#HistoryKeThread: KDF’s Deceptive Tactics In Somalia 
At the height of Operation Linda Nchi, Kenya’s war against Al Shabaab militants in Somalia, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) laid down plans for the capture of the Afmadhow.
This was a town in Somalia that served as a major stronghold of the militant group.
This was a town in Somalia that served as a major stronghold of the militant group.
KDF would lead the allied attack, backed by friendly forces from Somalia, such as the Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ) and Jubbaland troops led by Sheikh Madobe.
However, KDF was wary of elements within their Somalia allies sharing intelligence with their clansmen in Al Shabaab. Thus a deception plan was employed before the advance to capture Afmadhow.
KDF battalion commander, Lt. Col. Jeff Nyaga, convened a meeting of his men and allied forces on 15th May 2012 to unveil the plan for the capture of Afmadhow.
Kismayo and Afmadhow, he told the fighters, would be attacked and captured simultaneously by KDF.
Of course, this was a deception. And it worked.
While advancing towards Afmadhow on 29th May 2012, KDF forces thwarted an ambush by the Al Shabaab during which attack six militants were killed and one captured.
From the captured fighter, KDF learnt that majority of Al Shabaab fighters had retreated in order to defend Kismayo. This was a confirmation that 1. the KDF deception had worked and 2. that Al Shabaab were receiving intelligence leaks.
Afmadhow was lightly defended and fell without much resistance.
The same deception tactics were used in planning for the capture by KDF of Kismayo, the commercial capital of the autonomous Jubbaland province. Kismayo was key in Operation Linda Nchi because the town served as the premier bastion of Al Shabaab.
Capturing Kismayo would inflict a major psychological and operational blow on the core of Al Shabaab. And so in August of 2012, military officials at defence headquarters in Nairobi embarked on laying down plans for the capture of this port city.
KDF top brass dubbed this mission Operation Sledge Hammer.
Part of the plan involved making allied forces, including senior KDF commanders on the ground, believe that the objective was to capture via an amphibious landing the coastal town of Koday, which was situated to the South of Kismayu.
As Al Shabaab had infiltrated the rank and file of allied forces embedded within KDF, the militia got wind of the Koday attack plans. Hundreds of Al Shabaab fighters from various parts of southern Somalia were therefore sent to reinforce Koday.
Heavy machine guns were deployed along the beach, trained on an enemy in the sea that never showed up.
Al Shabaab had hook, line and sinker fallen prey to yet another KDF deceptive strategy. Koday was a decoy target intended to spread the militant group’s defenses thin and leave Kismayo lightly defended.
In the wee hours of 28th September 2012, dozens of KDF troops poured into lightly defended Kismayo beaches from shadowy naval ships in the ocean.
The first KDF boots on the ground were drawn from 30SF battalion. Using dinghies from navy ship KNS Jasiri, their task was to employ diversionary tactics in order to allow for a larger force to disembark from KNS Shujaa.
Air assets from the Kenya Air Force were also engaged to take part in decoy missions around Koday.
The deception tactics and subsequent mop ups worked so well that the KDF was able to take over Kismayo without loss of equipment or personnel.
The deception tactics and subsequent mop ups worked so well that the KDF was able to take over Kismayo without loss of equipment or personnel.
Photos credit - George Mulala and AMISOM Public Information.
