I assessed what the macro data tells us about the Tax Cut & Jobs Act for @AEIdeas. My bottom line: "not much". Since passage GDP growth has slowed slightly as slowing consumption & investment growth only partly offset by faster govt spending. #TCJANowWhataei.org/publication/no…
The second sense in which the data tell us "not much" is that is the difficulty of extracting the signal (the effect of the tax cut) from the noise (the effect of the Fed, global economy, trade war, oil prices, fiscal stimulus, etc. etc. etc.)
A lot of sector-specific stories are important. This table tells some of them: (i) oil-related investment growth slowed dramatically as oil prices stopped their rapid rise; (2) software and R&D growth increased for reasons unrelated to the TCJA; and (3) everything else slowed.
At least three macro stories are also important but go in different directions: fiscal stimulus boosted the economy while the trade wars and interest rate increases went in the opposite direction.
Sorting all of this out the main conclusion is that the second sense of "not much" (hard to extract the signal from the noise) reinforces the first sense of "not much" (if the tax cut was so important relative to everything else we would see the signal much more clearly).
The best hope for a better understanding of the causal impact of the TCJA will be microeconomic research that looks at how similar firms are affected differently by the law and tracking their differential responses.
Ultimately, however, the most important issue is what to do going forward. I believe we can have a more efficient business tax system while raising more revenue than the current system. I couldn't explain it in 280 characters so you'll have to read the image.
I really appreciate @aparnamath and @erinmelly2 inviting me to write this--and recommend you stay tuned for the all star cast they have doing upcoming blogs on the TCJA drawing on a diverse set of expertise and perspectives. aei.org/tag/trumps-tax…
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Jobs report uniformly weak: 92K jobs lost (with job losses in almost every industry), household survey employment down too, unemployment rate up to 4.4%, participation down, avg weekly hours flat.
Main sign in the other direction was strong wage growth.
The dynamics for private employment look just like overall (86K lost in private with govt basically flat.
Unemployment rate still stable or slightly rising. Breakeven job growth is in the 25-50K range so negative jobs months will be more common and normal going forward. Note 3-month moving average of jobs is 6K so a bit below this range.
More than *all* of the jobs added over the last year have been in private education & health services.
Total jobs: 359K
Private education & health services: 773K
All other sectors: -414K
This might look surprisingly unbalanced. It's actually the opposite.
A 🧵
Here is percentage job growth across sectors over the last year. Dropping the two most extreme they range from 0.8% for leisure & hospitality to -1.5% for information, a 2.2pp difference.
(Note this post generally uses 3 month moving averages to smooth otherwise volatile data.)
This is job growth in 1996. It looks more balanced than 2025 because every industry added jobs. But actually the gap between the second highest (professional services at 5.1%) and second lowest (mining at 0.4%) is 4.7pp. Much more dispersed than this year.
Core CPI inflation rose during the month of January. But it fell and was relatively muted over longer periods of time--although still some concern the numbers a bit lower due to shutdown-related quirks.
On the surface a strong jobs report (130K jobs & unemployment falls to 4.3%).
And just about every detail makes it even stronger: participation up, involuntary part-time down, hours up, wages up.
The mystery of strong GDP and weak jobs is being resolved in the direction of GDP.
The job growth happened despite further cuts in federal jobs. Private employment was up an impressive 172K.
Note, breakeven job growth is currently about 25-50K because of reduced net immigration & also more fully recovered participation. So job growth has slowed but the unemployment rate now seems to have stabilized after slowly and steadily increasing since mid-2023.
I will be enthusiastically supporting faculty legislation to cap the number of A's at Harvard at 20% (plus a bit). The collective action problem that has driven grades higher & higher over time is increasingly problematic. I hope other institutions consider similar steps.
I've talked to numerous colleagues & students about grade inflation. Almost all of them see it as a a problem. I've also heard about as many different ideas for solutions as I've had conversations. I would tweak this proposal in various ways. But would support it over nothing.
One place the current system fails--and it's not the only place--is honors. I'm on the Committee to recommend honors in the economics department. It's increasingly hard to distinguish excellence with so many A's. I believe that now even two A-'s makes you ineligible for Summa.