At @CSIS @csisponi yesterday, Frank Miller engaged with my recent essay on targeting. In a collegial spirit, I'd like to respond to him here--he has mispresented me--and accept his offer to a public debate.

Link:

Here's the transcript. (1/n) csis.org/events/project…




First, I do not claim or imply in my recent essays that changing U.S. targeting policy would induce Beijing or Moscow to make changes to theirs.

I do not believe that our making changes would induce them to do so. (2/n)

warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my…

<THREAD>There's been evidence-free speculation that Prigozhin may try to seize a nuclear weapon or two. I think this fear is misplaced. That said, there is a nuclear risk associated with this insurrection--one that isn't yet being discussed. (1/n) CAVEAT: The situation on the ground in Russia is clearly very fluid and unpredictable, and I'm certainly not going to try to predict what's going to happen. Here I aim to assess what we should worry about NOT how worried we should be. (2/n)

<THREAD>China now appears to have a comprehensive early-warning system against a U.S. first strike, allowing it to operationalize launch-under-attack options.

Stay tuned a new discovery: a new-ish Chinese radar that rotates (no, not Korla).

(1/n) As Chinese sources and the Pentagon have reported, China has been developing an early-warning (EW) system for a decade-ish so it could launch its nuclear forces before being destroyed by a US first strike (launch under attack). (2/n)

media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/20…

<THREAD>As @POTUS, @RishiSunak, and @AlboMP announce AUKUS submarine plan, here’s my assessment of the technical and proliferation risks.

BLUF: They’ve made serious efforts to mitigate those risks, but those that remain are real and significant.



(1/n) Here’s the plan (in brief):
1. 🇬🇧 & 🇺🇸 deploy SSNs* in🇦🇺(from 2027)
2. 🇦🇺deploys Virginia-class SSNs purchased from 🇺🇸 (from ~2032)
3. 🇦🇺deploys AUKUS SSNs, designed and produced with UK (starting in early 2040s)

*SSN=nuclear-powered attack sub.

(2/n)

whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…

If these reports are correct, this program is a goat rodeo in the making. 🇦🇺, which has never operated an SSN before, now plans to operate two different classes. Plus modifying 🇬🇧-built Astute SSNs and introducing 🇺🇸 technology will add significantly to the technical risk.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1633594396619808768

Prior to today, I gave a ~50% chance of 🇦🇺 fielding SSNs by 2040, on the basis of reporting that it would go for an unmodified design. I think the odds of deploying Ozstute are now ~30% (though maybe still 50% of fielding Virginia).

Last week, Australian FM @SenatorWong refused to say explicitly that B-52s visiting Australia do not carry nukes, causing a minor furor.

The thing is that, best I can tell, official, stated U.S. policy is that bombers are not loaded with nukes. (1/n)

breakingdefense.com/2023/02/austra… Some history. Back in the 1960s, the U.S. did keep aircraft--B-52s actually--loaded with nuclear weapons on airborne alert. This posture had obvious disadvantages as became apparent when... you know... aircraft crashed. (2/n)

https://twitter.com/AtomicAnalyst/status/1616838037916319745?s=20

<THREAD>Russia has suspended its participation in New START--does it matter? (Spoiler alert: Yes!)

Andrey has a great thread below on the details of the Russian announcement; I'm going to assess its significance. (1/n)

https://twitter.com/baklitskiy/status/1627982732935536641

The immediate effect of Russia's suspension will be the end of notifications. As of 2/1/23, the US and Russia had exchanged over 25,000 notifications (not a typo). These notifications continued even in the absence of inspections and... (2/n)

state.gov/new-start/

<Threads>Some thoughts and suggestions--for both governments and journalists--on news that the IAEA has detected 84% enriched uranium in Iran.

This is a serious and worrying escalation, but we don't yet know how serious and worrying. (1/n)

bloomberg.com/news/articles/… It's serious because it's entirely possible to manufacture a nuclear weapon out of 84% enriched material. Although 90% is often called "weapon grade," it's not a special threshold; rather, you just need a bit more 84% enriched material to compensate for lower enrichment. (2/n)

<THREAD>Some personal recollections of Catherine Kelleher--surely the only person ever to have met both the satirist Tom Lehrer and the long-time dictator of Turkmenistan, Turkmenbasi.

Catherine has just passed away. She was a legend. (1/n) You'll be able to read about her incredible career in formal obituaries. Here, I'll just mention that she was a trailblazing woman in national security, serving as a deputy assistant secretary of defense and the SECDEF's representative to Europe. (2/n)

cissm.umd.edu/our-community/…

<THREAD>My new oped "The Case for Caution in Crimea" is out in @WarOnTheRocks.

It makes two points about enabling Ukraine to threaten Crimea:
1. It will NOT advance real negotiations.
2. It might lead to a nuclear war. (1/n)

warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-ca… The @nytimes reported that the Biden administration believes Ukraine's threatening Crimea could advance a negotiated settlement to the war.

In theory, this argument is sound--giving Putin a lot to lose could make him negotiate seriously.

BUT... (2/n)

nytimes.com/2023/01/18/us/…

First use may be a demonstration shot over, say, the Black Sea. Or perhaps against Ukrainian forces approaching Crimea. In any case, the likely primary goal would NOT be any form of concrete military advantage but to create fear (presumably among Ukraine and its allies)... (1/n)

https://twitter.com/russianforces/status/1616118554507591697

...about further escalation. To this end, the target actually isn't actually that important (though I doubt first use would be on a city or outside of Ukraine/Black Sea). To be clear, I'm not saying this would necessarily "work" (maybe it would; maybe not, we can debate.) (2/n)

<THREAD>Helping Ukraine to threaten Russia's hold on Crimea is not in U.S. interests.

While I've supported U.S. assistance so far and believe Crimea is Ukrainian, the risks of this idea are too big.

My thoughts on yesterday's @nytimes story. (1/n)

nytimes.com/2023/01/18/us/… Let's start at the end with Gen Breedlove. Feel free to agree with his conclusion, but recognize his reasoning is myopic. Helping Ukraine to threaten Crimea isn't exclusively a "military" issue. There are strategic and political ramifications that can't simply be ignored. (2/n)

<THREAD>Proliferation and national sovereignty--a response to replies to my tweet.

I strongly believe that acquiring nuclear weapons would not be in S Korea's interests, but I don't get to define those interests; the democratically elected ROK government does. (1/n)

https://twitter.com/james_acton32/status/1613545367529832449

*If* the ROK government makes the mistake of deciding to acquire nuclear weapons--in part because it doesn't trust U.S. security guarantees (thanks Trump!)--it can and will do so. S Korea may incur large costs, but if it willing to pay them, it will suceed. (2/n)

<Thread>The Department of Defense may end up being right about the pace of China's nuclear expansion, but the logic and evidence is unpersuasive should give us pause. (1/n)

media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/20… First off, I want to emphasize that "Chinese Military and Security Developments" is invaluable. It's informative, detailed, and normally authoritative. I don't criticize it lightly. (2/n)

<Thread>Yesterday's strikes in Poland turn out to have been Ukrainian air-defense missiles that accidentally hit its neighbor.

What does this incident tell us about the danger--or otherwise--of accidental escalation? (1/n)

https://twitter.com/seungminkim/status/1592745092112347136

In my book (currently being written!), I argue that accidental escalation is less of a concern than other forms of unintentional escalation because it's normally clear that an accident is just that. (2/n)

I disagree China has no meaningful leverage over Russia to try to prevent nuclear use.

The threat to isolate Russia *totally*--economically, diplomatically, and militarily--in that scenario is potent. It could undermine the viability of Putin's continued hold on power. (1/n) Whether China would use that leverage is a different issue. I don't know. Realistically, neither does Xi.

A world in which a nuclear weapon has been used in anger is a fundamentally different world from today's: it would be a world whose potential end was clearly visible. (2/n)

As someone who worries a lot about nuclear escalation in the war on Ukraine, I do NOT find this morning's New York Times story particularly concerning--for the simple reason that militaries discuss *everything*. That's their job. (1/n)

nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/… If you could listen to the conversations of military officers--in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere--I'm sure you'd hear many pretty crazy ideas (just like folks in other professions!) Some are dismissed immediately; others get shot down by political leaders. (2/n)

.#nukecon keynote. @iaeaorg Director General @rafaelmgrossi interviewed by @CarnegieEndow president Tino Cuéllar. Fun fact: They share a name: Mariano! .@rafaelmgrossi: Iran problem is becoming more and more “relevant” every day. (“I’m choosing a neutral word, ‘relevant.’”) #nukecon

Welcome to day two of #nukecon! We’re going to discuss the deterrence and escalation implications of new delivery system technologies with @LauraEGrego, Greg Weaver, Sun Xiangli, and @ElenaChernenko. .@LauraEGrego: New technologies won’t undermine U.S.-Chinese or U.S.-Russian mutual vulnerability, but could lead to escalation in crises because, for example, of the difficulty of distinguishing a space launch from a FOBs launch. #nukecon

Final panel of day 1 of #nukecon. Under Secretary of State Bonnie Jenkins, @UnderSecT, and NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby, @NNSAHruby, are in conversation with @nktpnd. .@UnderSecT: The predictability created by arms control is more impact than ever. #nukecon

Now that the agenda for #nukecon has been fully announced, here is the gender balance of our speakers and panelists. Once again, a majority are women.

Female panelists: 53% (26/49)
Male panelists: 47% (23/49)

(1/9) The % of moderators who are women (54% or 7/13) is essentially identical to the overall % of speakers and panelists who are women (53% or 36/49). (2/9)