I am among those trying to figure out Trump’s China trade strategy.
Like most I am confused. Trump’s latest escalation was formally a response to China’s latest round of tariffs. But China’s tariffs, in my view, basically confirmed that China has run out of good targets.
1/x
The incremental costs to the U.S. of the trade war right now are essentially coming from Trump’s own tariffs. And I suspect that undermines the United States' leverage.
UBS thinks that China added about $10b in new products to its tariff lists, so its tariffs now cover $100b rather than say $90b of its $150b in imports from the U.S. (based the Chinese number for imports from the U.S.)
3/x
China also raised the tariff rate a bit, but that’s largely irrelevant. China has already proved, tariff or no tariff, it can shut down certain U.S. imports if it wants to.
(Crude supposedly wasn't hit by tariffs last fall ... )
4/x
Remember that in 3 of the 4 largest goods exporting sectors, the market for U.S. exports is essentially China’s state. The state airlines. The state oil and gas companies. And the old state ag and oilseed import monopoly. Gives China some unique tools (like it or not)
5/x
Autos are the exception: they are sold to private buyers. & China did raise its tariffs there – but that cannot have surprised the Trump administration.
China lifted the auto tariffs it imposed last fall to help facilitate the negotiations. They were an obvious target.
6/x
Basically, China had to go back to the sectors it tariffed heavily after the initial U.S. tariffs last summer/ fall – it didn’t come up with any new targets. The incremental impact on (already modest) U.S. goods exports to China will likely be minimal.
6/x
The Trump Administration by contrast has basically doubled its total tariff on China in the last month – going from 25% on $250b ($62b) to 30% on $250b and 15% on $270b ($112b). The just pay it cost of the China tariff has increased to around a half point of U.S. GDP.
7/x
And by definition, if the USTR picked its tariffs rationally, the last round of tariffs will have the highest cost to the U.S. – China is basically the sole supplier (for now) of most of the goods on the final $170b (December) list.
8/x
Of course, with time (as Paul Krugman notes), firms will adjust. But until there is clarity on whether or not the tariffs are permanent, such investments don’t make sense. That’s a big part of the damaging uncertainty.
9/x
The thing is, China likely knows this – the easiest path for Trump give the economy a bit of a boost in an election year is, in a sense, to declare victory in the trade war and come home. (h/t @geoffreygertz)
10/x
@geoffreygertz Reversing the last two rounds of U.S. tariff escalation would likely put about a quarter point of GDP back into consumers’ pockets in an election year ...
11/x
@geoffreygertz Bottom line: President Trump obviously thinks he gains leverage by his willingness to escalate and hit back hard. But that isn’t at all clear to me.
12/x
@geoffreygertz Last note. There are much more advanced ways of estimating the cost of tariffs than the "just pay it" cost. But a lot of them end up converging toward the simple back of the envelope calculation tax hike impact. Offsetting effects and all.
13/13
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China's premier says China wants to be a market for the world, not just a source of supply.
He might want to get get started.
China exported over 7m passenger cars in 2025, and the pace of growth accelerated at the end of the year
1/ many
Passenger car imports are down to half a million, and falling fast ... no market for the world there
2/
As an aside the pace of China's (N)EV exports doubled over the course of 2025 -- huge, huge growth ... China is still a source of global supply there, not a source of global demand
The technicals around the long-end of the Japanese curve are difficult: the natural buyers are all underwater on their legacy holdings, making it a hedge fund playground.
I tho would love to hear a good explanation of the fiscal concerns, gross debt isn't the only metric
1/
Maybe the IMF's data is off, but it has the general government deficit in 2025 at under 2 pp pf GDP (way better than the US) and it likely would be ~ 2% of GDP even with Takaichi's 0.7 pp of GDP(?) stimulus
2/
Net debt is much more clearly on a downward trajectory than the US -- and the net interest bill is very modest comparatively (even with high gross debt); it will get worse JGBs are refinanced but there is room to give a bit ...
Gonna push back against my friends* at FT alphaville just a bit.
The countries that have backed the Danes most strongly (and the Danes themselves) are the surplus countries of Europe & they have generally have a ton of public sector financial assets
The Dutch are a good example; massive public sector pension funds. Sweden isn't that different. Denmark has big public investors (Norway is all Norges Bank obvly)
2/
With Germany you need to be a bit more creative -- but the Sparkassen have way more deposits than loans, and put a lot of money into bonds ... ask Christian Kopf
Allianz is ultimately a regulated German insurer, subject to public pressure
The fall in China's real estate investment -- which can still be mapped to objective indicators -- if anything accelerated toward the end of 2025 ...
1/many
. @KeithBradsher covered this well is the Times' story on China's 5% (shock, shock) reported growth in 2025 ... which understandably (being non-news) got overshadowed by the real news over Trump's Greenland/ peace prize obsession
@KeithBradsher All of the key line items in China's fixed asset investment series are now falling on a y/y basis (the trailing 12m sum is a lagged indicator), with an inflection point around June
The IMF, and others (the French?), should start tracking the customs based global goods imbalance.
Tis striking. China stands out. Followed by Korea and Taiwan (the NIEs). And Ireland of course (pharma)
1/ many
In a sane world of course the US should care about this -- but Trump is already taking credit for the (irrelevant) fall in the bilateral deficit with China, and seems poised to focus his trade policy (ha!) on the non-Ireland EU and Canada ...
2/
It genuinely is striking how concentrated the global surplus in Asia.
Should get the IMF worked up, if it can cast aside the legacy of their horrible 2024 forecast that imbalances would recede and their poor pro imbalances 24 policy advice in Asia
A reminder for armchair geostrategists trying to game out a trade war -- a massive fraction of EU exports to the US are in the pharmaceutical sector. That is mostly US firms producing for the US in Ireland for tax reasons ...
1/
About half the US trade deficit with Europe/ the European surplus with the US (~ $100b) is trade in tax (i.e. pharmaceutical trade). Ex Pharma, the EU now exports ~ $400b to the US and imports ~ $300b. Big numbers, no doubt, but materially less than if pharma is included
2/
With apologies, this chart shows EUR billion, so ex pharma, the EU exports ~ 400b EUR and imports ~ EUR 300b