I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
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The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
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China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
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Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
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Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
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Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
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The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
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And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
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Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
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The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
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@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
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@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
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@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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A lot of political reporting still casually equates the interest of (German) business operating in China with the interest of the Germany economy. Politico for example ...
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The same applies to arguments that link Tesla's production in China and its exports from China to the success of the US economy (as opposed to a US company). The confusion isn't limited to Germany
I was expecting a bit more from the Politico article I guess, because China is really now challenging the German economy in ways that no state visit can paper over.
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I was worried last night that China might change its fx regime before I finished my assessment of China's policy over the last 6ms. But I need not have worried.
The so called "market determined" fix stayed constant last night, and tonight (US time)
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The blog though is about more than just how to describe Chinese fx policy.
I also argue that considerations of external balance need to get more weight in consensus international advice to China (proxied by the IMF's article IV)
"A distinctive feature of purchase subsidies for BEV in China, however, is that they are paid out directly to manufacturers rather than consumers and they are paid only for electric vehicles produced in China, thereby discriminating against imported cars”
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In wing, China's industrial policy was carried out via local content requirements for firms that wanted to sell turbines for projects that connected to the State Grid (an off budget subsidy)
Personally find it sort of amusing that Liao Min (representing the CCP) cites two " @ business " (note the irony) stories -- including one whose headline I thought didn't fairly represent the underlying data.
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My read of the Tom Hancock story that China's government apparently likes is that the details don't actually support the headline
Was kind of surprised by this: China's holdings of US financial assets, as a share of China's GDP, are back down to where they were when China joined the WTO ...
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Lots of reasons for this: GDP has gone from $1-$1.5 trillion to $17-18 trillion, dollar share of reserves is down a bit, etc.
But one big reason is what China moved $2 trillion of fx out of its reserves and into its banks!
SAFE calls this the diversified use of its reserves (which technically makes the fx disappear from its reserves ... ); there was a box about it in SAFE's 2020 annual report -- i view it as an open secret.
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