1) Nothing unconstitutional about an "elected speaker pro tem." The House has periodically elected SPTs when a majority wants a temporary speaker to have full authority of speakership. True, the House rarely relies on them anymore (just five times since 1985). Why not? Because : 2) Because House instead amended its rules to allow *appointment* of SPTs for specific purposes. That means it's increasingly rare for the House to need to elect a SPT with full speaker toolkit. Even when deployed, they were pretty boring 🥱. Here are 2 (including first woman).

1/There's been good stuff written abt the politics underlying Democrats' landmark measure to address the climate crisis. One common refrain is that Dems finally figured out how to legislate on climate with carrots, not sticks. That's key-- but not the only way to think about it. 2/Some 15+ years ago (😳) I wrote about challenges Congress faces when it wants to legislate for the long term. Legislating for "November" is hard. But making deals to solve problems whose effects will (mostly) fall on *future* generations is even harder.
brookings.edu/wp-content/upl…

1/ Obvious solution (obvious to me, who does not have to wrangle 50 Senate Democratic votes...) to the political hurdles of addressing the debt limit (and extreme consequences of failing to do so) is nuking Rule 22 for measures related to suspending the debt limit. Upsides? 2/ Politically, Dems avoid a vote that specifies how high the ceiling is raised (making it slightly harder for GOP to weaponize vote against them). Institutionally, Dems avoid the uncertainties and time sink of addressing debt limit through reconciliation. Ds would most likely...

1/ Nothing like an evening🐦🛀 ! Setting aside 🧼🚿, why does the Senate (seemingly) give such power to the parliamentarian? I think discussions of parliamentarian's power often lose sight of a) why senators lean so heavily on her authority, & b) the real limits on her power. 2/ "Knowledge is power" ! It's a complex rule: ambiguous language & no ready formula for rank & file senators (or party leaders) to easily apply. And contests over the rule have yielded relatively few floor votes. Most disputes resolved behind closed doors of parl's offices.

1/ More thoughts on impasse over organizing Senate/committees. McConnell demands Democrats commit that they won't "go nuclear" to ban legislative filibusters. Schumer says no. The organizing resolution can be filibustered, hence McC's potential leverage. So what's going on here? 2/ Democrats are highly unlikely to make such a commitment, even if McC sees the ploy as a clever way to split the Democrats. Even if Dems *did* agree, both parties know it's not a credible commitment. The last time the party leaders shook hands on such an agreement (2011)...

1/ McConnell wants a handshake agreement for the Democrats not to go nuclear to ban legislative filibusters this Congress. Surely McConnell knows past is prologue though. Reid-McConnell 2011 gentlemen's agreement barely lasted a year. 2/ Reid as majority leader promised to allow minority party senators opportunities to offer amendments. McConnell vowed to only rarely filibuster motions to proceed. Both sides agreed not to pursue the nuclear option to ban the filibuster for 2 congresses.

1/ Just burrowing into House GOP Sedition Caucus. 120 GOP voted to reject both AZ & PA votes. No surprise, but electoral forces dominate. Bigger the Trump base back home, GOP more likely to object to both slates. And of course, vice versa: Swingier district GOP broke with Trump. 2/ Note: Until Trump 2020 vote by district is available, I'm using Trump 2016 vote. W/ the miraculous DailyKos 2020 data so far, the two are very highly correlated. And note: MC's own 2020 electoral vote doesn't help us distinguish the Sedition Caucus GOP from their colleagues.

1/ Quick reminder that Sen Judiciary Comm. rules require a quorum to be "actually" present to conduct business (such as recommending ACB for SCOTUS seat). Related Senate standing rule requires committee quorums to be "physically" present to report measure/matter to full Senate. 2/ SJC is 12 GOP-10 Dem. One GOP tested positive for Covid-19. Outside chance that pushes back a committee vote on ACB until SJC at full GOP strength. (SJC rules also require 2 Dem present to make quorum, tho likely easier for GOP to blow thru that particular rule.)

1/ Murmurs of negotiations over Covid relief bill again. I sense the *key* stumbling block is NOT disagreement over what makes it into a deal. Central issue is whether *both* parties want a deal and whether *either* party feels it will shoulder more electoral blame for killing it

https://twitter.com/JakeSherman/status/1310995241369993216

2/ Dems seem roughly indifferent between securing a deal or an issue for their campaigns. Voting this week on pared back HEROES Act suggests Dem leaders still favor a deal, not least on acct of pressure from swing district Dems who want a law, not an issue, to take home to voters

1/We spend a lot of time (often appropriately) worrying about the destruction of norms. But we should also care about the new ones that replace them. This is 🌊under the 🌉, I l know, but Romney's statement today laid bare how swiftly norms can be created-- and out of thin air. 2/This claim just isn't true: "The historical precedent of election year nominations is that the Senate generally does not confirm an opposing party's nominee but does confirm a nominee of its own." I know the point is to erase the GOP's refusal to consider Merrick Garland. But..

1/ In a world of slim majorities & few persuadable voters, it's not clear that we know how a controversial SCOTUS confirmation battle before November would affect Senate elections and control of the chamber. Keep in mind the parties drew different lessons from Kavanaugh battle. 2/GOP called their defeat of red state Dems (MO, IN, ND+ FL) "Kavanaugh's revenge." But those red states were represented by centrist Dems who had bucked rising partisan alignment of voters' choices for president and senate (see graph). Did Kavanaugh vote really do those Dems in?

1/ Today's move by the Powell Fed to adopt what they're calling "flexible average inflation targeting" essentially amounts to the Fed's vow to re-weight the parts of the Fed's dual mandate from Congress-- emphasizing employment over stable prices. But ... 2/ keep in mind that this is a less a new pivot for the Fed than a return to its historical roots (at least since the 1930s and the Eccles Fed in the wake of the Great Depression). Bolstering jobs-- more so than curtailing inflation-- dominates the political history of the Fed.

1/ Was curious abt allocation of PPP loans....Seems harder hit states (measured by Google's change in mobility data) received more PPP loans (of all sizes). Blue states harder hit than red states (as of these June data), so can't readily detect any partisan pattern in PPP loans 2/ Can also see the (inevitable) impact of malapportionment on distribution of PPP loans. Less popular states make out like (relative) bandits, tho they took a much smaller economic hit. (Figures show # all PPP loans per capita per state.)

1/ SCOTUS Mazars ruling is surely not a clear "win" for either Congress or the presidency (though in the short term the delays engendered advantage this POTUS and handicap this House). But does SCOTUS's new "balancing" test really protect the interests/authority of both branches? 2/ SCOTUS directs courts to balance subpoena's necessity, scope, and purpose against "burden" on POTUS. Putting aside that as best I can tell SCOTUS doesn't detail what constitutes "burden," SCOTUS logic seems to underweight potential POTUS power in future subpoena disputes.

1/ Comparing late June mobility (time spent away from home since January) to state partisanship (Cook PVI), notable that Democratic states still markedly affected by responses to Covid compared to GOP states-- despite general ebbing of Covid in blue states this spring. 2/ There’s a lot to disentangle here —> how much of sagging mobility shaped by federalism (varying state policies), individual behavior (responsiveness to policies/experts), state elite signals (😷), weather (🥵🥶). Some but not all run in tandem with state partisanship.

1/ Important to keep the hype about Trump appointing 200 federal judges in perspective. That's a lot of judges (tho less than a quarter of the federal bench). And how *many* judges a president puts on the bench depends on a few factors only marginally in his control... 2/ # of judges is shaped by # of vacancies (which sitting judges themselves can determine), consent of the Senate, and the rules of the (Senate) game (changed most recently in 2013 for lower court judges). And *impact* of new judges depends on which judges they replaced.

1/ Excellent @crampell piece on the economics that favor automatic stabilizers. I think it's worth ruminating a bit on the *politics* to get a better sense of the hurdles lawmakers face in securing enactment (if not during this economic emergency then perhaps a future one).

https://twitter.com/crampell/status/1259932954538672131

2/ I see at least 4 barriers to Congress adopting automatic stabilizers -- for example programs that would use a particular trigger (like an unemployment rate) to automatically enhance unemployment insurance, send direct payments to individuals, bolster food assistance etc.

The Fed's move today to expand scope of its program to buy state/local debt -- in response to pressure from lawmakers, industry, & government officials-- is precisely why @PotomacRC & I call the Fed a *political* institution in The Myth of Independence. press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove… Thinking of the Fed as a political institution doesn't mean that the Fed takes partisan sides or that the Fed *simply* holds its fingers to the political winds and makes policy choices accordingly. But it does mean that the Fed sits in the middle of the political system & thus...

1/ This piece about Shake Shack 🍔and Ruth Chris 🥩 securing PPP $$ is a good reminder about the politics of crisis legislating. It’s in Congress’s electoral DNA to care about taking popular positions not abt downstream policy outcomes. But in a crisis ... washingtonpost.com/business/2020/… 2/ Policy outcomes are immediate, visible, and subject to the media (and others) on the look out for pulling 🔥alarms about who benefits from federal aid/relief. That's atypical for normal legislating when political rewards stem from *positions* you (and your opponents) take.

1/ Important thread -- I would add a caution in how we interpret "congressional" intent in reading statutes. That's a particularly difficult task in the context of the direction in CARES for Treasury-Fed lending programs. A few cautions in order:

https://twitter.com/PeterContiBrown/status/1246160282537398273

2/ "Congress" is never a unitary actor. In this case (and typical of recent years/decades), Democrats and GOP wanted different things in empowering Fed and Treasury to expand and broaden its lending AND in the degree of autonomy given to Treasury in making its lending decisions

Fed (back to Burns & likely before) has been extremely reluctant to use Sect 14 authority to buy munis. Congress did not give Fed that power to provide aid to cities, & Fed officials know using it could land them in hot political mess w/Congress picking winners/losers back home.

https://twitter.com/GagnonMacro/status/1245369777020981249

For sure, CARE empowers Fed to set up facility to address liquidity needs of municipalities. But that doesn't also mean that lawmakers will give the Fed a free pass after the crisis based on its decisions of which states/cities to aid. Fed of course understands that it is there..