So allow me to respond to this in detail because this is very interesting.

First, the argument that "I know quite a few people in the loop and everyone of them disagrees with the article" is completely unconvincing, and can be easily countered with the following equally unconvincing argument: "I know quite a few people in the loop, many of them directly involved in the negotiations, and everyone of them thinks the article is spot on."

Now that the unconvincing arguments have been presented upfront, let's turn to a more serious discussion. First, about the article.
Our article with @scharap constructs a very complex set of arguments, so if you agree or disagree with the article, it's useful to explain what aspect of the argument you agree or disagree with.

- That at the negotiators prepared the text of a draft treaty on security guarantees that provided for Ukraine's permanent neutrality, which had a number of issues still unresolved, which we meticulously elaborate in the article?

- That the negotiations continued for weeks after Bucha and Irpin, which unambiguously suggests that Bucha and Irpin did not lead to the breakdown of negotiations, even if the Russian atrocities steeled Zelensky's resolve to continue the fight?

- That nevertheless the negotiations broke down eventually, and that was for the three reasons we elaborate, including the prospects of winning the war (which seemed brighter after the Russians retreated from Kyiv)?

- That the Ukrainians counted on a Western buy-in in the security guarantees process, and that it wasn't forthcoming for reasons that we explain?

- That Boris Johnson did *not* force Ukraine to abandon negotiations, and that the claim that he did is a caricature (the word we use in the article)?

- That the Ukrainians had not consulted with the US on the US buy-in before Istanbul?

- That the draft treaty contained a number of interesting ideas, proposed by the Russians, about changing specific Ukrainian laws on historical memory and language, and that these proposals amounted to a face-saving measure that would cover Putin's insistence on "nenazification"?

- That while we don't know whether Putin and Zelensky negotiated in good faith, it is at least conceivable that the negotiators themselves thought so because an advanced version of the draft and the multiple attached protocols point to a serious negotiation?

So which one of these arguments do the esteemed experts disagree with? All of them? Good. But at least we have the evidence upon which we rest our claims.

It's time to address some of the points raised by the esteemed commentariat. But, first of all, thank you for your engagement. @scharap and I expected that the article would be of interest, and we were certainly not disappointed.

https://twitter.com/ForeignAffairs/status/1780558910883061901

This thread here by @dszeligowski was interesting, I thought. . Poland's role in the talks is indeed worth exploring. I would say Poland's role in the Ukrainian calculus was not all that important, however. The US loomed (and continues to loom) much larger, so it's hardly surprising that we skirted Poland's role. Turkey was another player that clearly had a very important role in the story. We do not have enough information, however, to offer definitive conclusions about what that role might have been.

It has to be kept in mind that the article is in any case twice (or more?) the length of regular Foreign Affairs articles, and there are many stories and angles that we simply had no space for, including such tantalizing episodes as the (alleged) poisoning of the Ukrainian delegation, Abramovich's role, etc, etc. We are grateful to @ForeignAffairs for giving as much space as they did: it's a long read!

On the other hand, some statements in the thread are based on nothing but conjecture. Thus, "Russia never abandoned its maximalist goal. Realising that the plan to seize Kyiv "in three days" had failed, Moscow wanted to subjugate Ukraine at the negotiating table, but missed the moment when the fortune turned in favour of Ukraine and they were thrown out from Kyiv region."

It's incorrect because the Russians began negotiations while the offensive was only just beginning. The demands they made were for Ukraine's capitulation. However, their position softened and demands were modified once it became clear that the offensive was failing. Moreover, the notion that "Russia never abandoned its maximalist goal" is based on pure conjecture. Our purpose in this article was to steer clear of conjecture and indicate uncertainty where we were uncertain, e.g.:

https://x.com/dszeligowski/status/1780183950507262201

Foreign Affairs published today the results of a most fruitful collaboration between @scharap and yours truly, an article on the failed peace talks between Russia and Ukraine (March-April 2022). .foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-… The main takeaway: it's complicated. The talks indeed produced important documents, which we saw and analyzed. There are some remarkable revelations in these drafts.

The Russian Orthodox Church holds the 25th congress of the "Russian world." They adopt a policy document: [in Russian]. I nearly spilled my coffee reading it. About every sentence is pure gold, but the gist is this:patriarchia.ru/db/text/611618… 1. Russia needs to increase its population to 600 million people. This is to be achieved through government propaganda of "traditional values," criminalization of abortions, and writing off mortgages for families who have more than 2 children.

Some takeaways from the Russian election.

1) This election is a sham.

This, of course, should be obvious, but it's important to restate this basic fact. What makes it a sham is *not* whether it actually reflects the views of Russian voters (on this more below), but whether it was conducted in accordance with accepted criteria for a free and fair election, which fundamentally entails the making of a real choice between alternative candidates. There are of course other criteria, like equal access to airtime, the use (or not) of administrative resources, or voter intimidation, etc - the so-called "even playing field."

The second reason why this election is a sham is that the numbers produced by the Central Election Commission cannot be verified, and there is every reason to believe that they can be manipulated any way the regime wants.

So, once again, this election was fraudulent by definition. 2) Putin is genuinely popular among the Russian electorate.

Even if this election were not a sham but were in fact conducted freely and fairly, there is a good chance that Putin would still have won. Of course, he would not have secured the preposterously high margin. But polls indicate significant support for Putin - not just now, when polling has become more problematic - but going back years.

An interesting piece drawing on leaked documents that show Russia training to use battlefield nuclear weapons against potential adversaries, including China. A few caveats:

https://twitter.com/walberque/status/1762713918953116012

1) It's not surprising that Russia has military plans to use tactical nukes against potential adversaries. By contrast, it would be hugely surprising if Russia did not have such military plans: what's the use of these weapons then? This has always been the case.

Seeing bits and pieces of Medvedev's new extensive interview. The transcript is here: [in Russian]. I certainly found it interesting. Not because I think this "blood-thirsty clown" (Medvedev's term) necessarily defines policy but because he channels certain sentiments that we would be foolish to ignore.tass.ru/interviews/200… For example, he very clearly articulates claims to Kyiv and Odesa, among other places, which should serve as a wake-up call for all those calling for negotiations with the Kremlin. He calls for the (I assume, physical) elimination of the Ukrainian leadership, and proposes to ship a part of the Ukrainian population to the Siberian Gulag. Worth keeping in mind.

I've been asked whether Putin's "documents" presented to Tucker Carlson are genuine. Let me explain. First of all, we don't know what is in the folder. In general, Putin tends to give out "genuine" documents, usually taken of context. Mostly very well known. In this case, we may assume that the folder contains copies of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's letters to the tsar, like his 1648 letter asking of the Tsar's protection.

Tucker Carlson's Putin interview (also available here, where Putin is not dubbed: ) covers a lot of familiar ground. There are a couple of interesting nuances, and I'll mention what they are below. Carlson's ignorance of facts shows throughout. Ignorance is, of course, a benign interpretation of his unwillingness to contradict Putin's falsifications.kremlin.ru/events/preside… The historical part is made up of Putin's conventional fare about Russia's historical claims to its "primordial" territories (i.e. all of Ukraine). He goes a little further than his usual self in blaming Poland for standing up to Hitler in that it failed to "negotiate". He says the Poles "forces" Hitler to begin WWII.

I am sometimes asked what lessons the early Cold War holds for the present. Since I've written I big book on the Cold War that's about to hit the shelves, let me distill a few lessons with full awareness, of course, that history never repeats though often rhymes. amazon.co.uk/Run-World-Krem… Lesson 1. The Cold War was not an unfortunate misunderstanding. Moscow had concrete plans for the postwar. To sum up their thinking, they planned to dominate continental Europe. The British would balance off-shore. The Americans would stay put in their hemisphere.

Does Putin require the war in Ukraine to stay in power? I'll take an exception to this popular point of view and argue that this is actually not the case. A slightly academic thread. The argument reminds me of that famous Soviet proposition that capitalism, in search for profits, would always start wars.

. Meh.fortune.com/2023/12/20/par… I mean, it's reasonable to argue that Western sanctions and exodus of foreign companies had severe economic consequences for Russia, but no they have not had the crippling effect on the Russian economy that the authors claim.

A few reflections on Putin's press conference. First, it's worth checking the primary source: (don't go for ten second clips). Second, it's important to note that what Putin says at these events doesn't necessarily mean anything.kremlin.ru/events/preside… He can signal, but he can also deceive. Putin is known to lie and renege on his various claims. So when he says, as he does here, for instance, that we will not see another mobilization wave, the correct attitude is to just bookmark it so that we can say "he lied again" later.

One of the useful aspects of having access to both Chinese and Russian archives was that I was able to study the Vietnam War from angles most people would not have had. There are some interesting revelations in my book that imho help us understand the "other side" better. Consider the (completely unknown) discussion at the Vietnamese Workers' Party Politburo in September 1969, which we now have access to (the KGB somehow got a hold of the transcript, and it's in the Russian archives).

On the sixtieth anniversary of John F. Kennedy's assassination, here's a thread on his relationship with Nikita Khrushchev, one of the most important relationships of the Cold War. Moscow welcomed JFK's election as President in 1960. Khrushchev's relationship with Eisenhower deteriorated sharply after the U2 incident in May 1960. He privately called Ike a "non-entity", and derided Vice President Nixon, as a "careerist," a "time-server", and "an empty suit."

A few comments on Putin in Beijing.
Putin attended the third BRI forum (Oct. 17-18). This is his second trip outside of Russia this year (the first was to Bishkek a few days ago). So it's a big deal. Let's take a closer look. Xi Jinping literally put Putin front and Center. Here's the group photo, where you see Xi flanked by Putin (on the right) and his wife Peng Liyuan (on the left). I won't venture to guess whom he feels closer to.

An interesting article by Timothy Snyder: . As a fellow historian with pretensions of a public intellectual, I will disagree with my esteemed colleague's analysis. I find that his key points are 1) theoretically unsustainable and 2) potentially defamatory.amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/… First this here. Snyder argues that Ukrainian strikes on Crimea are "de-escalatory, as such attacks reduce Russia's capability to attack Ukrainian territory." The argument is of course directed at @elonmusk's claim that attacking Crimea could have been deemed escalatory.

Very significant language from the Putin-Kim meeting, where Kim claims Russia is waging a "sacred struggle", and says that he "always supported and supports all decisions by President Putin." Elsewhere Kim says relations with Russia are North Korea's "foremost priority". This will not go unnoticed by the Chinese.

An interesting thread. A couple of notes.
For a start, the Chechen war actually started before Putin (under Yeltsin), though of course it was put on hold at Khasavyurt. Second - much more importantly - criticism such as this seems unfair.

https://twitter.com/RG_Horvath/status/1685255961672646656

The key issue for American policy-makers in the 1990s and early 2000s was how to strengthen democratic tendencies in Russia at a time when Russia was clearly facing democratic backsliding and a nationalistic resurgence. The line to be walked was thin and far from obvious.

Let's talk about where we are with Russia.
For the second time in three days, Putin addressed the Russian people to condemn an "armed rebellion." In this second iteration, he came across as much angrier. Yet, in the end, he simply repeated that Wagner can leave for Belarus. Putin's impotent rage highlights the underlying weakness of his position. Long gone are the days when he promised to "beat the shit out of terrorists in the outhouse." Today's Putin has to settle for compromise solutions, and even resort to the services of Lukashenko.

Putin links Prigozhin to Ukraine, suggesting that they were working towards the same goal: Russia's defeat.

Main takeaways:
1) No backing down (Shoigu remains in post).
2) Harsh condemnation of Prigozhin's "treason"
3) Those Wagnerites who want to, can "exit" freely to Belarus. Lukashenko earns a notable mention, suggesting that, as I previously argued, he has increased his weight relative to Putin's, as someone who saved Russia from a civil war.