Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth. I study nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy.
Oct 6, 2022 • 10 tweets • 4 min read
Since this keeps coming up, here's why we are extremely unlikely to see to a nuclear proliferation cascade, even if Russia succeeds at holding some of the territory it has seized from Ukraine.
A short thread.
The logic is compelling in the abstract: A Russian "success" will demonstrate nuclear weapons can provide a shield for aggression.
And non-nuclear states will conclude acquiring a bomb is the best way to protect against aggression.
In reality, the world is a lot more complex.
Feb 27, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
A few thoughts on Ukraine and nuclear risk.
The fact NATO is arming Ukraine to kill Russians does not in and of itself make me overly worried about nuclear use.
Cold War showed even intense proxy wars can avoid escalating to direct conflict (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan).
What worries me more is what Putin would do if he thought he was at serious risk of losing/failing to achieve his aims.
US mulled nuclear use in Korea, for example, during conditions of stalemate.
Dec 15, 2021 • 45 tweets • 10 min read
Lots of debate lately about the possibility of a US/Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program if talks break down.
Here's a thread on what we know from the academic international relations literature about counterproliferation attacks.
In particular, the thread focuses on three questions about such attacks: do they work? Does the threat of attack work? And when do attacks take place in practice?
Dec 4, 2021 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Biden got more negative press coverage for the withdrawal from Afghanistan than Trump did at any point in 2020—when he was openly subverting the electoral process and actively making the pandemic worse.
The JCPOA is 6 years old today. Having spent a decent chunk of this time writing/arguing about it, I thought I’d offer a few reflections.
What’s most striking to me is people’s reluctance to recognize how hard it was to get the JCPOA and how rare of a success it was. 1/x
From 2003-2013, diplomatic negotiations repeatedly collapsed, Iran continuously expanded its enrichment program, “all options were on the table,” and the United States had to work hard to convince Israel not to conduct a preventive attack. 2/x
Jan 25, 2020 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
Everyone is (rightly) focusing on the portion of @NPRKelly's interview with Pompeo that focused on Ukraine, but she also held his feet to the fire on Iran policy more effectively than I've seen from any journalist. npr.org/2020/01/24/798…
Some highlights below.
@NPRKelly "You use the word pressure. This is the maximum pressure campaign that President Trump put into place a year and a half ago when he pulled out of the nuclear deal. But in that year and a half, Iran has behaved more provocatively, not less. So is maximum pressure working?"
Jan 8, 2020 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
Hannity's opening monologue called for U.S. air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and nuclear sites. Yikes. 😳
Lindsey Graham calls Iranian attack an "act of war" on Hannity and says president needs to "restore deterrence."
In response, Hannity says "if we don't react, we're incentivizing more" Iranian aggression.
Apr 3, 2019 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
Yesterday, the State Department’s point person on Iran, Brian Hook, held a press briefing on US policy toward Tehran. state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2…
Like much of the administration’s Iran policy, it is filled with contradictions and misleading statements. A quick thread. 1/x
Let’s start with the contradictions. Much of Hook’s statement celebrates the punitive impact of US sanctions, including forcing 100+ companies out of Iran, “taking with them billions of dollars in investment” and triggering Iran’s “most severe economic crisis in 40 years.” 2/x
Oct 30, 2018 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Yesterday, "the Good ISIS" released a new report on Iran’s nuclear program, using evidence from the Israeli-seized “Atomic Archive” in Tehran to cast doubt on Iran’s intentions: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… But the major points are not new and reinforce the case for JCPOA. 1/9
The ISIS report strangely frames its analysis around the 2007 NIE which judged that Iran had ended its nuclear weapons work in 2003. If this is your prior, then it would be important to learn that Iran continued nuclear weapons work after that date. But we already knew that. 2/9
