Thread by @miltonwrites

This is an excellent paper and well worth reading for anyone observing China. Congrats to @Scholars_Stage as well for the reference to his @palladiummag piece.

Highlights thread.

uscc.gov/sites/default/…

Tobin notes that observers have overlooked the importance of benchmarks in CCP self-legitimization. It sees itself as leading China on a path to global influence. Unlike US, its system has an explicit end in mind. Calls for research program on how China sees this competition.

For CCP, socialism is a *tool* to achieve this end. It is also seen as creating an "advanced culture"--a goal which once united Chinese modernizers. Western-style capitalism is seen as a threat because it historically handed over the country to foreign interests.

Contra the CCP line that its model is unique to China, Xi has presented it as a new development option. The party wants its success to be seen the fruit of its model.

I've noted before that the CCP attacks "state-capitalism" discourse (which is, in fact, often a poor analysis).

Tobin takes the role of Leninism in the CCP seriously. America is in an ideological battle, not just geopolitical. CCP measures success in terms of material development and scientific progress, not freedom. It also sees international institutions as essential to its global rise.

Xi's "Community of Common Destiny" concept for global relations is interesting for two reasons. 1) it explicitly draws on ancient Chinese concepts, as well as modern. 2) it has more room for interconnectivity than Hu Jintao's previous focus on cooperation between sovereign states

Belt and Road is the material vehicle. This brand has been slapped all over initiatives in development, policy, security, etc. Party documents invoke the traditional "tianxia" (all-under-heaven) concept. Tianxia is universal, not regional. Historically, it has a Chinese center.

“China is not exporting violent revolution as in the period of high Maoism, rather it is seeking to rewire the global order from a position of connectedness to it.”

My note: while the CCP international strategy is no longer Leninist, it is still Marxist. Power is material.

In practice, Tianxia only extends as far as economic development can paper over differences. In terms of fundamentally incompatible values, as well as conflicts of interest, the CCP falls back on Leninist views of dissent as sabotage.

What is America's response? Tobin affirms that American improvement is necessary: “To win a global systems contest, our system must continue to deliver demonstrably better human flourishing.”

But it’s not enough. America must learn about Beijing.

Tobin ends with 3 proposals:

1) Expand comprehensive knowledge of China and the CCP. Top priorities include translation of party documents, to learn how the party thinks. Redevelop familiarity with Marxist-Leninist modes of thought.

2) Retool security institutions for systems rivalry, based on precedents like the 1947 National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

3) Harden the anti-CCP stance. Confront China as an aggressor against the “free world” coalition of shared values, rather than just accepting the CCP frame of a rivalry against the US alone. Notes leadership from allies, e.g. Australia confronting Chinese influence ops.

More than half of this document is made up of footnotes. I second @Scholars_Stage that they’re worth a read.

#2: “Along with the report of a Party Congress, the “general program” of the Party’s constitution (revised at each Party Congress) represent the most authoritative description of its strategy...The general program is even more authoritative than the report but extremely succinct”

#14: The CCP is not cynical in its ideological commitments

#16: “Modern, powerful, socialist” is a phrase which has enjoyed continuity from Mao onward, and throughout the reform period. Each of the three is an important goal for the party. The cultural revolution period is seen as an aberration.

#33/34: Socialism as a *vehicle* for national rejuvenation (the dream of nearly all modernist intellectuals in China, including those opposed by the Communists)

#53: Rather than directly promoting China as a rival to the US ideological model, party documents variously discuss US failures in one part and elevate Chinese success in the same areas in others

#55 demonstrates how seriously and continuously the Party has wanted its successes to be explicitly tied to the superiority of its ideological system

#80: Xi explicitly ties in modern Chinese multilateral efforts with more ancient concepts in Chinese history.

My note: it would be interesting to know how much of this is desire for continuity vs knowing how “Chinese wisdom” is considered wise and nonthreatening in the West.

#82: Chinese concepts of harmony are agnostic on diversity. They can either include it or imply uniformity.

#84: Xi admits to the PLA that rising Chinese power will incur confrontation:

#93: Xi often quotes the Chinese Book of Rites: “When the great way prevails, all under Heaven belongs to the people” (大道之行也，天下為公)."

Tobin notes that inconsistency in translation cloaks how much he does it—perhaps showing why his own first recommendation is necessary.

#101: Development serves two ends: as its results become higher priority, shelved international disputes might stay shelved. But if not, then it expands Chinese national power nonetheless.

Final reflection: this paper is a very useful resource for anyone wanting an overview of the issues which we’ve been covering at @palladiummag, particularly how the Party’s self-conception needs to be taken seriously. Footnotes are a treasure trove. Top recommended reading.