I'm a think tanker, not an academic, and I have no formal training in political science. But I have published in peer reviewed journals so had to learn about the review process through trial and error. Lots of error! (2/n)
Over time I learned to write for the reviewers--who are a subset of my audience, but only a subset.
Reviewers are super-experts and it's their job to critique your work. This influences the way you write, I think... (3/n)
...you pay a lot of attention to the details, offer obvious lines of pre-emptive rebuttal (pre-buttal!), and try to engage deeply with the existing literature.
None of this is bad per se, but it's easy for the big picture to get lost in all of this. (4/n)
In fact, I can't stop myself from offering some prebuttal in Twitter thread!
Peer review isn't the only reason, by any means, for bad academic writing. And it's possible for a well-written article to survive review. But I do think there's a tension here. (5/n)
Also, while it was a tweet from @MorganLKaplan that lead me to write this thread, I'm not singling out @Journal_IS (the writing there is much better than most academic journals).
But I do have a suggestion to editors... (6/n)
...why not ask reviewers to comment on the clarity of the writing and consider it, as one factor of many, in deciding whether to accept a paper? (7/7)
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@ForeignPolicy @IgnatiusPost @washingtonpost Ignatius's oped is written as if it's a news story. The "news" in this case is that--SURPRISE!--an Israeli source backed up claims by the Israeli government! (3/n)
🧵How much damage was done to Iran's nuclear program?
An analysis of Friday's reporting of the U.S. government assessment. I'll focus on the @nytimes, which was clearer than the earlier but confused @NBCNews story. (1/n)
U.S. officials continue to argue that it would take Iran years to rebuild the facilities that were hit. That seems right to me.
But a key question is this: How long would it take Iran to build the bomb? (2/n)
Attempts to play down the survival of most or all of Iran's HEU are comical.
It may be true that "only" the HEU at Isfahan is accessible--but that's almost all of it! (3/n)
Here's my proposed U.S. nuclear strategy for managing escalation, arms racing, and proliferation with two nuclear peers, published through @CFR_org.
Health warning: If you like counterforce, take a DEEP breath before reading on. (1/n)
The U.S. faces a security environment that's bad and getting worse. There's an emerging bipartisan consensus that, in response, the U.S. needs more nukes. The justification stems from the current policy of "counterforce" targeting. (2/n)
The logic of counterforce targeting is merciless, however, and will catalyze an expensive, tension-generating, and futile three-ways arms race in which the United States will fail to achieve the nuclear superiority it seeks. (3/n)
The claim that Iran had 60 days to make a deal is disingenuous since the United States was hardly ready, and did not conduct, an intensive, detailed negotiation. (1/n)
For example, there were times when Iran was willing to talk but the United States wasn't (presumably because it needed more time to prepare).