Thread by @garius

I haven't done a military history thread for a while.

So let's talk about the 1932 Emu War. In which the Commonwealth of Australia fought and lost a short but bloody war against...

...well. Against Emus.

Some context: Up until the 1920s, relations between Australia and what we will refer to here, for simplicity, as the 'Emu Nation' (which was really a loose confederation of autonomous tribes) had been relatively cordial.

By 1922, however, this situation had deteriorated rapidly, particularly in Western Australia. Here, the government had purchased approx. 90,000 hectares of marginal farmland that it offered to WW1 veterans as part of a settlement scheme to grow wheat.

This brought the settlers into sporadic conflict with the local Emus, who frequently migrated through this region or stopped there during times of drought.

Small-scale Emu raids (units of 20-100) on farms became increasingly common, often backed up by larger forces of rabbits.

Farmer irregular units were largely able to repel these small raids, supported financially by a government beak bounty scheme.

Increasing wheat yields, however, due to government pressure to boost exports after the 1929 Wall Street crash, had not gone unnoticed by the Emus.

In late summer of 1932, a combined force of approx. 20,000 Emus crossed into the Wheatbelt, near Perth in Western Australia.

Armed only with rifles, the farmers were overwhelmed and unable to repel the invasion. They appealed to the government for help.

In response, the Australian government dispatched a small relief force of machine gunners from the 7th Heavy Battery of the Royal Australian Artillery, led by Major G.P. Meredith.

The Emu War had begun.

On 2nd Nov 1932, Meredith received reports of a small force of Emus approaching the strategically important town of Campion. Meredith rapidly deployed his machine guns on their line of advance and ordered farmer irregulars to pressure their wings.

At 1000 yards, Meredith's machine gunners opened fire immediately halting the Emu advance. The emu force broke and dispersed, disappearing into the nearby tree line.

Emboldened by the success, Meredith used similar tactics to disperse other Emu forces in the region.

The next day, Meredith's forces succeeded in ambushing and routing a force of 50 Emus occupying a nearby wheatfield, inflicting heavy casualties.

It was already becoming clear, however, that tactically Meredith had a problem. Worse, that the Emus knew it.

On the 4th Nov 1932 Meredith tried to bring the full Emu force to decisive battle. Meredith deployed his machine guns and irregulars ahead of an advancing force of 1,000 Emus.

Again, the Emu attack was immediately routed, but again they withdrew at speed, with minimum casualties

Meredith's force was designed on the WW1 model. Occupy. Hold. Decimate with overlapping machine gunfire.

The Emus, however, had fully embraced the concept of mobile warfare. They didn't just have superior numbers, their ENTIRE force could move at 35mph or more.

From now on, the Emu force refused to take the field in force. Instead, they dispersed across the wheatfield in raiding parties of 50 to 100 birds, attacking in multiple places at once.

Meredith's men reported these units were led by an Emu who:

'Keeps watch while his fellows busy themselves with the wheat. At the first suspicious sign, he gives the signal, and dozens of heads stretch up out'

The Emus would retreat,the leader always the last to leave the field

To counter the Emu's mobile advantage, Meredith requisitioned trucks, mounting a machine gun on one.

This yielded little success. The Emu easily outpaced the machine gun truck. Another truck was disabled by an Emu which fell under it, disabled its steering and caused it to crash

Unable to counter the rapid Emu units operating in the north of his zone of operations, Meredith shifted his forces south. There, the Emu were said to be 'tamer' and using more traditional, static tactics.

Focusing on ambush, he was soon reporting more success to his superiors.

The numbers, however, showed that this success was limited. By 8th Nov. Meredith had used 25% of his ammunition, for only 200 Emu kills - at best, to one Emu per 10 shots fired.

Emus it turned out, were REALLY hard to kill.

"If we had a military division with the bullet-carrying capacity of these birds, it would face any army in the world." Meredith wrote in his report. "They could face machine guns with the invulnerability of tanks."

That report was necessary because, on the 9th Nov. 1932 politics intervened. Worried that the Emus seemed to be winning, and worried about the image of the government and army, Meredith's force was recalled.

It was, however only a temporary retreat. The War was FAR from over.

And our story of the Emu War continues here...

https://twitter.com/garius/status/1167471307539341313