Spent a few days in the Crimea, not on government invitation, so free to explore. Conclusions: 1) Massive government infrastructural investments. Locals complain of outrageous corruption but note corruption under Ukraine (with little investment);
2) Overwhelming support for Russia. Locals recounted their enthusiastic involvement in the pre-annexation referendum. Russian flags flying everywhere, etc. If another referendum were held today, it is inconceivable that it would result in a vote for Ukraine.
3) Sanctions were felt. Oddly, Russian mobile operators treat Crimea as a foreign country (for roaming purposes). Foreign cards proved useless. Crimea's is a cash economy, and will likely remain so.
4) Many locals secretly hold on to their Ukrainian passports.
- "Why?"
- "Just in case."
5) Ukrainians are selling their vacation homes in Crimea but the slack is being taken up by scores of Russians (from Siberia etc) buying vacation homes.
6) There seems to be considerable seasonal workforce from Ukraine that continues to service Crimea's vacation industry.
7) No happy end to this story. Crimea is not "returning" to democratic Ukraine any time soon, or ever. This should probably be taken as a starting point for a regional settlement.
One could argue that non-recognition keeps this hope alive, as in the case of the Baltics (their annexation by the USSR was never recognised by the West). But the parallel is a weak one, mainly because Crimea is populated by ethnic Russians.
What else to say? Worth visiting, just to get a better grasp on the political realities.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Tucker claims we are "now far closer [to a nuclear war] than we were during the Cuban Missile Crisis." As a historian of the Cuban Missile Crisis, let me weigh in here.
So, the first thing to know is that we don't know how close we were to a nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I think it's fair to say that there's a scholarly consensus that a deliberate nuclear exchange was not in the cards in Oct. 1962, but there is some disagreement over whether a nuclear war could have happened accidentally.
For example, JFK could have ordered the invasion of Cuba (instead of the quarantine), and the Soviet military in Cuba could have tried to repel an invasion with tactical nukes. (They were explicitly prohibited from using IRBMs without Moscow's prior authorization, but there was no such explicit prohibition re tactical nukes). Likely? Who can tell?
The other popular example is the one related to Vasily Arkhipov who in popular lore "saved the world" by talking one of the submarine captains out of firing a nuclear torpedo. A well-known but surprisingly poorly documented episode.
Anyway, things could have gone off the rails for any number of reasons, but it's hard to say how "close" we were to a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it's impossible to prove a negative.
Now, let's consider the second part of Tucker's thesis: that we are now "far closer" to a nuclear war than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I would disagree with this, for the following reason. Today, the US and Russia know much more about one another than during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
We know the two sides' procedures and protocols. There is a hotline (installed as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis). There is, finally, extensive satellite imagery, so we can no longer be caught off-guard in the same way as we were in October 1962. Consider that the US picked up Russian nuclear preparations in the fall of 2022 and immediately indicated to the Russians that they were being watched, and that there would be a strong response to nuclear use in Ukraine (so much for Tucker's claim that there is no communication).
Also, the fact that Blinken says there is no communication with Moscow doesn't mean there is no backchannel. Backchannels are backchannels because no one knows about them (fun fact).
Finally, there is practically no scope for inadvertent nuclear war. It can only happen as a result of a deliberate decision in Moscow or Washington or both to resort to nuclear weapons.
No it's not. The Korean War was not a world war, although 16 countries participated in the UN coalition on the South Korean side, and the Chinese and the Soviets on the North Korean side.
The Vietnam War was not a world war, despite the involvement of third parties like the South Koreans or the Soviets (air defense) or indeed the Chinese (thousands of railroad troops).
The Somali-Ethiopian war was not a world war, although it was basically fought and won by the Cubans.
Putin has staged another performance concerning the "missile": . He bragged about the specs and promised to start serial production. A master bullshi**er, he delights in intimidation. You can tell from his demeanor here that he thinks his tactic has worked.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
One thing he said in his statement is particularly interesting. "We all emerged from different Soviet institutions. We were all educated by what was achieved by previous generations." Let me follow through on this to show how Putin's bullish**ting is an established tradition.
This is a play in three acts. Act one: "We have this new amazing missile." Act two: "We will make it like sausages." Act three: "Everyone in Europe should now be afraid of us."
Ok let's talk a little about the infamous "statement". . The most interesting bit is how Putin used the word "testing" to create a certain ambiguity around Russia's actions.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Note that he vaguely threatened to also "test" IRBMs against NATO targets ("we consider ourself to have the right...") while literally in the next paragraph he appeared to suggest that targets would actually be in Ukraine.
The point of the exercise was to rebuild credibility after threatening repeatedly and publicly to retaliate against missile strikes deep inside Russia. Doing nothing would have damaged Putin's credibility.
As the incoming Trump administration considers options on Ukraine, the big question will be this: can Putin be enticed or coerced into a peace deal, and at what price. Let's consider some of the ingredients. (A thread of five points).
1) Permanent non-nuclear neutrality for Ukraine. Promising *not* to admit Ukraine into NATO would entail going back on NATO's own recent proclamations (i.e. "Ukraine's future is in NATO"). This would be a big symbolic victory for Putin, though it won't be a huge practical concession, insofar as despite the proclamations, the chances of Ukraine being admitted into NATO in our lifetimes were anyway close to nil. Permanent neutrality could be guaranteed a la Istanbul, provided the US were willing to participate as a guarantor-state (not a given but could be an important card to play).
2) Territories. My guess is that Putin will want to have Western recognition of all the annexed territories, not just Crimea. Control is great, but *legitimate* control is far, far better, and Western recognition would in this case *legitimize* de facto control. This is a huge can of worms, because any form of Western recognition would entail a precedent-setting legitimation of conquests. Ghosts of Munich here. Important to recognize Russia doesn't even fully control the territories it has formally annexed. Midway solution: implicit recognition by excluding certain territories from the security guarantees (i.e. the Istanbul scenario). I'd be extremely reluctant to play this card. The US has enormous leverage but the loss of credibility would be equally immense.
Amid all the Canadian soul searching in light of the alleged recruitment of David Pugliese by the Soviet KGB, let me share what I think is a much more important aspect of Soviet involvement with the Canadians: purchase of critical technologies during the Cold War. (A thread).
People would of course know of the significance of West Siberian oil. After the discovery of Samotlor in 1965, Soviet oil production began to shift east from the depleted Tatarstan fields and into the wilderness of Tyumen. The problem was getting to that oil, and getting it out.
The whole area was covered in swamps, there were no roads, equipment would just sink, pipelines (when laid) would "float". The answer, according to the Soviet Oil Minister Valentin Shashin, was to learn from the Canadians.