Thread by @Ali_Wyne

THREAD: Many observers have ventured that America's response to the coronavirus pandemic could streamline China's path to replacing the United States as the world's preeminent power.

It's important, though, to assess both Beijing's capacity and its willingness to do so.

[1/11]

Beyond confronting a poor demographic outlook and an increasingly inefficient growth model, China is surrounded by highly capable democracies, has only transactional partners, and confronts growing global disquiet.

[2/11]

Regardless of how maximalist China's objectives may be, such obstacles, internal and external, will constrain its trajectory.

It's worth dwelling a bit on the last of these (that is, growing global disquiet).

[3/11]

To conclude that China will overtake the United States as the world's preeminent power is effectively to posit that economic momentum beyond a certain threshold obviates the need to develop alliances or cultivate a baseline of trust among the global public.

[4/11]

.@stevenleemyers explained earlier this week that China has squandered significant goodwill in recent weeks with its inept messaging and diplomacy around the pandemic, even with countries that have actively courted its trade and investment.

nytimes.com/2020/04/17/wor…

[5/11]

Assuming that China could overcome the aforementioned obstacles, though, would it seek to supplant the United States as the underwriter of a global order?

The answer isn't self-evident; consider @osmastro's conclusion from early last year.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…

[6/11]

Recent days have produced corroborating assessments; take, for example, this excerpt from a leader in the 4/16 issue of @TheEconomist.

economist.com/leaders/2020/0…

[7/11]

And @NisidHajari noted yesterday that there are many steps China isn't taking in response to the pandemic that it could and/or would be taking if "it aspired to true global leadership."

bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…

[8/11]

While inveighing continuously against the U.S.-led order, moreover, China has been circumspect about specifying the contours of its preferred system, as @RollandNadege details meticulously in her @NBRnews special report of this January.

nbr.org/publication/ch…

[9/11]

Could the pandemic affect the U.S.-China strategic balance? Undoubtedly.

Could China prove to be an increasingly formidable competitor within the boundaries of an order over which the United States still (at least nominally) presides? Undoubtedly.

[10/11]

Still, considering both the myriad obstacles to China's continued resurgence and its demonstrated reluctance to be a U.S.-style superpower, it seems premature to conclude that the pandemic will hasten a power transition.

A tense, unsettled cohabitation is more probable.

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