Thread by @AMFChina

Who is behind the cyber bullying and smear campaign against UK-based critics of the Chinese Communist Party?

I shared the following information with the British @foreignoffice on 27 February 2020. In light of recent developments I hereby make my memo public 1/38

Four UK-based critics of the Chinese Communist Party—a prominent British politician and counter-intelligence expert, two British human rights advocates and a Nottingham-based German national and China expert—have been subject to a cyber bullying & smear campaign 2/38

The four victims are:

MP Tom Tugendhat, Chairman of the UK Foreign Affairs Committee;

Mr Luke de Pulford, Director of the Arise Foundation, Co-Founder of the Coalition for Genocide Response and member of the Conservative party Human Rights Commission; 3/38

Mr Benedict Rogers, Co-Founder and Chair of Hong Kong Watch and Co-Founder and Deputy Chair of the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission; and

Dr Andreas Fulda, Senior Fellow at the University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute. 4/38

Over the past four months they have experienced threats (including death threats), impersonations (and false resignations to family and colleagues), as well as an attempt to interfere in the UK 2019 General Election 5/38

Due to the anonymity of the perpetrators it is currently not clear whether these active measures are initiated by state agents or whether perhaps non-state agents are acting on behalf of a hostile foreign power 6/38

All four UK-based critics of the Chinese Communist Party are active on the social media network Twitter. They have a combined following of more than 120,000 followers 7/38

The link to Twitter posts by the four UK-based critics of the CCP can be established since many of the threatening anonymous emails / messages are sent in direct response to specific social media posts (which often link to op-eds / publications of the four individuals). 8/38

This means that instead of replying to tweets by MP Tom Tugendhat, Mr Benedict Rogers, Mr Luke de Pulford and Dr Andreas Fulda on Twitter, the replies are sent anonymously and directly to the four UK-based critics, either by email or mail. 9/38

While it is widely acknowledged that social media can have a corrosive effect on public debate, responses to the UK-based CCP critics go beyond legitimate critique but instead aim to instil a sense of fear and/or anxiety among the recipients. 10/38

In the People's Republic of China (PR China) so-called Big V bloggers on the Chinese Twitter-equivalent Weibo where effectively silenced in 2013/14 with the help of propaganda and police actions. 11/38

While the CCP can not directly control Twitter the Chinese party-state is not sitting idle. 12/38

The cyber security expert Dr Samantha Hoffman recently pointed out that "(the) party-state intends to shape, manage and control its global operating environment so that public sentiment is favourable to its own interest". 13/38

State agents and/or non-state agents acting on behalf of the CCP can incur penalties for Twitter posts which they consider hostile to the interests of the Chinese party-state. 14/38

As the following specific examples will show the tactics employed resemble the attrition / corrosion (Zersetzung) strategy of the Stasi in the former GDR 15/38

Max Hertzberg has described "the aim [of attrition / corrosion] to disrupt the working of groups and the lives of individuals to such a degree that their activism became ineffective, or more preferably, ceased altogether." 16/38

The cyber bullying and smear campaign currently consists of five features: (I) online and offline threats, (II) impersonations, (III) smears, (IV) false resignations, and (V) attempted election interference. 17/38

All four victims have received threatening anonymous emails, which range from verbal abuse to death threats. The latter have been reported to the police and FCO. 18/38

In addition one of the victims (and his family members) was shadowed by a suspicious person in early December, thus combining online with offline threats. 19/38

Fake emails have been sent in the names of the four victims from both hacked and spoofed email accounts. 20/38

Through impersonations perpetrators have attempted to smear the professional reputation of the four individuals. Such spoofed emails follow the playbook of USSR-style disinformation campaigns. 21/38

Deliberately distorted information is being shared electronically with often a wide range of email recipients. The hope is that recipients will respond to such prompts, e.g. by sending email replies or tweeting about the received information. 22/38

This way the deliberately distorted information enters the public communication process. 23/38

Malicious email content includes doctored original communications which make UK-based CCP critics appear racist or politically radical. 24/38

Spoofed emails with false resignations have also been sent to family and colleagues. This has forced victims to publicly state that they are subject to a cyber bullying and smear campaign. 25/38

While the vast majority of family and colleagues are generally understanding, being forced to go public about the endured abuse increases the reputational risks for speaking up against the CCP. 26/38

One of the spoofed email misrepresented the election platform of the Conservative Party vis-a-vis the issue of Hong Kong in the run up to the 2019 general election. 27/38

If one of the email recipients had made this information public it would have entered the public communication process. 28/38

Such fake news could have negatively impacted the standing of the Conservative Party and could have damaged UK-China relations. 29/38

While organs of the British state have been made aware of this ongoing cyber bullying and smear campaign there are currently a number of unresolved problems. 30/38

In November 2019 the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that "the Government appoints a cross-departmental Whitehall champion for academic freedom to coordinate the different agencies involved in monitoring and responding to foreign influence". 31/38

While it seems that the @foreignoffice has been tasked to take a lead on the issue of foreign interference it is not clear for outside observers what the division of labour is between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, GCHQ/MI5, the NCSCentre, the NCA and the police? 32/38

Overlapping or overly restrictive jurisdictions for each of the government and/or law enforcement agencies are likely to hamper coordinated efforts to deal with this problem in a decisive manner. 33/38

It is in the enlightened British national interest to ensure that UK-based critics of the Chinese Communist Party—regardless whether they are politicians, civil society practitioners or academics—can exercise their freedom of speech without fear or favour. 34/38

On their own they are not in a position to defend themselves against what now appears to be an increasingly organised cyber bullying and smear campaign by a hostile foreign power. 35/38

This is why the British state should step in and try to find out who is behind this campaign against UK-based critics of the Chinese Communist Party. Is this campaign orchestrated by state agents, non-state agents or perhaps both? 36/38

This is a question which could be addressed by a UK-equivalent of the US Interagency Active Measures Working Group, which was operational throughout the 1980s to counter Soviet propaganda. 37/38

If evidence of a coordinated campaign against UK-based critics of the CCP could be found this would enable senior British government officials to take this issue up with the Chinese authorities. /End