Great thread here by @Brad_Setser trying to puzzle out Trump’s trade strategy. (TL;DR – escalating at this point doesn’t give Trump much leverage, and China knows it.)
One additional puzzle from me: where are all the national security voices on this? (1/x)
@Brad_Setser DC is full of debates on rethinking China, ‘the new China consensus’, whether or not there actually *is* a consensus, rival “open letters”, etc. But this discussion is, for the most part, carrying on separately from current US-China trade tensions. (2/)
@Brad_Setser Meanwhile, Trump admin seems to fully buy in to hawkish national security views of China (it’s in the national security strategy, talk of ‘clash of civilizations’, etc.) But we haven’t heard much from those quarters on the current trade war. (3/)
@Brad_Setser On trade, the Trump admin talks a lot about how China is cheating and taking advantage of us. But not a lot about how this fits into a grand strategy of great power competition. (4/)
@Brad_Setser Does the Trump admin think economic interdependence with China is a strategic liability? Does it want to see decoupling? If so, it should say so! Because that might actually convince American firms to reconfigure supply chains, rather than just waiting out a tariff spat. (5/)
@Brad_Setser So while, as @Brad_Setser argues, the economic strategy hasn’t been clearly articulated, neither has the foreign policy / national security strategy. Maybe there’s a lot going on behind the scenes we don’t see, but hard to figure out a coherent strategy. (6/)
@Brad_Setser And at some point USG will need to publicly articulate a China strategy, especially if it expects the public to bear costs. (And there will be costs.) (7/)
@Brad_Setser Currently, at a very basic level, it is unclear to me if the goal of the trade war is to get China to open up its market and increase interdependence between the two countries, or the opposite of that. Which is … not a great way to fight a war! (8/end)
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🚨🚨 New (or at least new to the public) CFIUS case - US blocked Chinese company from acquiring a fertility clinic in San Diego. A few quick thoughts, based on this great in-depth reporting from CNBC here 1/ cnbc.com/2020/10/16/tru…
First, CFIUS secrecy remains a real challenge. CFIUS notes this happened "sometime during the Trump admin", but won't say when. Don't know who the acquiring company or the target was. So we have official sources confirming something happened but can't say what or when... 2/
That said, this report does have more than we normally get, which is a DOJ CFIUS official talking in general terms about, hypothetically, why action would be justified in this type of case. It's a small step toward public engagement, which is welcome 3/
Japan expanding its supply chain policies, specifically focused on a "China+1" model - objective not necessarily reshoring, but avoiding concentration of production in any one country. 1/4
My reading of the investment incentives literature is that these kind of subsidies usually aren't that effective - most of the money ends up going to firms that were going to move anyways, with or without incentives. So we'll see. 2/4
Don't know the details here, but says "subsidies apply to products for which manufacturing tends to be concentrated in a specific country." Curious if there's some kind of H index threshold for eligibility - would allow for regression discontinuity to identify any effect? 3/4
Excellent thread. I think a lot of the quick analysis in the US is misreading what happened here - IMHO this isn't a story about the UK hardening on China, it's about the persistent regulatory power of the US in global supply chains 1/
For example this description from the NYT suggests this is about the UK opting to confront China, views it as a threat, etc. 2/
But the UK gov'ts own explanation for the move doesn't suggest anything like this. They're quite clear: new US sanctions announced in May are going to make it difficult for Huawei to maintain its supply chains, which creates risks about reliability. 3/ ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/a-di…
On A, I think I mostly agree w/ Sarah’s comments here. Certainly true that foreign production isn’t nec more vulnerable, & domestic production isn’t nec more resilient. /2
I see two dimensions in which states are reasserting autonomy: specific worry about dependence on China, & broader worry about being at mercy of ‘global markets’, and seeking more hands-on steering of globalization. Neither of these nec mean bringing production ‘home’. 3/
There’s a global rush to reconfigure supply chains to reassert national autonomy and resilience. A brief thread on why, ironically*, this shift from globalism to sovereign autonomy may demand more int’l coordination, not less. 1/
*plz don’t @ me over definition of irony
First, for all the focus on Donald Trump’s economic nationalism, worth noting that other world powers are also acting to reconfigure supply chains. 2/
For instance, in a speech earlier today, EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan spoke on the need to ensure the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’, including ‘building resilient supply chains, based on diversification’ 3/ ec.europa.eu/commission/com…
This article is a strong argument for invoking the DPA – the medical market has become a deeply dysfunctional Wild West, and desperately needs some top down coordination.
Effective top down coordination in a crisis would be great. As that Post article shows, US hospitals are in the dark negotiating with shady middle men, bidding up prices against each other. No one knows where these goods are coming from. It’s a mess. 2/
But the recent record of the USG doesn’t give much reason to expect effective coordination. Partially this is about Trump himself, and the appointees/high level advisers around him, who don’t exactly inspire confidence. 3/