Alright, let's talk about this paper.
The deep issue here is the relationship between the phenomenological embodiment and artifacts. Ultimately, you can't have both. (Thread)
The deep issue here is the relationship between the phenomenological embodiment and artifacts. Ultimately, you can't have both. (Thread)
FWIW, I generally agree with the paper's stance towards the politics and ethics of AI as a field, and the threats it poses to human welfare.
It's not at all clear to me that recognizing these threats requires strong metaphysical distinctions between human and robot agency.
It's not at all clear to me that recognizing these threats requires strong metaphysical distinctions between human and robot agency.
I wrote a paper on how to align the robot rights (or "critical robot studies") discussions with other activist rights and welfare movements, drawing especially from the animal justice movement.
Rights are not zero sum.
digitalcommons.odu.edu/cepe_proceedin…
Rights are not zero sum.
digitalcommons.odu.edu/cepe_proceedin…
For instance, the animal justice and ecofeminist literatures provide good resources for dealing with the "white savior complex" inherent to the liberation discourse around rights, because they've been dealing with the same problems for decades. 
The animal justice literature also helps get over the "robot rights means rights like humans" misunderstanding that kicks off the OP paper, a mistake @David_Gunkel has been condemned to correct on Twitter for the rest of eternity.
twitter.com/search?q=(from…
twitter.com/search?q=(from…
It's unfortunate that the animal justice literature didn't find it's way into the OP paper, since animals provide a great example of embodied organisms that are also and at the same time artifacts.
Our agency is embodied, but so is the agency of our artifacts.
Our agency is embodied, but so is the agency of our artifacts.
The OP accuses the whole field of AI as indulging a Cartesian view of disembodied minds, and argues that embodiment is more fundamental.
At the same time, the paper argues that "artifacts attain their meaning by mediating our world [of] enactment".
At the same time, the paper argues that "artifacts attain their meaning by mediating our world [of] enactment".
IMO, the Dreyfus-Heidegger phenomenological view is just another form of subject-centered Cartesianism, and it doesn't escape any of the individualist or mystifying dimensions of disembodied minds.
Using *embodiment* to distinguish agents from artifacts is symptomatic of this.
Using *embodiment* to distinguish agents from artifacts is symptomatic of this.
Look, if embodiment is fundamental, then our machines are embodied just like we are. We are all mechanical agents operating in an entropic world.
From the perspective of embodiment, there is no room to distinguish agents from other kinds of machines.
From the perspective of embodiment, there is no room to distinguish agents from other kinds of machines.
It's only from the perspective of an already thinking subject that the world appears as ready-to-hand.
The fact that you give an embodied account of agency hasn't stopped you from reifying the agential subject, and centering the world on their operations. That's Cartesianism.
The fact that you give an embodied account of agency hasn't stopped you from reifying the agential subject, and centering the world on their operations. That's Cartesianism.
Again: the distinction between agents and artifacts is not an objective (mind-independent) fact about the world, it's a perspective-relative fact about one subject's orientation towards the world.
That something "seems like a tool to me" cannot be grounds for denying its agency
That something "seems like a tool to me" cannot be grounds for denying its agency
If agency is grounded in embodiment, there is no deep distinction between agents and artifacts.
"Agent" and "artifact" are two different ways of looking at the same fundamentally mechanical world.
These are not distinctions in "ways of being" as such.
"Agent" and "artifact" are two different ways of looking at the same fundamentally mechanical world.
These are not distinctions in "ways of being" as such.
As far as I can tell, the claim:
"no robots that come close to the kind of ‘being’ that humans are"
is fundamentally inconsistent with an embodied perspective on agency.
It amounts to saying that the metaphysics of artifacts is more fundamental than that of embodiment.
"no robots that come close to the kind of ‘being’ that humans are"
is fundamentally inconsistent with an embodied perspective on agency.
It amounts to saying that the metaphysics of artifacts is more fundamental than that of embodiment.
The OP seems to argue that embodiment requires appreciating that we "always already" exist in a world of socially constructed artifacts.
But what does this imply? Artifacts also find themselves in a world of socially constructed meaning!
But what does this imply? Artifacts also find themselves in a world of socially constructed meaning!
The OP starts from a place of human exceptionalism, and blusters at discussions of robot rights for threatening their precious humanity.
The OP fails to engage the robot rights literature as a critique of human exceptionalism as such.
The OP fails to engage the robot rights literature as a critique of human exceptionalism as such.
Instead of critiquing the ideal theory that centers the rights discourse on human exceptionalism, the OP confuses exceptionalism with Cartesianism.
Then they critique Cartesianism while embracing exceptionalism, which imo undermines the force of their critique.
Then they critique Cartesianism while embracing exceptionalism, which imo undermines the force of their critique.
So, I think the OP gets things wrong about:
a) the robot rights literature
b) the metaphysics of embodiment and agency
c) the metaphysics of artifacts
But more importantly, I don't think these issues matter to the ethical (human welfare) issues that motivate their paper...
a) the robot rights literature
b) the metaphysics of embodiment and agency
c) the metaphysics of artifacts
But more importantly, I don't think these issues matter to the ethical (human welfare) issues that motivate their paper...
... since clearly there is widespread disagreement over the metaphysical issues at stake, among people who otherwise largely *agree* on practical ðical matters of addressing human risks.
I have more to say, but I'll stop here =)
I have more to say, but I'll stop here =)
