(1) New year has led to lots of reflecting around the drivers of performance: growth, value, momentum, capitalization, sector focus, lots of ways to slice data in hindsight. But this isn’t how I think of the investing opportunity set. If you found opportunities to buy great…
(2) …businesses at attractive prices, who then executed on their plans the ensuing 5-6 years, you likely did very well. I don’t believe this is fad or cyclical. Rather, great businesses accruing the lion’s share of new economic value created should be expected to persist.
(3) In the last 7 years (’12 - ‘19), 5 companies (Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Facebook) have added $3.7 trillion of new market cap. 10 companies (adding BRK, V, MA, CRM, ADBE) have collectively added $4.8 trillion dollars of new market cap.
(4) This wasn’t a fluke or a mistake. These 10 companies were each shrugged off at different times as “obvious and fully valued,” “too expensive,” “too big to grow,” or “past their prime.” Investors who looked past the narrative and were able to own these companies have…
(5) …been rightfully rewarded by the continued success of the underlying businesses. All 10 companies have observable and understandable business models, most people interact with their products every day, all have formidable competitive advantages, generate cash, have been…
(6) …reinvesting thoughtfully and become stronger and more valuable every day. There are 3,300 companies with market caps >$25mm in the Wilshire5000. 2,700 of them have market caps under $9bn, and those are collectively worth about $4.6 trillion.
(7) The 10 companies listed above added more value in the last 7 years than these 2,700 companies collectively are worth today. Just 5 of them have created new value equivalent to 80% of the market cap of the 2,700 companies.
(8) Explaining the above phenomenon simply as “growth has outperformed value” is missing the point. The greatest arbitrage in equities is not in special situations, beaten down cyclicals, or in the fastest current period growth rates. Those opportunities exist, but ultimately…
(9) …more value is in finding and owning great companies that can create enormous new value over very long periods of time. These companies come in different sizes, growth rates, capital intensity, and valuations, but they can be found in readily understandable businesses…
(10) …run by capable managers, and if held over long periods of time will create substantial value. They can be bought and held with less risk than mining among small caps, spinoffs, structurally challenged sectors or by trying to predict “the next big thing.”
(11) Again, there is money in off-the-path situations, but that isn’t where most of the opportunity lie, especially operating under Buffett’s rules #1 & #2 (don’t lose money). The greater opportunity is to buy attractively priced, carefully selected businesses, and to hold them.
(12) If investors can’t or don’t want to find these great businesses, they can index. But the opportunity in this “strategy” is so large, I don't think it's over just because its worked well. I doubt the next $TN made in equities needs to come from beaten down, cyclical stocks.
(13) The S&P contains more than its share of great companies, which is why it’s so hard to beat. The 10 great companies above are just 2% of names, but 22.5% of S&P weight. With robust PE/VC markets, businesses coming public later and larger, one could argue small caps…
(14) …are not as attractive as they once were. The S&P should continue to be a good place for many people to put their money. For investors who have lagged the S&P’s return for sustained periods of time, and are blaming “growth vs. value” for that outcome, I challenge that…
(15) MSFT, AAPL, FB have resembled conventional value stocks at times, presenting attractive entry relative to long-term opportunity. Expensive-looking stocks V, ADBE, AMZN have executed well and “grown into” lofty valuations and may well do so again. The S&P is betting on it.
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$MSFT has said to think of capex growth in the mid-teens % in FY26 and for long-lived assets (datacenter shells, HVAC, Fiber, Power, etc.) spend as % of that capex to revert from current elevated ~60/40 ratio to as much as ~30/70 in favor of servers/semis in 2026+. The simple math of this makes its really hard to see how industrial revenues benefitting from the boom in the "long-lived assets" category can grow in 2026+, at least w/ $MSFT (but ratio of spend elevated elsewhere too). Simply put, MSFT has been double-ordering datacenters in L24mo to catch up to demand, so that category of spend will cycle earlier and much harder than semis and can decline severely even if MSFT capex continues to grow. I'm not sure industrial sellside covg. or mgmt teams have listed to the MSFT call or are truly thinking through what this means, bc i havent heard any caution on '26 growth decel. Rather, everyone continues to point to overall hyperscale capex growth in '25 as defense for the trend that has lifted stocks recently and saying the Deepseek selloff is an overreaction. While investors are beginning to be more visibly concerned, valuations and financial results (growth rates / margins) are still at hugely inflated levels. If DC revs broadly decline in '26 as MSFT math suggests is possible (likely?), DC-exposed industrial stocks could be down a lot from current levels. As good as shortage economics are on the upside, glut economics are absolutely brutal on the downside. And markets tend to overshoot either way on multiples.
Here are two hypothetical scenarios for $MSFT capex (very high-level for simplicity) to think through implications for DC vs semis spending. Starting w/ now fully-guided FY25 capex of $88B and assuming +15% growth in Fy26 (in-line w/ IR's mid-teens framework from callbacks) and +10% in Fy27 (IR suggested a trendline decel) total MSFT capex could reach $111B in FY27. If DC mix went from 55/45 in FY25 to 30/70 as $MSFT IR has suggested, DC-related spending could decline significantly (30%+) from '25 to '27 even w/ growing overall capex. In a bear case where MSFT spend decelerates more quickly than expected and outright declines in FY27, DC revs could get cut nearly in half over 2yrs. Implied CY26 semis rev could still grow nicely in either scenario (note FY vs CY dynamics here for MSFT June year end). For $NVDA specifically this would be bullish but there is risk of share loss to ASICs that might cause them to under-grow these scenarios, plus idiosyncratic issues like China import bans, but this general framework is why ASICs stocks have performed better than $NVDA post $MSFT and $META earnings (plus META emphasizing broader use of ASICs in '25 and '26 for inference then training).
$ETN stock down today despite strong results as mkt prices in some amount of risk they are a beneficiary of supply shortage economics leading to above-normal levels of pricing power / flow-through. Order growth of 75% LTM for data center being ~2x expected hyperscale capex tells you exactly what $MSFT did - clients are double ordering.
Pretty interesting data from Michael Nathanson today on $NFLX having lower content spend efficiency (in viewership per hour of content available) than $DIS DTC platforms. $NFLX has a lot of hits, because they put out a lot of content, but ultimately achieve a lower “hit rate”
Paired with the additional windows that $DIS/$WBD films get, if a producer or star wants to get reach on a project, $NFLX isn’t the automatic destination of choice…
@nosunkcosts Data in OP offers signal to structural maintenance level of “content intensity.” If larger % of the $DIS subs are superfans of the core franchises and brands (incl. kids/family genre, Bluey, Mickey, etc.), the number of “wasted” projects resulting in no engagement should be lower
$RBA is the mkt leader (w/ a price umbrella) in a mature mkt where competition is ticking up. This is structural & why no CEO has been able to sustainably re-accel the biz for 15yrs. What looks like accel is just more risk-taking inventory purchases, w/ some tailwind from price.
RBA made better than avg. inventory margins in '22 but incremental returns here are a headwind (easier to find $500M of bargains than $1B), & even at elevated margins inventory is much worse biz vs. auction/mktplce (10% GP on GTV vs. 14%) w/ more downside risk & capital intensity
Mgmt touted its "Evergreen Model" for 8yrs & misled many bulls into believing this was a better biz than it is. Thus Luxor & others are angry about IAA acquisition. But mgmt guiding to Evergreen didnt mean they were correct to do so. That model was & is a dream of a different biz
“We think the synergy is much higher, but we’re not going to start announcing numbers. We’ve given numbers to the street, & in the last 8yrs we’ve only missed one number by 1%. One of the things about us is we say what we’re going to do, and we do it.”
“The goal for us now is to make and exceed every one of our numbers. And if we emerge and generate 6,7,8 Bn of FCF with great IP, this company is going to look and feel very different than it does now.” - David Zaslav $WBD
“The majority of my comp is options striking $35-55. I wanted it that way bc I felt the stock was undervalued @ that price. To be in the $, the stock has to triple. I feel pretty good abt that. My job is to build a great company & if we do that the stock will take care of itself”
Nor should a quasi-monopoly growing 18%, with 92% Gross margins, enormous embedded income statement investment, and which likely grow substantially >GDP w/ high contribution margins until my 1yr old has a college diploma, be.
Adsk is ~24x FY2 FCF. Yes, much of that is deferred rev, & ~25% will be SBC
Beyond next yr, essentially all FCF growth will come from earnings
SBC has blown out in recent yrs, but this is partially due to a lot of m&a & headcount growth, and it will get operating leverage
~20% of ADSK rev is from customers on the M2S program, effectively 1/2 priced subscriptions for 8yrs. Normalizing those contracts can provide a quick ~$1bn EBITDA bump in the latter half of the decade. Beyond a time horizon most are willing to look but meaningful to the valuation
$AMZN is changing the way they purchase servers, and this will have a material impact on FCF for the next few years. But its nothing to worry about.
$AMZN typically finances server purchases w/ leases. While some people refer to CFO - Capex as Amazon "FCF," $AMZN doesn't & neither should you. This would ignore the very real economic cost of buying servers for AWS which is ~25-30% of AWS sales. FCF is the bottom line below:
Leasing servers defers some of the purchase price and therefore favors FCF in the short term. You can see how the value of PP&E added via leases is higher than the cash outflow of repaying leases through 2020. The delta is a timing benefit to FCF from this funding mechanism: