As we think about how the Russians will react to the ceasefire proposal, let's return to Putin's comments from December 19, 2024. Here he says that a ceasefire would give Ukraine breathing space at a time when the Russians are making gains on the battlefield. On the other hand, here he talks about a "lengthy ceasefire period," implying perhaps that a "shorter" ceasefire would not have the same effect.

So now that passions have died down somewhat (including my own), let's try to understand what happened. The disastrous Trump/Zelensky press conference reflected a real divergence of interests, but also a culture clash and a personality clash. Trump's worldview is that of a crime boss. He brooks no dissent and values loyalty above all else, including competence. Contradicting the boss in public makes Trump lose face, and cannot be tolerated. @JDVance knows this, which is why, as a loyal underling, he jumped to Trump's defense at the flimsiest of provocations.

To me, the "reverse-Kissinger" thinking that one often encounters these days in Washington, is both completely unsurprising, and fundamentally erroneous. "Completely unsurprising" means that we've seen this for years now; no sooner had China emerged as a possible strategic rival to the US than people began talking about playing Russia against China. This what we'd call "Kissingerian" thinking didn't even originate with Kissinger. Here's what Sen. Henry Scoop Jackson (the highly anti-Soviet Democrat and the sponsor of the Jackson-Vanik amendment) told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin 50 years, in June 1975. See parallels?

Summed up my thought on the latest developments for the Spectator: . I speak here as a "moderate" in all respects. I have always kept a good distance from the "yay, Russia is about to collapse" crowd. I would not have touched NAFO with a ten-foot-pole.spectator.co.uk/article/donald… I have co-authored a (widely read) piece on the failed Istanbul negotiations, looking for what future negotiations might look like.

So let's talk a bit about US-Russia talks in Riyadh. First, the Russians are represented by a much stronger team than when they talked peace with the Ukrainians in Belarus and later in Istanbul. We have here the old war horse Lavrov and Putin's foreign policy aide Ushakov. This obviously implies the seriousness of intent. Ushakov mentioned, before the talks began, that "the main thing is to begin a real normalization of relations between us and Washington," . Ukraine is a means to this end.

https://x.com/MoscowTimes/status/1891579624850682038

Some thoughts on the possible Putin-Trump meeting. This is unquestionably something Putin would relish. He would want to time it, presumably, to coincide with Victory Day anniversary (early May), leaving time to reach an agreement with the US. Cannot have a summit without it. An agreement with the US, sidelining Europe (and of course Ukraine) is something Putin had long wanted. It would give him a sense of greatness, of recognition by mighty America as an equal, a return (at least in glory) to 1945. There is a lot of symbolism here.

Carter is gone. RIP. In my book, To Run the World, I talk at length of his impact on US-Soviet relations. Broadly speaking, he annoyed everyone in Moscow. Actually, at first the Soviets thought he might be a welcome change after the rocky Ford presidency.

Tucker claims we are "now far closer [to a nuclear war] than we were during the Cuban Missile Crisis." As a historian of the Cuban Missile Crisis, let me weigh in here.

https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1864092222091657502

So, the first thing to know is that we don't know how close we were to a nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I think it's fair to say that there's a scholarly consensus that a deliberate nuclear exchange was not in the cards in Oct. 1962, but there is some disagreement over whether a nuclear war could have happened accidentally.

For example, JFK could have ordered the invasion of Cuba (instead of the quarantine), and the Soviet military in Cuba could have tried to repel an invasion with tactical nukes. (They were explicitly prohibited from using IRBMs without Moscow's prior authorization, but there was no such explicit prohibition re tactical nukes). Likely? Who can tell?

The other popular example is the one related to Vasily Arkhipov who in popular lore "saved the world" by talking one of the submarine captains out of firing a nuclear torpedo. A well-known but surprisingly poorly documented episode.

Anyway, things could have gone off the rails for any number of reasons, but it's hard to say how "close" we were to a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it's impossible to prove a negative.

No it's not. The Korean War was not a world war, although 16 countries participated in the UN coalition on the South Korean side, and the Chinese and the Soviets on the North Korean side.

https://twitter.com/Kasparov63/status/1860773390077894968

The Vietnam War was not a world war, despite the involvement of third parties like the South Koreans or the Soviets (air defense) or indeed the Chinese (thousands of railroad troops).

Putin has staged another performance concerning the "missile": . He bragged about the specs and promised to start serial production. A master bullshi**er, he delights in intimidation. You can tell from his demeanor here that he thinks his tactic has worked.kremlin.ru/events/preside… One thing he said in his statement is particularly interesting. "We all emerged from different Soviet institutions. We were all educated by what was achieved by previous generations." Let me follow through on this to show how Putin's bullish**ting is an established tradition.

Ok let's talk a little about the infamous "statement". . The most interesting bit is how Putin used the word "testing" to create a certain ambiguity around Russia's actions.kremlin.ru/events/preside… Note that he vaguely threatened to also "test" IRBMs against NATO targets ("we consider ourself to have the right...") while literally in the next paragraph he appeared to suggest that targets would actually be in Ukraine.

As the incoming Trump administration considers options on Ukraine, the big question will be this: can Putin be enticed or coerced into a peace deal, and at what price. Let's consider some of the ingredients. (A thread of five points). 1) Permanent non-nuclear neutrality for Ukraine. Promising *not* to admit Ukraine into NATO would entail going back on NATO's own recent proclamations (i.e. "Ukraine's future is in NATO"). This would be a big symbolic victory for Putin, though it won't be a huge practical concession, insofar as despite the proclamations, the chances of Ukraine being admitted into NATO in our lifetimes were anyway close to nil. Permanent neutrality could be guaranteed a la Istanbul, provided the US were willing to participate as a guarantor-state (not a given but could be an important card to play).

Amid all the Canadian soul searching in light of the alleged recruitment of David Pugliese by the Soviet KGB, let me share what I think is a much more important aspect of Soviet involvement with the Canadians: purchase of critical technologies during the Cold War. (A thread). People would of course know of the significance of West Siberian oil. After the discovery of Samotlor in 1965, Soviet oil production began to shift east from the depleted Tatarstan fields and into the wilderness of Tyumen. The problem was getting to that oil, and getting it out.

This here, from Putin, in response to @BBCSteveR's question about Russia's security and how it has worsened since the invasion of Ukraine, is very revealing. Before presenting his usual case about NATO enlargement etc etc (summed up here: ) Putin says: "we were being constantly shown our place" by the West.bbc.com/news/videos/c9…

Zelensky's pitch: NATO membership for Ukraine, or nukes, raises interesting questions. First, as Marianna Budjeryn shows in her excellent book () one of the reasons Ukraine originally chose not to pursue a nuclear status (moral and legal considerations aside) is the absence of a full nuclear cycle.amazon.co.uk/Inheriting-Bom… This is by no means a minor issue to address, especially in wartime. Especially in the face of a determined adversary intent on preventing such a scenario. But suppose this could be addressed, and Ukraine managed to build a few nuclear bombs. Then what?

A very interesting statement from Kara-Murza here. I agree with him in principle that a democratic Russia should be included in the security architecture of a future Europe (otherwise Europe will never be secure).

https://twitter.com/adagamov/status/1819449452542992555

On the other hand, there is a massive distance between that noble goal and the pressing reality of a resurgent, revanchist, aggressive Russia, which needs to be contained and deterred, not flirted with.

This here is pretty entertaining (and I have never seen anything like this). Russia's foreign intelligence (SVR) publishes fake "declassified" reports by its rezidenty in Kyiv, Paris, Riga, and Washington who are identified as "Aleks," "Feliks," "Diaz," "Stone," and Nora. These fake reports promote conspiracy theories like one here that claims that the Americans are secretly hiring Latin American criminals to fight in Ukraine.

I am a little bit late to the discussion of this important article by Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher: . Let me weigh in on the core argument, however, because it is all about one of the central themes of my book - detente.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… I both agree and disagree with Pottinger and Gallagher in how they draw the parallel between the failure of detente and our own days. First, let me talk a bit about where I disagree with them. This here.

A few thoughts on the Putin-Xi presser.
1) Xi described his conversation with Putin as "frank, friendly, and substantive". "Frank" is the usual codeword for disagreements; "friendly" suggests that disagreements were nevertheless secondary to the broader alignment of views. 2) "Friendship forever"

An interesting thread, which comes to different conclusions about the March-April 2022 peace talks than @scharap and I do in our article. There are several problematic aspects to this thread. I'll point out three.

https://twitter.com/dszeligowski/status/1785771531458462188

First this. @dszeligowski claims that "it is not ... true that Russia agreed to Ukraine's accession to the EU." He then corrects himself by saying that "it expressed its consent in principle, but subject to conditions that Ukraine rejected."

https://x.com/dszeligowski/status/1785771557404426553

So allow me to respond to this in detail because this is very interesting.

First, the argument that "I know quite a few people in the loop and everyone of them disagrees with the article" is completely unconvincing, and can be easily countered with the following equally unconvincing argument: "I know quite a few people in the loop, many of them directly involved in the negotiations, and everyone of them thinks the article is spot on."

Now that the unconvincing arguments have been presented upfront, let's turn to a more serious discussion. First, about the article.
Our article with @scharap constructs a very complex set of arguments, so if you agree or disagree with the article, it's useful to explain what aspect of the argument you agree or disagree with.

- That at the negotiators prepared the text of a draft treaty on security guarantees that provided for Ukraine's permanent neutrality, which had a number of issues still unresolved, which we meticulously elaborate in the article?

- That the negotiations continued for weeks after Bucha and Irpin, which unambiguously suggests that Bucha and Irpin did not lead to the breakdown of negotiations, even if the Russian atrocities steeled Zelensky's resolve to continue the fight?

- That nevertheless the negotiations broke down eventually, and that was for the three reasons we elaborate, including the prospects of winning the war (which seemed brighter after the Russians retreated from Kyiv)?

- That the Ukrainians counted on a Western buy-in in the security guarantees process, and that it wasn't forthcoming for reasons that we explain?

- That Boris Johnson did *not* force Ukraine to abandon negotiations, and that the claim that he did is a caricature (the word we use in the article)?

- That the Ukrainians had not consulted with the US on the US buy-in before Istanbul?

- That the draft treaty contained a number of interesting ideas, proposed by the Russians, about changing specific Ukrainian laws on historical memory and language, and that these proposals amounted to a face-saving measure that would cover Putin's insistence on "nenazification"?

- That while we don't know whether Putin and Zelensky negotiated in good faith, it is at least conceivable that the negotiators themselves thought so because an advanced version of the draft and the multiple attached protocols point to a serious negotiation?

So which one of these arguments do the esteemed experts disagree with? All of them? Good. But at least we have the evidence upon which we rest our claims.