Everyone is (rightly) focusing on the portion of @NPRKelly's interview with Pompeo that focused on Ukraine, but she also held his feet to the fire on Iran policy more effectively than I've seen from any journalist. npr.org/2020/01/24/798…
Some highlights below.
@NPRKelly "You use the word pressure. This is the maximum pressure campaign that President Trump put into place a year and a half ago when he pulled out of the nuclear deal. But in that year and a half, Iran has behaved more provocatively, not less. So is maximum pressure working?"
@NPRKelly "Since the president came to office, Iran has moved closer to a nuclear weapons capability...If the plan is to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, how do you do that when they're not abiding by the limits of the old deal and there's no new deal in sight?"
@NPRKelly "But again, you say you're determined to prevent them. How do you stop them? I was in Tehran two weeks ago. I sat down with your counterpart there, Javad Zarif, and he told me, quote, 'All limits on our centrifuge program are now suspended.'"
@NPRKelly "But my question again, how do you stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon?"
Pompeo: We'll stop them.
"How? Sanctions?"
Pompeo: We'll stop them.
@NPRKelly "Is there any new deal being developed? A new nuclear deal, something that would rein in Iran, something that they would agree to."
Pompeo: The Iranian leadership will have to make the decision about what its behavior is going to be.
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Since this keeps coming up, here's why we are extremely unlikely to see to a nuclear proliferation cascade, even if Russia succeeds at holding some of the territory it has seized from Ukraine.
A short thread.
The logic is compelling in the abstract: A Russian "success" will demonstrate nuclear weapons can provide a shield for aggression.
And non-nuclear states will conclude acquiring a bomb is the best way to protect against aggression.
In reality, the world is a lot more complex.
Analysts and officials have been predicting these sorts of cascades (for various reasons) for decades and they've always been proven wrong. brookings.edu/research/predi…
The number of nuclear states has grown slowly and steadily--there's never been a rapid increase.
The fact NATO is arming Ukraine to kill Russians does not in and of itself make me overly worried about nuclear use.
Cold War showed even intense proxy wars can avoid escalating to direct conflict (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan).
What worries me more is what Putin would do if he thought he was at serious risk of losing/failing to achieve his aims.
US mulled nuclear use in Korea, for example, during conditions of stalemate.
The US accepted defeat in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan without resorting to nuclear weapons but I suspect Ukraine is more important to Putin than Vietnam or Afghanistan were to the US/Soviets.
(Also, Nixon did have some crazy musings about nuclear use in Vietnam).
Lots of debate lately about the possibility of a US/Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program if talks break down.
Here's a thread on what we know from the academic international relations literature about counterproliferation attacks.
In particular, the thread focuses on three questions about such attacks: do they work? Does the threat of attack work? And when do attacks take place in practice?
First: are attacks effective at setting back nuclear programs? The most comprehensive study is from @sekreps and @mcfuhrmann in 2011. They found attacks in wartime tend to fail but peacetime attacks can produce delays in nuclear programs of a few years.
Biden got more negative press coverage for the withdrawal from Afghanistan than Trump did at any point in 2020—when he was openly subverting the electoral process and actively making the pandemic worse.
The JCPOA is 6 years old today. Having spent a decent chunk of this time writing/arguing about it, I thought I’d offer a few reflections.
What’s most striking to me is people’s reluctance to recognize how hard it was to get the JCPOA and how rare of a success it was. 1/x
From 2003-2013, diplomatic negotiations repeatedly collapsed, Iran continuously expanded its enrichment program, “all options were on the table,” and the United States had to work hard to convince Israel not to conduct a preventive attack. 2/x
The deal that was finalized in 2015 substantially rolled back Iran’s nuclear capacity. You probably know the basics: 98% of enriched uranium eliminated, 2/3 of centrifuges removed, no enriching with advanced centrifuges, no reprocessing, stringent monitoring procedures, etc. 3/x