Carter is gone. RIP. In my book, To Run the World, I talk at length of his impact on US-Soviet relations. Broadly speaking, he annoyed everyone in Moscow. Actually, at first the Soviets thought he might be a welcome change after the rocky Ford presidency.

Tucker claims we are "now far closer [to a nuclear war] than we were during the Cuban Missile Crisis." As a historian of the Cuban Missile Crisis, let me weigh in here.

https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1864092222091657502

So, the first thing to know is that we don't know how close we were to a nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I think it's fair to say that there's a scholarly consensus that a deliberate nuclear exchange was not in the cards in Oct. 1962, but there is some disagreement over whether a nuclear war could have happened accidentally.

For example, JFK could have ordered the invasion of Cuba (instead of the quarantine), and the Soviet military in Cuba could have tried to repel an invasion with tactical nukes. (They were explicitly prohibited from using IRBMs without Moscow's prior authorization, but there was no such explicit prohibition re tactical nukes). Likely? Who can tell?

The other popular example is the one related to Vasily Arkhipov who in popular lore "saved the world" by talking one of the submarine captains out of firing a nuclear torpedo. A well-known but surprisingly poorly documented episode.

Anyway, things could have gone off the rails for any number of reasons, but it's hard to say how "close" we were to a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it's impossible to prove a negative.

No it's not. The Korean War was not a world war, although 16 countries participated in the UN coalition on the South Korean side, and the Chinese and the Soviets on the North Korean side.

https://twitter.com/Kasparov63/status/1860773390077894968

The Vietnam War was not a world war, despite the involvement of third parties like the South Koreans or the Soviets (air defense) or indeed the Chinese (thousands of railroad troops).

Putin has staged another performance concerning the "missile": . He bragged about the specs and promised to start serial production. A master bullshi**er, he delights in intimidation. You can tell from his demeanor here that he thinks his tactic has worked.kremlin.ru/events/preside… One thing he said in his statement is particularly interesting. "We all emerged from different Soviet institutions. We were all educated by what was achieved by previous generations." Let me follow through on this to show how Putin's bullish**ting is an established tradition.

Ok let's talk a little about the infamous "statement". . The most interesting bit is how Putin used the word "testing" to create a certain ambiguity around Russia's actions.kremlin.ru/events/preside… Note that he vaguely threatened to also "test" IRBMs against NATO targets ("we consider ourself to have the right...") while literally in the next paragraph he appeared to suggest that targets would actually be in Ukraine.

As the incoming Trump administration considers options on Ukraine, the big question will be this: can Putin be enticed or coerced into a peace deal, and at what price. Let's consider some of the ingredients. (A thread of five points). 1) Permanent non-nuclear neutrality for Ukraine. Promising *not* to admit Ukraine into NATO would entail going back on NATO's own recent proclamations (i.e. "Ukraine's future is in NATO"). This would be a big symbolic victory for Putin, though it won't be a huge practical concession, insofar as despite the proclamations, the chances of Ukraine being admitted into NATO in our lifetimes were anyway close to nil. Permanent neutrality could be guaranteed a la Istanbul, provided the US were willing to participate as a guarantor-state (not a given but could be an important card to play).

Amid all the Canadian soul searching in light of the alleged recruitment of David Pugliese by the Soviet KGB, let me share what I think is a much more important aspect of Soviet involvement with the Canadians: purchase of critical technologies during the Cold War. (A thread). People would of course know of the significance of West Siberian oil. After the discovery of Samotlor in 1965, Soviet oil production began to shift east from the depleted Tatarstan fields and into the wilderness of Tyumen. The problem was getting to that oil, and getting it out.

This here, from Putin, in response to @BBCSteveR's question about Russia's security and how it has worsened since the invasion of Ukraine, is very revealing. Before presenting his usual case about NATO enlargement etc etc (summed up here: ) Putin says: "we were being constantly shown our place" by the West.bbc.com/news/videos/c9…

Zelensky's pitch: NATO membership for Ukraine, or nukes, raises interesting questions. First, as Marianna Budjeryn shows in her excellent book () one of the reasons Ukraine originally chose not to pursue a nuclear status (moral and legal considerations aside) is the absence of a full nuclear cycle.amazon.co.uk/Inheriting-Bom… This is by no means a minor issue to address, especially in wartime. Especially in the face of a determined adversary intent on preventing such a scenario. But suppose this could be addressed, and Ukraine managed to build a few nuclear bombs. Then what?

A very interesting statement from Kara-Murza here. I agree with him in principle that a democratic Russia should be included in the security architecture of a future Europe (otherwise Europe will never be secure).

https://twitter.com/adagamov/status/1819449452542992555

On the other hand, there is a massive distance between that noble goal and the pressing reality of a resurgent, revanchist, aggressive Russia, which needs to be contained and deterred, not flirted with.

This here is pretty entertaining (and I have never seen anything like this). Russia's foreign intelligence (SVR) publishes fake "declassified" reports by its rezidenty in Kyiv, Paris, Riga, and Washington who are identified as "Aleks," "Feliks," "Diaz," "Stone," and Nora. These fake reports promote conspiracy theories like one here that claims that the Americans are secretly hiring Latin American criminals to fight in Ukraine.

I am a little bit late to the discussion of this important article by Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher: . Let me weigh in on the core argument, however, because it is all about one of the central themes of my book - detente.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… I both agree and disagree with Pottinger and Gallagher in how they draw the parallel between the failure of detente and our own days. First, let me talk a bit about where I disagree with them. This here.

A few thoughts on the Putin-Xi presser.
1) Xi described his conversation with Putin as "frank, friendly, and substantive". "Frank" is the usual codeword for disagreements; "friendly" suggests that disagreements were nevertheless secondary to the broader alignment of views. 2) "Friendship forever"

An interesting thread, which comes to different conclusions about the March-April 2022 peace talks than @scharap and I do in our article. There are several problematic aspects to this thread. I'll point out three.

https://twitter.com/dszeligowski/status/1785771531458462188

First this. @dszeligowski claims that "it is not ... true that Russia agreed to Ukraine's accession to the EU." He then corrects himself by saying that "it expressed its consent in principle, but subject to conditions that Ukraine rejected."

https://x.com/dszeligowski/status/1785771557404426553

So allow me to respond to this in detail because this is very interesting.

First, the argument that "I know quite a few people in the loop and everyone of them disagrees with the article" is completely unconvincing, and can be easily countered with the following equally unconvincing argument: "I know quite a few people in the loop, many of them directly involved in the negotiations, and everyone of them thinks the article is spot on."

Now that the unconvincing arguments have been presented upfront, let's turn to a more serious discussion. First, about the article.
Our article with @scharap constructs a very complex set of arguments, so if you agree or disagree with the article, it's useful to explain what aspect of the argument you agree or disagree with.

- That at the negotiators prepared the text of a draft treaty on security guarantees that provided for Ukraine's permanent neutrality, which had a number of issues still unresolved, which we meticulously elaborate in the article?

- That the negotiations continued for weeks after Bucha and Irpin, which unambiguously suggests that Bucha and Irpin did not lead to the breakdown of negotiations, even if the Russian atrocities steeled Zelensky's resolve to continue the fight?

- That nevertheless the negotiations broke down eventually, and that was for the three reasons we elaborate, including the prospects of winning the war (which seemed brighter after the Russians retreated from Kyiv)?

- That the Ukrainians counted on a Western buy-in in the security guarantees process, and that it wasn't forthcoming for reasons that we explain?

- That Boris Johnson did *not* force Ukraine to abandon negotiations, and that the claim that he did is a caricature (the word we use in the article)?

- That the Ukrainians had not consulted with the US on the US buy-in before Istanbul?

- That the draft treaty contained a number of interesting ideas, proposed by the Russians, about changing specific Ukrainian laws on historical memory and language, and that these proposals amounted to a face-saving measure that would cover Putin's insistence on "nenazification"?

- That while we don't know whether Putin and Zelensky negotiated in good faith, it is at least conceivable that the negotiators themselves thought so because an advanced version of the draft and the multiple attached protocols point to a serious negotiation?

So which one of these arguments do the esteemed experts disagree with? All of them? Good. But at least we have the evidence upon which we rest our claims.

Hmm okay well let's address this (with apologies to @slantchev, I overlooked the original critique). I now found it: .

https://x.com/slantchev/status/1780267015091183934

https://twitter.com/slantchev/status/1780627320119935244

This long thread is actually contradictory. Thus, here @slantchev argues that the Ukrainians were negotiating in good faith (I would agree btw). However, later in the same thread, he claims that the Ukrainians were simply trying to deflect the blame for the failure of the talks.

It's time to address some of the points raised by the esteemed commentariat. But, first of all, thank you for your engagement. @scharap and I expected that the article would be of interest, and we were certainly not disappointed.

https://twitter.com/ForeignAffairs/status/1780558910883061901

This thread here by @dszeligowski was interesting, I thought. . Poland's role in the talks is indeed worth exploring. I would say Poland's role in the Ukrainian calculus was not all that important, however. The US loomed (and continues to loom) much larger, so it's hardly surprising that we skirted Poland's role. Turkey was another player that clearly had a very important role in the story. We do not have enough information, however, to offer definitive conclusions about what that role might have been.

It has to be kept in mind that the article is in any case twice (or more?) the length of regular Foreign Affairs articles, and there are many stories and angles that we simply had no space for, including such tantalizing episodes as the (alleged) poisoning of the Ukrainian delegation, Abramovich's role, etc, etc. We are grateful to @ForeignAffairs for giving as much space as they did: it's a long read!

On the other hand, some statements in the thread are based on nothing but conjecture. Thus, "Russia never abandoned its maximalist goal. Realising that the plan to seize Kyiv "in three days" had failed, Moscow wanted to subjugate Ukraine at the negotiating table, but missed the moment when the fortune turned in favour of Ukraine and they were thrown out from Kyiv region."

It's incorrect because the Russians began negotiations while the offensive was only just beginning. The demands they made were for Ukraine's capitulation. However, their position softened and demands were modified once it became clear that the offensive was failing. Moreover, the notion that "Russia never abandoned its maximalist goal" is based on pure conjecture. Our purpose in this article was to steer clear of conjecture and indicate uncertainty where we were uncertain, e.g.:

https://x.com/dszeligowski/status/1780183950507262201

Foreign Affairs published today the results of a most fruitful collaboration between @scharap and yours truly, an article on the failed peace talks between Russia and Ukraine (March-April 2022). .foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-… The main takeaway: it's complicated. The talks indeed produced important documents, which we saw and analyzed. There are some remarkable revelations in these drafts.

The Russian Orthodox Church holds the 25th congress of the "Russian world." They adopt a policy document: [in Russian]. I nearly spilled my coffee reading it. About every sentence is pure gold, but the gist is this:patriarchia.ru/db/text/611618… 1. Russia needs to increase its population to 600 million people. This is to be achieved through government propaganda of "traditional values," criminalization of abortions, and writing off mortgages for families who have more than 2 children.

Some takeaways from the Russian election.

1) This election is a sham.

This, of course, should be obvious, but it's important to restate this basic fact. What makes it a sham is *not* whether it actually reflects the views of Russian voters (on this more below), but whether it was conducted in accordance with accepted criteria for a free and fair election, which fundamentally entails the making of a real choice between alternative candidates. There are of course other criteria, like equal access to airtime, the use (or not) of administrative resources, or voter intimidation, etc - the so-called "even playing field."

The second reason why this election is a sham is that the numbers produced by the Central Election Commission cannot be verified, and there is every reason to believe that they can be manipulated any way the regime wants.

So, once again, this election was fraudulent by definition. 2) Putin is genuinely popular among the Russian electorate.

Even if this election were not a sham but were in fact conducted freely and fairly, there is a good chance that Putin would still have won. Of course, he would not have secured the preposterously high margin. But polls indicate significant support for Putin - not just now, when polling has become more problematic - but going back years.

An interesting piece drawing on leaked documents that show Russia training to use battlefield nuclear weapons against potential adversaries, including China. A few caveats:

https://twitter.com/walberque/status/1762713918953116012

1) It's not surprising that Russia has military plans to use tactical nukes against potential adversaries. By contrast, it would be hugely surprising if Russia did not have such military plans: what's the use of these weapons then? This has always been the case.