. This is not dissimilar from Istanbul, and looks pretty good for Putin (if Trump can arm-twist Zelensky into signing off on this, which he may well be able to). Several questions:axios.com/2025/04/22/tru… Let's distinguish here between U.S. recognition of Crimea as Russian (could be done unilaterally in a declaration), and Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as Russian. The latter would require an "all-Ukrainian referendum" (the outcome cannot be guaranteed).

A fascinating interview. Here’s the problem. In 1945 the US had skin in the game. It could get things done because it was willing to risk a war with the USSR to protect its position in Germany. It showed that much in the Berlin airlift. thetimes.com/us/american-po… What we have today is an American government that is “negotiating” like hell over Ukraine, but without pledging itself to the outcome, letting the Europeans sort things out later. This just doesn’t hang together. You are either in or you are out.

There has been a lot of confusion about what has or has not been agreed in Riyadh. Let me try to summarize where we are now that we have statements from all sides and preliminary reactions. In a nutshell, I don't think a Black Sea truce has been agreed yet. This is despite statements by the White House (here: whitehouse.gov/briefings-stat… and here: whitehouse.gov/briefings-stat…) that claim that an agreement has been reached with Russia and Ukraine "to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea."

So since everyone (myself included) have been trashing Witkoff, let me offer an alternative view of his interview with @TuckerCarlson, which I think should be watched in full, to give Witkoff the benefit of the doubt. I think he deserves it tbf. I found several striking elements in the interview. And no, I won't talk about his knowledge (or lack thereof) of the "five regions." The fact of the matter is: even if Witkoff new Eastern Ukraine like the back of his hand and could name every little village...

Well, @MartinDiCaro since you asked, Alan Kuperman's oped on the origins of the war in Ukraine is not particularly convincing. It's one-sided in its presentation of facts, and omits important information. thehill.com/opinion/519802… First, Kuperman argues that far-right militants were responsible for violence in Kyiv in February 2014. He draws heavily on Ivan Katchanovski who published several studies to this effect.

As we are waiting for the outcome of the second Trump-Putin call, let's take a closer look at Putin's comments to Russian businessmen earlier today. Some very interesting points, which I think suggest what Putin thinks he can and cannot accomplish. Full transcript: .kremlin.ru/events/preside… One thing I found interesting is that Putin did *not* make the recent distinction between "our partners" the Americans and the difficult Europeans. He did not take the opportunity to thank @realDonaldTrump profusely for his commitment to peace (as in the presser with Lukashenka).

As we think about how the Russians will react to the ceasefire proposal, let's return to Putin's comments from December 19, 2024. Here he says that a ceasefire would give Ukraine breathing space at a time when the Russians are making gains on the battlefield. On the other hand, here he talks about a "lengthy ceasefire period," implying perhaps that a "shorter" ceasefire would not have the same effect.

So now that passions have died down somewhat (including my own), let's try to understand what happened. The disastrous Trump/Zelensky press conference reflected a real divergence of interests, but also a culture clash and a personality clash. Trump's worldview is that of a crime boss. He brooks no dissent and values loyalty above all else, including competence. Contradicting the boss in public makes Trump lose face, and cannot be tolerated. @JDVance knows this, which is why, as a loyal underling, he jumped to Trump's defense at the flimsiest of provocations.

To me, the "reverse-Kissinger" thinking that one often encounters these days in Washington, is both completely unsurprising, and fundamentally erroneous. "Completely unsurprising" means that we've seen this for years now; no sooner had China emerged as a possible strategic rival to the US than people began talking about playing Russia against China. This what we'd call "Kissingerian" thinking didn't even originate with Kissinger. Here's what Sen. Henry Scoop Jackson (the highly anti-Soviet Democrat and the sponsor of the Jackson-Vanik amendment) told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin 50 years, in June 1975. See parallels?

Summed up my thought on the latest developments for the Spectator: . I speak here as a "moderate" in all respects. I have always kept a good distance from the "yay, Russia is about to collapse" crowd. I would not have touched NAFO with a ten-foot-pole.spectator.co.uk/article/donald… I have co-authored a (widely read) piece on the failed Istanbul negotiations, looking for what future negotiations might look like.

So let's talk a bit about US-Russia talks in Riyadh. First, the Russians are represented by a much stronger team than when they talked peace with the Ukrainians in Belarus and later in Istanbul. We have here the old war horse Lavrov and Putin's foreign policy aide Ushakov. This obviously implies the seriousness of intent. Ushakov mentioned, before the talks began, that "the main thing is to begin a real normalization of relations between us and Washington," . Ukraine is a means to this end.

https://x.com/MoscowTimes/status/1891579624850682038

Some thoughts on the possible Putin-Trump meeting. This is unquestionably something Putin would relish. He would want to time it, presumably, to coincide with Victory Day anniversary (early May), leaving time to reach an agreement with the US. Cannot have a summit without it. An agreement with the US, sidelining Europe (and of course Ukraine) is something Putin had long wanted. It would give him a sense of greatness, of recognition by mighty America as an equal, a return (at least in glory) to 1945. There is a lot of symbolism here.

Carter is gone. RIP. In my book, To Run the World, I talk at length of his impact on US-Soviet relations. Broadly speaking, he annoyed everyone in Moscow. Actually, at first the Soviets thought he might be a welcome change after the rocky Ford presidency.

Tucker claims we are "now far closer [to a nuclear war] than we were during the Cuban Missile Crisis." As a historian of the Cuban Missile Crisis, let me weigh in here.

https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1864092222091657502

So, the first thing to know is that we don't know how close we were to a nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I think it's fair to say that there's a scholarly consensus that a deliberate nuclear exchange was not in the cards in Oct. 1962, but there is some disagreement over whether a nuclear war could have happened accidentally.

For example, JFK could have ordered the invasion of Cuba (instead of the quarantine), and the Soviet military in Cuba could have tried to repel an invasion with tactical nukes. (They were explicitly prohibited from using IRBMs without Moscow's prior authorization, but there was no such explicit prohibition re tactical nukes). Likely? Who can tell?

The other popular example is the one related to Vasily Arkhipov who in popular lore "saved the world" by talking one of the submarine captains out of firing a nuclear torpedo. A well-known but surprisingly poorly documented episode.

Anyway, things could have gone off the rails for any number of reasons, but it's hard to say how "close" we were to a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it's impossible to prove a negative.

No it's not. The Korean War was not a world war, although 16 countries participated in the UN coalition on the South Korean side, and the Chinese and the Soviets on the North Korean side.

https://twitter.com/Kasparov63/status/1860773390077894968

The Vietnam War was not a world war, despite the involvement of third parties like the South Koreans or the Soviets (air defense) or indeed the Chinese (thousands of railroad troops).

Putin has staged another performance concerning the "missile": . He bragged about the specs and promised to start serial production. A master bullshi**er, he delights in intimidation. You can tell from his demeanor here that he thinks his tactic has worked.kremlin.ru/events/preside… One thing he said in his statement is particularly interesting. "We all emerged from different Soviet institutions. We were all educated by what was achieved by previous generations." Let me follow through on this to show how Putin's bullish**ting is an established tradition.

Ok let's talk a little about the infamous "statement". . The most interesting bit is how Putin used the word "testing" to create a certain ambiguity around Russia's actions.kremlin.ru/events/preside… Note that he vaguely threatened to also "test" IRBMs against NATO targets ("we consider ourself to have the right...") while literally in the next paragraph he appeared to suggest that targets would actually be in Ukraine.

As the incoming Trump administration considers options on Ukraine, the big question will be this: can Putin be enticed or coerced into a peace deal, and at what price. Let's consider some of the ingredients. (A thread of five points). 1) Permanent non-nuclear neutrality for Ukraine. Promising *not* to admit Ukraine into NATO would entail going back on NATO's own recent proclamations (i.e. "Ukraine's future is in NATO"). This would be a big symbolic victory for Putin, though it won't be a huge practical concession, insofar as despite the proclamations, the chances of Ukraine being admitted into NATO in our lifetimes were anyway close to nil. Permanent neutrality could be guaranteed a la Istanbul, provided the US were willing to participate as a guarantor-state (not a given but could be an important card to play).

Amid all the Canadian soul searching in light of the alleged recruitment of David Pugliese by the Soviet KGB, let me share what I think is a much more important aspect of Soviet involvement with the Canadians: purchase of critical technologies during the Cold War. (A thread). People would of course know of the significance of West Siberian oil. After the discovery of Samotlor in 1965, Soviet oil production began to shift east from the depleted Tatarstan fields and into the wilderness of Tyumen. The problem was getting to that oil, and getting it out.

This here, from Putin, in response to @BBCSteveR's question about Russia's security and how it has worsened since the invasion of Ukraine, is very revealing. Before presenting his usual case about NATO enlargement etc etc (summed up here: ) Putin says: "we were being constantly shown our place" by the West.bbc.com/news/videos/c9…

Zelensky's pitch: NATO membership for Ukraine, or nukes, raises interesting questions. First, as Marianna Budjeryn shows in her excellent book () one of the reasons Ukraine originally chose not to pursue a nuclear status (moral and legal considerations aside) is the absence of a full nuclear cycle.amazon.co.uk/Inheriting-Bom… This is by no means a minor issue to address, especially in wartime. Especially in the face of a determined adversary intent on preventing such a scenario. But suppose this could be addressed, and Ukraine managed to build a few nuclear bombs. Then what?