how intervention & official asset accumulation enters into its current account model. The current variable only uses formal central bank intervention & interacts it "optimal" v realized capital controls. So it has no practical impact
3/
Before the global financial crisis, in 06 and 07, the US fiscal deficit was under 2 percent of GDP and note issuance was under 1 pp of GDP in 07. That was also the time of peak reserve accumulation
The low level of US fiscal deficit prior to the global crisis + the small stock of Treasury debt prior to the crisis, especially relative to reserves, are 2 things that many have forgotten; constantly surprised by folks who think US fiscal was an pre crisis issue
2/
So I would posit two things --
a) US real rates would be substantially lower with the current "glut" of Asian manufacturing dollars if the US fiscal deficit was 1-2% of GDP v 5-6% of GDP; the swing in the fiscal deficit/ stock of Treasuries are important omitted variables 3/
Happy to see the IMF has noticed the expansion of global current account imbalances --
And guess what, the IMF seems to have rediscovered the idea that currency manipulation can drive imbalances (though manipulation has been renamed "macro-industrial policy" ... )
1/ many
The IMF doesn't find that "micro" industrial policy has a big impact on global imbalances, only economy wide "macro-industrial policies"
2/
"An example of such a policy is an export-led growth strategy operationalized through a combination of real exchange rate depreciation and enforced low domestic demand" --
that sounds a lot like foreign exchange rate intervention to me (Welcome to the club, @pogourinchas)
"The problem is there was never enough cash to fund all his [Crown Prince MBS] ambitious initiatives."
Indeed. That's why measures lie the balance of payments breakeven are useful. The Saudis needed $90 plus oil -- or near unlimited access to debt financing
1/
Going into the current conflict, the Saudis were borrowing $100b a year from the rest of the world (that's a form of reverse petrodollars so to speak)
2/
"The country’s projects ran into the trillions of dollars—far more than a government with a $300 billion annual budget could afford."