Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

You can paste full URL like: https://x.com/threadreaderapp/status/1644127596119195649
or just the ID like: 1644127596119195649

How to get URL link on X (Twitter) App

  1. On the Twitter thread, click on or icon on the bottom
  2. Click again on or Share Via icon
  3. Click on Copy Link to Tweet
  4. Paste it above and click "Unroll Thread"!
  5. More info at Twitter Help
Henrik Paulsson Profile picture
Henrik Paulsson
@henrikrpaulsson
Researcher @ Swedish Defence University. I mostly study change, tactics, and drones.
Jun 24 • 26 tweets • 5 min read
Henrik's Monday morning (procrastination) musing-thread: Force Design 2030, name calling, and a lack of (?) debate

So this piece came out a few days ago, attacking @MAGTravF @CTReese2 @ian_tb03 and @PHLexpat.
It's not well written. Not worth your time. >
realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/… > a TL;DR is that these Marines - and implicitly others who write in support of FD2030 - are alternatively instructed by their bosses or DC think tanks to write in support of FD2030; the implication being mil-ind complex and corporate interests governing and driving it. >
Nov 23, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
I'm grading papers of Swedish cadets discussing Ru vs German Operational Art. What strikes me, and not as a comment towards my cadets as much as the general perspective of comparing the two, is how we read, talk about, and teach them as these two polar opposites. German OpArt didn't lack planning, preparations, and logistics, nor did it lack concentration of firepower to create holes in opposing lines. (WWII)

Soviet (as per formal OpArt, not Russian fuck-ups in Ukraine) didn't argue for massed waves of attacks ...
Apr 12, 2022 • 23 tweets • 5 min read
A running theme for the last few weeks of my TL is a debate - or commentary on the debate - of changes in the Marine Corps, commonly called FD2030, EABO, or SIF - depending on context.

Some observations from me, who is studying these changes for my PhD. I start by paraphrasing the eminent scholar of the Corps, Terry Terriff: much is driven by an institutional paranoia, which goes into an existential fear of relevance. The Corps, already a somewhat paradoxical organization, is always seeking of its relevance.
Mar 24, 2022 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
Short thread to collate a very incomplete thought: much of 'western' issues in context of Ukraine - both before, and now during, the war - seem to relate to 1, an attempt at predicting the future, and 2, on being uncomfortable with uncertainty. 'Western' because I'm mostly aware of discourse in regards to western reactions to the war. But as some threads floating around twitter pointed out, Russia is doing much better in information in for example Serbia, India, and other paces - but I don't have knowledge there.
Mar 4, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
@Justin_Br0nk It's funny, despite all the changes going on I caught two things back in 2015/16: 1, the Indian Air Force could barely keep their own Su-27/30 in the air, because the reliability was so poor - and that was with production in country.
> @Justin_Br0nk 2, the VKS never moved away from the Soviet standard of air C2 - ground-based, radar-vectored. They eventually got data-links, but still had a tendency to design their aircraft for plane-ground-plane comms/coord instead of plane-plane-air radar as the West did.
Mar 2, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Pro-Russian telegram was sharing this map. Notably, it includes larger areas under Russian control, highlights the strong concentration of Ukr forces in the east, and a combat zone along Transnistria.

It is biased against Ukraine, but shows how different the war is depicted. Image This photo was circulating yesterday, stating that a new T-80BVM was captured.
A separate message claimed that a whole battalion of the same type of tanks were captured.

An example of contrasting propaganda, rumors, and evidence. Image
Feb 27, 2022 • 27 tweets • 5 min read
Mixed thoughts after a few days of fighting, in no special order:

1. A lot has been said by others, but one thing that strikes me is that maps are poorly updated, often being very hesitant in assigning territory to Russian forces. Can lead to unwittingly obscuring view ... ... for us observing, but for example the Ru to the west of Kyiv have now essentially placed themselves in a blocking position. Might not have large forces to actually defend against larger counter-attacks, but clearly they hold more terrain than is depicted.
Sep 30, 2020 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
I don't get this talk about tanks being obsolete. All warfare comes down to bang bang and vroom vroom. IFVs? Not enough bang. Artillery? Not enough vroom. Tanks? Perfect balance of bang and vroom.
As such, all a military needs is lots of tanks. I mean, what does infantry do anyways? Take a hike and chat with the enemy over biscuits and tea? Pfft. Tanks go vroom vroom and bang bang. War over.
Sep 27, 2020 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
The problem with this article, and others before, is that with opinion pieces they need to be taken at good faith. That is, they are expected to adhere to factual statements- but it isn’t. It is the role of the pub and it’s editors to step in when this keeps on happening. Both the quoted thread, as well as the several branches off of @ArmchairMajor thread on it lifted up direct responses to its arguments: thinking the ‘next war’ will be more like WWI, assuming the opponent doesn’t have female combat troops, etc - all of which are problematic.
Aug 24, 2020 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Reminds me of this recent article in WotR, on producing in-house solutions. The USMC team went on a road-tour, and were able to in only a few days create different prototypes.
warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-ba… One of the SUAS team told me that only 1-in-10 could fly, but that's beyond the point: developing in-house leads to tailored solutions, in-house know-how, and the ability to specify something able to be built/maintained by local Marines.
Jul 28, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Utsökt artikel av @neretnieks, med många guldklimpar.

Tankarna för mig till @BZweibelson och design-tänk: Det är inte svaret som är viktigt, men istället vilka frågor man ställer sig. Situationer är alltid annorlunda - hur handskas vi med osäkerhet och flexibilitet? Vet at Övlt Westberg här på FHS har lyckats få in designtänk, och skickat svenskar till @BZweibelson och JSOU i USA tidigare. Tror vi även fick en mobile training team!

Kanada har genomfört ganska stora förändringar med designtänk i fokus, vilket OF-utb nu kretsar kring.
Jul 23, 2020 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
Content warning for the video in the link.

It shows a Syrian shoot a TOW-missile against a group of perhaps 15 soldiers standing together. It explodes perfectly on target, and the obvious conclusion that most died.

reddit.com/r/CombatFootag… The TOW is an anti tank weapon but can be used against other vehicles as well. @Rebel44CZ keeps track of these statistics with around 45% of videos showing the target as a non vehicle. These are mostly bunkers, buildings, and groups of soldiers.
Jun 26, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Finally got around to reading the most recent Marine Corps Gazette. It really is my favorite journal - this edition containing everything from a SSGT questioning how and if infantry recruitment and training corresponds with a maneuver warfare mindset to @tomricks1 on innovation. Sadly, it's a bit hard to get to without institutional access. See the Dropbox link here for a collection of some of my favorite articles - not that I necessarily agree with everything, but they highlight some of the excellent writing!
dropbox.com/sh/bs50hq7u7vf…
Jun 11, 2020 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
Non-return-to-twitter-thought-but-I-don't-have-a-blog-thread:
A thought I have been toying with is the inability to deal with contradictions. Turns out there is a thing called dialetheism - or the acceptance that there are statements which are both true and false. I for one struggle with how social sciences deal with theories - one must be true (or truer) than others. Gross simplification, but it was how it was explained to me as an undergrad.

Humorous example, of the state of the main philosopher of dialethism:
May 26, 2020 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Re-reading this article; happy that the Navy is doing their part of USMC's redesign.
Just musing here that the ideal for these would be the stern landing vessels mentioned in the article. But what else would be useful for the "littoral task force?"

thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3… RN using the term Littoral Strike Groups, so the USN needs their own.

Directly, I for one think having an equivalent of the RN Littoral Strike Ship/Ocean Trader style ship with them provides a capability that is cheaper than a San Antonio-class.
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/2…
May 11, 2020 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
forbes.com/sites/kelseyat… 40mm version: c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2019/…
Longer range: flightglobal.com/military-uavs/…
May 11, 2020 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Today is an important Swedish holiday: chokladbollens dag - chocolate ball day!
Here is my small batch. Btw, for all our liberal laws in Sweden, having a mandatory chocolate ball day is something I support. It’s enshrined in Fikalagsbalken:1523-Vasa. Image We have many such legal requirements in Sweden; these include Semla-day (a bank holiday), waffle-day, Mazarin-day, and Gustaf Adolfo-dagen (which controversially is not a bank holiday).
Mar 3, 2020 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
If you ever want an explanation of Indonesian military dynamics (and culture), this post is worth spending the many hours unpacking. Purely descriptive explanation of what is happening, but not an unpacking:

The Army Strategic Reserve Command (not reservists, but perhaps the most politically powerful Army unit) commander is leading an islamic praying in the mausoleum of the unit founder.
Jan 21, 2020 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Interesting article, but also one that poses the more important question: What happens when formations, be it from the squad up to brigade, keep on getting more information? How do leaders keep from being paralyzed by "the need for more information"?
armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Milit… It's something that comes up when discussing company and lower UAVs repeatedly. Hell, in a decently recent MC Gazette article, the OPFOR pointed out how the Marine coy and plt commanders relied almost too much of their UAS, slowing their pace down.
Dec 9, 2019 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/… “Our biggest single project, sadly and inadvertently, of course, may have been the development of mass corruption”
Dec 9, 2019 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
"If military leaders want real insight, one lesson from all this, is to accept views that work against the grain and to support junior officers’ opportunity to study and promote countervailing views."

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/berna… "Kilcullen explained that the hardest task in counterinsurgency is figuring out what is actually going on. Fall, perhaps more than any other observer writing in English before large-scale U.S. intervention in 1965, achieved the goal of explaining what was really happening ...