I assessed what the macro data tells us about the Tax Cut & Jobs Act for @AEIdeas. My bottom line: "not much". Since passage GDP growth has slowed slightly as slowing consumption & investment growth only partly offset by faster govt spending. #TCJANowWhataei.org/publication/no…
The second sense in which the data tell us "not much" is that is the difficulty of extracting the signal (the effect of the tax cut) from the noise (the effect of the Fed, global economy, trade war, oil prices, fiscal stimulus, etc. etc. etc.)
A lot of sector-specific stories are important. This table tells some of them: (i) oil-related investment growth slowed dramatically as oil prices stopped their rapid rise; (2) software and R&D growth increased for reasons unrelated to the TCJA; and (3) everything else slowed.
At least three macro stories are also important but go in different directions: fiscal stimulus boosted the economy while the trade wars and interest rate increases went in the opposite direction.
Sorting all of this out the main conclusion is that the second sense of "not much" (hard to extract the signal from the noise) reinforces the first sense of "not much" (if the tax cut was so important relative to everything else we would see the signal much more clearly).
The best hope for a better understanding of the causal impact of the TCJA will be microeconomic research that looks at how similar firms are affected differently by the law and tracking their differential responses.
Ultimately, however, the most important issue is what to do going forward. I believe we can have a more efficient business tax system while raising more revenue than the current system. I couldn't explain it in 280 characters so you'll have to read the image.
I really appreciate @aparnamath and @erinmelly2 inviting me to write this--and recommend you stay tuned for the all star cast they have doing upcoming blogs on the TCJA drawing on a diverse set of expertise and perspectives. aei.org/tag/trumps-tax…
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Strong jobs report. 177K jobs added. Unemployment rate steady at 4.2% but participation rate up and U-6 down. Hours steady. A slowdown in hourly wage growth.
Federal employment was down a bit but state and local more than made up for it. The trend in private jobs is basically the same as total.
Unemployment rate very slowly drifted up for the last year and a half.
Wednesday's Q1 GDP # will have a lot of economic noise, a lot of measurement noise, and could generate even more political noise.
A technical🧵on one aspect: what period does it reflect?
The answer is a combo of pre- and post- 1/20 because of the weirdness of quarterly averages
When I (and most people) look at things like CPI or jobs, we look at something like a three month average. That would be growth from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025. Which is also the (geometric) average of the growth rates in Jan, Feb and Mar. It tells you what happened in those 3 months.
But GDP is not reported monthly (fortunately, would be really volatile). So the numbers are the growth from the average of Oct/Nov/Dec to Jan/Feb/Mar. If there is weak growth in Nov or Dec that lowers part of Q4 but all of Q1 so lowers overall growth.
Core PCE inflation came in a little above the already high expectations in Feb. The pattern is the opposite of what you want to see--the shorter the window the higher the annualized rate (and still high at 12 months):
Here are the full set of numbers. They were uniformly ugly in February.
If you're looking for some slivers of reassurance, market-based core (which excludes imputed items like portfolio fees) was only up 2.4% over the last 12 months. And "only" 3.0% annualized over the last three, less than the regular core.
Income taxes are distort trade by reducing purchases of imports. At least they do so as much as VATs do. Which is to say not any more than they reduce purchases of domestic goods.
A hopefully irrelevant thread.
A simple toy example.
Consider a person in Spain with 100€ in income that they use to buy oranges. Absent taxes oranges cost 1€. They must spend all their income this year.
In this case they could buy 100 total oranges--imported plus Spanish.
Now assume there's a 25% VAT.
VAT raises the cost of imported oranges to 1.25€, this is the way it is supposed to be like a tariff.
Of course, also raises the cost of Spanish oranges to 1.25€. This is not a tariff & is trade neutral.