Thread by @asfandyarmir

Thanks @JJSchroden for another episode of the Afghanistan panel. Its great to be sharing the twitter stage with @OmarSadr and @ andrewquilty #AFGpanel 1/n

I have been asked to comment on al-Qaida in South Asia. I have written about different facets of the politics of al-Qaida’ South Asia operation here: tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1…, here: mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.116…, and here: lawfareblog.com/al-qaedas-cont… 2/n

Al-Qaida’s South Asia operation, known now as al-Qaida in Indian Subcontinent since al-Qaida's turn to official franchising, remains one of the most important -- if not the most important – franchise of al-Qaida’s central (a moniker given by US, but embraced by al-Qaida). 3/n

After US invasion of AFG, al-Qaida’s Pak-based op revived org 03 onward, hosted much of AQ’s central leadership; recently, leaders such as Zawahiri & Hamza appear to have been with South Asia branch. From 06-12, South Asia op was key node of its int’l terror plotting. 4/n

As US pulls out from AFG, the question of al-Qaida’s status in AFG is imp to policymakers; some want to know if al-Qaida will attempt another 9/11 type attack due to reduced US presence. Others want to dismiss al-Qaida altogether, like Sec Pompeo: foxnews.com/media/sec-pomp… 5/n

Predicting attacks and strategy of clandestine terror groups is hard, so I track indicators of political strengths, weaknesses, strategic focus of the group, try to assess the trajectory of indicators and shifts. Here are my assessments on where group is at. 6/n

On side of strengths, al-Qaida in South Asia’s political cohesion is good; despite attempts by many states, group hasn’t fragmented or splintered; letters left behind by Bin Laden, messaging, behaviors suggest high level of obedience to top bosses like Zawahiri. 7/n

Al-Qaida in South Asia has many important, some powerful allies, who provide material and political support; a main one is the Afghan Taliban, which provides both logistical help and political cover; another one is TTP... 8/n

...which has functioned as paramilitary of al-Qaida in the past; a Kashmir-based faction Ansar Ghazwa Tul Hind; Kashmir-focused, Pakistan-based jihadis like Jaish-e-Muhammed... 9/n

...Al-Qaida in South Asia also has robust relationships with groups from beyond *but in sanctuary in) South Asia, such as the ETIM and IJG... 10/n

Another strength of the South Asia op is its mix of fighters, who have experience of fighting amid high-tempo US CT pressure; it also has a CRBN cell, about which not a lot is known; the cell consistently tries to access black-market of loose materials... 11/n

...I don't want to inflate the threat here; it may well be that this cell is a road to nowhere, as is the record of last decade, but the political commitment of the group to the cell has struck me in my work. 12/n

Final strength I'd note are major strategic opportunities argued by the group. The obvious one is the US drawdown from Afghanistan, which it can frame as its victory. A second one is India’s worsening relationship with its Muslim population, salient for al-Qaida as a whole. 13/n

On the side of weaknesses, the group’s leadership succession is uncertain; who will succeed chief Asim Umar given he appears dead? Al-Qaida hasn’t announced anyone yet or for that matter admitted Umar’s death...no Khalid Batrafi (of AQAP) like figure waiting in wings. 14/n

Another issue for the group is its organizational strength, which remains constrained; it hasn’t recovered from the US drone war from 08-15; previous losses *deter* it, much like other al-Qaida franchises, from plotting ops which invite US wrath in form of similar campaign. 15/n

A final weakness imo is that it is short on western foreign fighters. Even though the turn of foreign fighters towards ISIS has dwindled, al-Qaida’s South Asia operation doesn’t seem to have energized foreign fighter streams. That can change. 16/n

Let me conclude with a word on al-Qaida’s future strategy: from 03-12, al-Qaida in South Asia focused on three strategic priorities; protecting leadership, Afghanistan, int'l terror; since 13, priorities became leadership protection, Afghanistan, preventing fragmentation… 17/n

Going forward, based on the group’s public outputs, what it is socializing its audiences in, there appear to be two priorities; shift to India/Kashmir given it sees the war in Afghanistan ending and international terrorism, including against US. n/n