As Wang Yi starts to speak at the @MunSecConf, the first thing he wants to mention is that the effort to fight coronavirus is happening under firm leadership of Xi Jinping, talks at some length about Xi's inspections and instructions. #MSC2020
@MunSecConf Of course, the way China fights the virus has "highlighted the advantages of the Chinese governance system." At least, according to Wang Yi. #MSC2020
@MunSecConf Wang Yo thanks countries that have helped China to fight coronavirus. Russia, Belarus, ROK are mentioned by name, he than goes at length to thank Italy #MSC2020
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The fact that 🇷🇺 will receive 28% less for its gas in 🇨🇳 than in Europe, but still seeks to expand gas sales to China, illustrates a dilemma Moscow faces in economic relations with Beijing. Simply put: amid war in 🇺🇦, there is no alternative to dependency on China. 🧵1/14
2/ According to this excellent story in @business, 🇷🇺 government expects to earn 28% less in 🇨🇳 market for same amounts of gas than in EU & Turkey. For example, in 2024 it's $257 vs $320 for 1,000 m2. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ This reality shouldn't come as a surprise. As my @CarnegieEndow colleague @SergeyVakulenk0 has established in the best to date study on 🇨🇳🇷🇺 piped gas pricing formula, a discount benefiting Beijing is nearly pre-programmed in the devil's bargain. carnegieendowment.org/politika/89552
The deepening of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 alignment is one of the most consequential geopolitical outcomes of Russia's war against Ukraine. How so, and why is this important? I wrote about it in a new essay for @ForeignAffairs. Some key takeaways in a🧵1/20 foreignaffairs.com/china/putin-an…
2/ Even before Crimea annexation in 2014 and February 24, 2022, Moscow and Beijing have been on a steady path to improve and deepen their ties. Driving forces include delimitation of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 border, economic complementarity, and deepening compatibility of the two political regimes.
3/ Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine has provided a qualitative leap to what has been an incremental qualitative improvement before 2022. China and Russia are more firmly aligned now than at any time since the 1950s. Why is that?
As I argue in my latest piece for @WSJ, in Russia, the war against Ukraine is now the organizing principle around which most decisions are made, and at the core of Russia’s domestic, economic and foreign policy. Short summary in a 🧵 wsj.com/world/russia/r…
2/ On the domestic front: in their recent in-depth research paper into attitudes toward the war, my colleagues @AndrKolesnikov and Denis Volkov showed that about 75% of the population support it. Most of Russia doesn’t look or feel like a nation at war. carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…
3/ The elites, too, have demonstrated remarkable cohesion and the inability to challenge the Kremlin’s course. Even the infamous mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny earlier this year only strengthened Putin’s grip on power. ft.com/content/0960e7…
It finally happened! 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade has surpassed $200b mark. Trade figures might be different in years to come, but the trendline is clear: as a result of Putin's war against 🇺🇦, Moscow and Beijing find themselves in a deepening asymmetrical economic interdependence. Short 🧵
2/ Chinese customs has published November stats.
🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade Jan-Nov = $218.2b (+26.7% yoy)
🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 = $100,3 (+50.2%)
🇨🇳 imports from 🇷🇺 = $117.8 (+11.8%)
This means that the goal set by Putin and Xi for 2024 has been achieved. customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ The pace of trade growth has slowed down compared to earlier in 2023, which can be attributed to effect of sanctions shock of spring 2022 for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade, as well as impacts of headwinds in the Chinese economy in Q3 (jury for Q4 is out).
My colleague @AndrKolesnikov and @levada_ru's Denis Volkov have published a new @CarnegieEndow paper documenting Russian attitudes towards the war. Main conclusion: support for the Kremlin's disastrous course is undiminished. Key findings in a🧵1/ carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…
2/ In September 2023, @AndrKolesnikov and Volkov released "My Country Right or Wrong," which established that after 6 months of war, Russian society was confused, depressed and repressed. carnegieendowment.org/p-87803
3/ The new paper revisits the same issues a year later, and is based on nationwide @levada_ru polls and focus groups. The rationale behind respondents’ answers provides a more complex picture than the numbers alone.
🧵
Does participation of Li Hui 🇨🇳 envoy on 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war, in Saudi-hosted peace consultations over the weekend mean that Beijing is about to abandon its tacit support for the Kremlin, as some people want to believe? Let's take a look. (Spoiler alert: hardly). 1/20
2/ There is a lot of hope, as this excellent piece by @jamestareddy in @WSJ demonstrates, that Beijing's decision to send Li Hui to Jeddah signals China's growing frustration with Putin's war and desire to work with international community to stop it. wsj.com/articles/a-dra…
3/ The economic cost of war is rising, and so is Western criticism towards 🇨🇳 position on Ukraine. There was Wagner mutiny in 🇷🇺, and maybe Xi has buyers' remorse about "no limits partnership" with Putin, the hope goes. But let's take a step back & look at 🇨🇳 strategic interests.