Spent a few days in the Crimea, not on government invitation, so free to explore. Conclusions: 1) Massive government infrastructural investments. Locals complain of outrageous corruption but note corruption under Ukraine (with little investment);
2) Overwhelming support for Russia. Locals recounted their enthusiastic involvement in the pre-annexation referendum. Russian flags flying everywhere, etc. If another referendum were held today, it is inconceivable that it would result in a vote for Ukraine.
3) Sanctions were felt. Oddly, Russian mobile operators treat Crimea as a foreign country (for roaming purposes). Foreign cards proved useless. Crimea's is a cash economy, and will likely remain so.
4) Many locals secretly hold on to their Ukrainian passports.
- "Why?"
- "Just in case."
5) Ukrainians are selling their vacation homes in Crimea but the slack is being taken up by scores of Russians (from Siberia etc) buying vacation homes.
6) There seems to be considerable seasonal workforce from Ukraine that continues to service Crimea's vacation industry.
7) No happy end to this story. Crimea is not "returning" to democratic Ukraine any time soon, or ever. This should probably be taken as a starting point for a regional settlement.
One could argue that non-recognition keeps this hope alive, as in the case of the Baltics (their annexation by the USSR was never recognised by the West). But the parallel is a weak one, mainly because Crimea is populated by ethnic Russians.
What else to say? Worth visiting, just to get a better grasp on the political realities.
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Ok let's talk a little about the infamous "statement". . The most interesting bit is how Putin used the word "testing" to create a certain ambiguity around Russia's actions.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Note that he vaguely threatened to also "test" IRBMs against NATO targets ("we consider ourself to have the right...") while literally in the next paragraph he appeared to suggest that targets would actually be in Ukraine.
The point of the exercise was to rebuild credibility after threatening repeatedly and publicly to retaliate against missile strikes deep inside Russia. Doing nothing would have damaged Putin's credibility.
As the incoming Trump administration considers options on Ukraine, the big question will be this: can Putin be enticed or coerced into a peace deal, and at what price. Let's consider some of the ingredients. (A thread of five points).
1) Permanent non-nuclear neutrality for Ukraine. Promising *not* to admit Ukraine into NATO would entail going back on NATO's own recent proclamations (i.e. "Ukraine's future is in NATO"). This would be a big symbolic victory for Putin, though it won't be a huge practical concession, insofar as despite the proclamations, the chances of Ukraine being admitted into NATO in our lifetimes were anyway close to nil. Permanent neutrality could be guaranteed a la Istanbul, provided the US were willing to participate as a guarantor-state (not a given but could be an important card to play).
2) Territories. My guess is that Putin will want to have Western recognition of all the annexed territories, not just Crimea. Control is great, but *legitimate* control is far, far better, and Western recognition would in this case *legitimize* de facto control. This is a huge can of worms, because any form of Western recognition would entail a precedent-setting legitimation of conquests. Ghosts of Munich here. Important to recognize Russia doesn't even fully control the territories it has formally annexed. Midway solution: implicit recognition by excluding certain territories from the security guarantees (i.e. the Istanbul scenario). I'd be extremely reluctant to play this card. The US has enormous leverage but the loss of credibility would be equally immense.
Amid all the Canadian soul searching in light of the alleged recruitment of David Pugliese by the Soviet KGB, let me share what I think is a much more important aspect of Soviet involvement with the Canadians: purchase of critical technologies during the Cold War. (A thread).
People would of course know of the significance of West Siberian oil. After the discovery of Samotlor in 1965, Soviet oil production began to shift east from the depleted Tatarstan fields and into the wilderness of Tyumen. The problem was getting to that oil, and getting it out.
The whole area was covered in swamps, there were no roads, equipment would just sink, pipelines (when laid) would "float". The answer, according to the Soviet Oil Minister Valentin Shashin, was to learn from the Canadians.
This here, from Putin, in response to @BBCSteveR's question about Russia's security and how it has worsened since the invasion of Ukraine, is very revealing.
Before presenting his usual case about NATO enlargement etc etc (summed up here: ) Putin says: "we were being constantly shown our place" by the West.bbc.com/news/videos/c9…
This is not a security argument. It's an argument about status and hierarchy, and it goes along way to explain Putin's actions and - as indeed I have shown in my book To Run the World - the Kremlin's actions for much of the Cold War.
Zelensky's pitch: NATO membership for Ukraine, or nukes, raises interesting questions. First, as Marianna Budjeryn shows in her excellent book () one of the reasons Ukraine originally chose not to pursue a nuclear status (moral and legal considerations aside) is the absence of a full nuclear cycle.amazon.co.uk/Inheriting-Bom…
This is by no means a minor issue to address, especially in wartime. Especially in the face of a determined adversary intent on preventing such a scenario. But suppose this could be addressed, and Ukraine managed to build a few nuclear bombs. Then what?
Would a few nuclear bombs suffice to deter an aggressive adversary equipped with an extensive arsenal of nuclear weapons? Possibly (though seems highly doubtful).
A very interesting statement from Kara-Murza here. I agree with him in principle that a democratic Russia should be included in the security architecture of a future Europe (otherwise Europe will never be secure).
On the other hand, there is a massive distance between that noble goal and the pressing reality of a resurgent, revanchist, aggressive Russia, which needs to be contained and deterred, not flirted with.
In the long term, we should aim to build European security *with* Russia, even if in the short term, circumstances require that we build European security *against* Russia.