Ännu en HOP kurs lider mot sitt slut, och ännu en gång är förtroendet och en positivt synsätt på #SvFM, dess officerare, och framtiden. Våran intellektuella kraft är bra, och fortsätter öka!
Att höra majorer prata med professionsföreträdare, i en öppen diskussion med ordentligt teoretiskt och metodologiskt underlag, om otroligt relevanta ämnen för försvarets framtid är inte bara roligt - det visar på styrkan i våran tankekraft!
Värt att poängtera är att kadetter - första året dessutom - har också imponerat. Vi är otroligt bra på att använda våra huvuden, och att utbilda för att stärka knopparna.
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I'm grading papers of Swedish cadets discussing Ru vs German Operational Art. What strikes me, and not as a comment towards my cadets as much as the general perspective of comparing the two, is how we read, talk about, and teach them as these two polar opposites.
German OpArt didn't lack planning, preparations, and logistics, nor did it lack concentration of firepower to create holes in opposing lines. (WWII)
Soviet (as per formal OpArt, not Russian fuck-ups in Ukraine) didn't argue for massed waves of attacks ...
... allowed for initiative, and didn't always depend on heavy firepower. Hell, I'd even argue that the two are to many degrees more similar than different.
If our teaching of these different approaches are tied to "what are we most like", then it's a false equivalency.
A running theme for the last few weeks of my TL is a debate - or commentary on the debate - of changes in the Marine Corps, commonly called FD2030, EABO, or SIF - depending on context.
Some observations from me, who is studying these changes for my PhD.
I start by paraphrasing the eminent scholar of the Corps, Terry Terriff: much is driven by an institutional paranoia, which goes into an existential fear of relevance. The Corps, already a somewhat paradoxical organization, is always seeking of its relevance.
These arguments - no comment on right or wrong - are clearly present. Both Pro and Anti sides appeal to relevance, and that's all fair - pro obviously arguing that change is how relevance is retained, while anti seems to have missed their own point: change leads to irrelevance.
Short thread to collate a very incomplete thought: much of 'western' issues in context of Ukraine - both before, and now during, the war - seem to relate to 1, an attempt at predicting the future, and 2, on being uncomfortable with uncertainty.
'Western' because I'm mostly aware of discourse in regards to western reactions to the war. But as some threads floating around twitter pointed out, Russia is doing much better in information in for example Serbia, India, and other paces - but I don't have knowledge there.
Problem 1: Predicting the future. Can we predict the future? Can we ever know 1, the full picture, and 2, predict something? Big questions that a lot of philosophy of science rotates around - as does questions of intelligence.
@Justin_Br0nk It's funny, despite all the changes going on I caught two things back in 2015/16: 1, the Indian Air Force could barely keep their own Su-27/30 in the air, because the reliability was so poor - and that was with production in country.
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@Justin_Br0nk 2, the VKS never moved away from the Soviet standard of air C2 - ground-based, radar-vectored. They eventually got data-links, but still had a tendency to design their aircraft for plane-ground-plane comms/coord instead of plane-plane-air radar as the West did.
@Justin_Br0nk Further, as several pilots who had flown both Gripen and Eurofighters told me, they were not concerned at all about the supposed maneuverability of Su-XX, because 1, they hadn't been used that way in ops, and 2, if the planes were slowed down they had already lost.
Pro-Russian telegram was sharing this map. Notably, it includes larger areas under Russian control, highlights the strong concentration of Ukr forces in the east, and a combat zone along Transnistria.
It is biased against Ukraine, but shows how different the war is depicted.
This photo was circulating yesterday, stating that a new T-80BVM was captured.
A separate message claimed that a whole battalion of the same type of tanks were captured.
An example of contrasting propaganda, rumors, and evidence.
Another are the sailors from Snake island (Russian warship, go fuck yourself). Turns out they’re alive.
Mixed thoughts after a few days of fighting, in no special order:
1. A lot has been said by others, but one thing that strikes me is that maps are poorly updated, often being very hesitant in assigning territory to Russian forces. Can lead to unwittingly obscuring view ...
... for us observing, but for example the Ru to the west of Kyiv have now essentially placed themselves in a blocking position. Might not have large forces to actually defend against larger counter-attacks, but clearly they hold more terrain than is depicted.
Similar goes for forces to the north of Melitopol; check out LivemapUA with updates from the 27th only, and contrast the furthest forward forces with what maps from all different(mostly western) outlets are showing. Seems that there are significant forces and movement ...