Well, this here is certainly worth reading this morning: . The biggest takeaway is that Witkoff leaned on Zelensky during the meeting with Trump to surrender Donbas to the Russians (because they speak Russian in Donbas, according to Witkoff).washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/… I wonder if Trump and Putin already reached an agreement on this point in their phone call on Oct. 16, and Trump promised Putin to arm-twist Zelensky. I would think this is a definite possibility.

An interesting choice of a location (though previously discussed). Remarkable optics here. Budapest--with its decidedly "neutral" position in the war--is like the new Helsinki. Zelensky and the Europeans won't be thrilled but @PM_ViktorOrban stands tall and proud.

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1978875389490434077

For Putin, a trip to Budapest is a finger in the EU's eye. Here he is, a criminal wanted by the ICC (Hungary btw is still a member of the ICC despite voting to withdraw), kicking Europe's door open with his boot. It'll be something else.

My view on this is that it does not represent a new departure for Trump or the United States. Trump is doing here what he has already threatened to do many times: wash his hands of the whole Ukraine situation and let the Europeans sort it out.

https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse/status/1970564074850123952

As long as the Europeans are willing to purchase US weapons for Ukraine, he is willing to sell them. That's good. But the financial burden will fall on Europe, and Ukraine for its part will have to come up with the necessary manpower.

So here's the bizarre thing. Steve Witkoff, Marco Rubio et al are now arguing that Russia's acceptance of Art. 5-style guarantees for Ukraine is some kind of an incredible breakthrough that amounts, per Rubio, to Russia's major concession. However, if you follow this story, as, for instance, Sam Charap and I have, over the years, you'll see that the idea of something *like* Art. 5 was being negotiated at Istanbul in 2002, and that the key obstacle was *not* Russia but U.S. unwillingness to offer such guarantees.

A few reflections on where we are after another meeting in Istanbul. Since we now have both the Ukrainian and the Russian documents in full, I will do a full analysis on my Substack () tomorrow morning, so subscribe, but for now, here are some thoughts.profradchenko.substack.com The fact that we have both documents already means that neither side is currently prepared to seriously negotiate. Recall we didn't have this at Istanbul 1.0: those were secret talks, and it was only much later that we obtained the leaked documents.

On Putin's obsession with history, an interesting quote. He says here: "Clearing out of the historical memory dissolves our very selves, we lose our identity... A nation that has no past, has no future. This attempt to dissolve us in an amorphous state is not accidental." In other words, Putin understands history-writing as a nation-building exercise. His history is by necessity propagandistic. History that is not, as he describes it, "patriotic" is automatically suspect as a probable foreign imposition.

So, since I am a fan of primary sources, let's go through the new US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement: . At first, it's pretty bad. At second, it (possibly?) amounts to little. An explainer.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/up… The first part - WHEREAS - explains the underlying intentions and principles. This bit, to me, is pretty interesting. I guess this refers to denying Russia any future economic stake in Ukraine. But it could mean anything. It could mean excluding China, for example.

. This is not dissimilar from Istanbul, and looks pretty good for Putin (if Trump can arm-twist Zelensky into signing off on this, which he may well be able to). Several questions:axios.com/2025/04/22/tru… Let's distinguish here between U.S. recognition of Crimea as Russian (could be done unilaterally in a declaration), and Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as Russian. The latter would require an "all-Ukrainian referendum" (the outcome cannot be guaranteed).

A fascinating interview. Here’s the problem. In 1945 the US had skin in the game. It could get things done because it was willing to risk a war with the USSR to protect its position in Germany. It showed that much in the Berlin airlift. thetimes.com/us/american-po… What we have today is an American government that is “negotiating” like hell over Ukraine, but without pledging itself to the outcome, letting the Europeans sort things out later. This just doesn’t hang together. You are either in or you are out.

There has been a lot of confusion about what has or has not been agreed in Riyadh. Let me try to summarize where we are now that we have statements from all sides and preliminary reactions. In a nutshell, I don't think a Black Sea truce has been agreed yet. This is despite statements by the White House (here: whitehouse.gov/briefings-stat… and here: whitehouse.gov/briefings-stat…) that claim that an agreement has been reached with Russia and Ukraine "to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea."

So since everyone (myself included) have been trashing Witkoff, let me offer an alternative view of his interview with @TuckerCarlson, which I think should be watched in full, to give Witkoff the benefit of the doubt. I think he deserves it tbf. I found several striking elements in the interview. And no, I won't talk about his knowledge (or lack thereof) of the "five regions." The fact of the matter is: even if Witkoff new Eastern Ukraine like the back of his hand and could name every little village...

Well, @MartinDiCaro since you asked, Alan Kuperman's oped on the origins of the war in Ukraine is not particularly convincing. It's one-sided in its presentation of facts, and omits important information. thehill.com/opinion/519802… First, Kuperman argues that far-right militants were responsible for violence in Kyiv in February 2014. He draws heavily on Ivan Katchanovski who published several studies to this effect.

As we are waiting for the outcome of the second Trump-Putin call, let's take a closer look at Putin's comments to Russian businessmen earlier today. Some very interesting points, which I think suggest what Putin thinks he can and cannot accomplish. Full transcript: .kremlin.ru/events/preside… One thing I found interesting is that Putin did *not* make the recent distinction between "our partners" the Americans and the difficult Europeans. He did not take the opportunity to thank @realDonaldTrump profusely for his commitment to peace (as in the presser with Lukashenka).

As we think about how the Russians will react to the ceasefire proposal, let's return to Putin's comments from December 19, 2024. Here he says that a ceasefire would give Ukraine breathing space at a time when the Russians are making gains on the battlefield. On the other hand, here he talks about a "lengthy ceasefire period," implying perhaps that a "shorter" ceasefire would not have the same effect.

So now that passions have died down somewhat (including my own), let's try to understand what happened. The disastrous Trump/Zelensky press conference reflected a real divergence of interests, but also a culture clash and a personality clash. Trump's worldview is that of a crime boss. He brooks no dissent and values loyalty above all else, including competence. Contradicting the boss in public makes Trump lose face, and cannot be tolerated. @JDVance knows this, which is why, as a loyal underling, he jumped to Trump's defense at the flimsiest of provocations.

To me, the "reverse-Kissinger" thinking that one often encounters these days in Washington, is both completely unsurprising, and fundamentally erroneous. "Completely unsurprising" means that we've seen this for years now; no sooner had China emerged as a possible strategic rival to the US than people began talking about playing Russia against China. This what we'd call "Kissingerian" thinking didn't even originate with Kissinger. Here's what Sen. Henry Scoop Jackson (the highly anti-Soviet Democrat and the sponsor of the Jackson-Vanik amendment) told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin 50 years, in June 1975. See parallels?

Summed up my thought on the latest developments for the Spectator: . I speak here as a "moderate" in all respects. I have always kept a good distance from the "yay, Russia is about to collapse" crowd. I would not have touched NAFO with a ten-foot-pole.spectator.co.uk/article/donald… I have co-authored a (widely read) piece on the failed Istanbul negotiations, looking for what future negotiations might look like.

So let's talk a bit about US-Russia talks in Riyadh. First, the Russians are represented by a much stronger team than when they talked peace with the Ukrainians in Belarus and later in Istanbul. We have here the old war horse Lavrov and Putin's foreign policy aide Ushakov. This obviously implies the seriousness of intent. Ushakov mentioned, before the talks began, that "the main thing is to begin a real normalization of relations between us and Washington," . Ukraine is a means to this end.

https://x.com/MoscowTimes/status/1891579624850682038

Some thoughts on the possible Putin-Trump meeting. This is unquestionably something Putin would relish. He would want to time it, presumably, to coincide with Victory Day anniversary (early May), leaving time to reach an agreement with the US. Cannot have a summit without it. An agreement with the US, sidelining Europe (and of course Ukraine) is something Putin had long wanted. It would give him a sense of greatness, of recognition by mighty America as an equal, a return (at least in glory) to 1945. There is a lot of symbolism here.

Carter is gone. RIP. In my book, To Run the World, I talk at length of his impact on US-Soviet relations. Broadly speaking, he annoyed everyone in Moscow. Actually, at first the Soviets thought he might be a welcome change after the rocky Ford presidency.

Tucker claims we are "now far closer [to a nuclear war] than we were during the Cuban Missile Crisis." As a historian of the Cuban Missile Crisis, let me weigh in here.

https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1864092222091657502

So, the first thing to know is that we don't know how close we were to a nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I think it's fair to say that there's a scholarly consensus that a deliberate nuclear exchange was not in the cards in Oct. 1962, but there is some disagreement over whether a nuclear war could have happened accidentally.

For example, JFK could have ordered the invasion of Cuba (instead of the quarantine), and the Soviet military in Cuba could have tried to repel an invasion with tactical nukes. (They were explicitly prohibited from using IRBMs without Moscow's prior authorization, but there was no such explicit prohibition re tactical nukes). Likely? Who can tell?

The other popular example is the one related to Vasily Arkhipov who in popular lore "saved the world" by talking one of the submarine captains out of firing a nuclear torpedo. A well-known but surprisingly poorly documented episode.

Anyway, things could have gone off the rails for any number of reasons, but it's hard to say how "close" we were to a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it's impossible to prove a negative.