1/ This @nytopinion claim that chief justice can unilaterally issue subpoena for witnesses seems a weak reading of impeachment rules. Authors overlook critical rule (#VI) that states "The Senate shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses..." nytimes.com/2020/01/27/opi…
@nytopinion 2/ Granted, Senate impeachment rules can be ambiguous if you line up all the rules that touch on orders, writs, witnesses, etc. But ambiguity is often baked into Senate rules. They don't foresee every application, and Sen majority is ultimate interpreter of meaning of its rules.
@nytopinion 3/ The presiding officer (here, the chief justice) isn't endowed with great parliamentary powers during impeachment trials. The role is to execute decisions of the Senate. And-- as with the Senate generally-- a Senate majority is the ultimate arbiter of procedural questions.
@nytopinion 4/ Senators can of course *try* the tactic proposed in the op-ed. But ultimately, the power of Democrats to succeed in calling witnesses is *likely* to depend on securing GOP votes for their procedural gambit.
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1) Nothing unconstitutional about an "elected speaker pro tem." The House has periodically elected SPTs when a majority wants a temporary speaker to have full authority of speakership. True, the House rarely relies on them anymore (just five times since 1985). Why not? Because :
2) Because House instead amended its rules to allow *appointment* of SPTs for specific purposes. That means it's increasingly rare for the House to need to elect a SPT with full speaker toolkit. Even when deployed, they were pretty boring 🥱. Here are 2 (including first woman).
3) Of course they were boring because the speakership wasn't *vacant*! Speaker had just slipped out for a day or two. So, yeah, nudging SPT McHenry to gin up the legislative ⚙️⚙️ by electing him SPT would be unusual. But certainly consistent with House rules & the📜. And...
1/There's been good stuff written abt the politics underlying Democrats' landmark measure to address the climate crisis. One common refrain is that Dems finally figured out how to legislate on climate with carrots, not sticks. That's key-- but not the only way to think about it.
2/Some 15+ years ago (😳) I wrote about challenges Congress faces when it wants to legislate for the long term. Legislating for "November" is hard. But making deals to solve problems whose effects will (mostly) fall on *future* generations is even harder. brookings.edu/wp-content/upl…
3/Core problem? Congress is short-sighted. Lawmakers prefer benefits now, defer costs til later. Why? Because extremely short time horizons of most *voters* limit incentive to think beyond immediate costs of measures. Pace @TufteEdward (1978), "myopic policies for myopic voters.”
1/ Obvious solution (obvious to me, who does not have to wrangle 50 Senate Democratic votes...) to the political hurdles of addressing the debt limit (and extreme consequences of failing to do so) is nuking Rule 22 for measures related to suspending the debt limit. Upsides?
2/ Politically, Dems avoid a vote that specifies how high the ceiling is raised (making it slightly harder for GOP to weaponize vote against them). Institutionally, Dems avoid the uncertainties and time sink of addressing debt limit through reconciliation. Ds would most likely...
3/ For starters, Dems would have to amend the budget resolution. As best I can tell (CRS), the last time Congress did this (as a stand alone measure) was 1977 (when Cong Budget Act was a toddler and I was in middle school). But uncertainties abound: Would parliamentarian judge...
1/ Nothing like an evening🐦🛀 ! Setting aside 🧼🚿, why does the Senate (seemingly) give such power to the parliamentarian? I think discussions of parliamentarian's power often lose sight of a) why senators lean so heavily on her authority, & b) the real limits on her power.
2/ "Knowledge is power" ! It's a complex rule: ambiguous language & no ready formula for rank & file senators (or party leaders) to easily apply. And contests over the rule have yielded relatively few floor votes. Most disputes resolved behind closed doors of parl's offices.
3/ Because Byrd baths don't leave a lot of public footprints for those inside or outside the Senate to study, that serves to increase the parliamentarian's perceived power.
1/ More thoughts on impasse over organizing Senate/committees. McConnell demands Democrats commit that they won't "go nuclear" to ban legislative filibusters. Schumer says no. The organizing resolution can be filibustered, hence McC's potential leverage. So what's going on here?
2/ Democrats are highly unlikely to make such a commitment, even if McC sees the ploy as a clever way to split the Democrats. Even if Dems *did* agree, both parties know it's not a credible commitment. The last time the party leaders shook hands on such an agreement (2011)...
3/ the agreement didn't stick. McConnell and the GOP's concerted effort to block judicial and executive nominees encouraged Reid and Democrats to nuke most nomination filibusters in 2013-- in a Congress that was covered by the 2011 agreement. Granted, that agreement was informal
1/ McConnell wants a handshake agreement for the Democrats not to go nuclear to ban legislative filibusters this Congress. Surely McConnell knows past is prologue though. Reid-McConnell 2011 gentlemen's agreement barely lasted a year.
2/ Reid as majority leader promised to allow minority party senators opportunities to offer amendments. McConnell vowed to only rarely filibuster motions to proceed. Both sides agreed not to pursue the nuclear option to ban the filibuster for 2 congresses.
3/ But agreement fell apart by late 2011.Dems argued GOP blocked motions to proceed, so Reid began filing cloture (and GOP voted against cloture)-- propelling parliamentary arms race between the parties. (See Steve Smith's excellent The Senate Syndrome amazon.com/Senate-Syndrom…)