“It’s the end of globalization!”
“There will be no more bars and no more parties!”
@TheAltantic, I explain why I don’t but that—and what changes might really happen.
[Thread.]
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
The Spanish Influenza killed more than fifty million people, many of them young and healthy.
It was followed by the Roaring Twenties.
Throughout history, humanity has, again and again, experienced pestilence.
None of these diseases lastingly stopped people from seeking out one another’s company.
In Tel Aviv, Baghdad, and Paris, the bars and restaurants were full even when there was a heightened risk of terrorism.
And in Rio and Mexico City, the restaurants remain full despite the threat of robberies or kidnappings.
Five or 10 years from now, there will be about as many mass gatherings as there were before the coronavirus.
Because we’re human.
A lot of people are predicting the end of “neoliberalism” or (🙄) “globalism.”
COVID-19 has shown various things to be irrational—👋giant wave of the hand👋—so those things must surely end.
That’s not how the world works.
Take the UN Security Council. No one likes it. But everyone has different ideas for how to change it. And some countries don’t want to dilute their power.
👉 It limps along.
Is it rational for companies to rely less on just-in-time production? Probably.
Will consumers still prefer cheaper goods? Definitely.
Can CEOs risk losing market share? Probably not.
I believe this pandemic shows the urgent need to reinvest in key institutions like the CDC.
Many Americans believe it shows that government can never get the job done.
Who’ll win? 🤷♂️
Similarly, we all should beware the “predictive fallacy”: Just because we now believe something *ought* be the case hardly means that it *will* be.
This is not to say that the post-pandemic future will look just like the past. Of course it should—and, yes, will—bring about some important changes.
Most likely, those changes will fall into three categories.
Smart governments will, for example, insist on being able to produce critical goods at home. This will significantly change the course of globalization.
But since these goods are a small percentage of the world economy, it won’t slow or end it.
As Roberto Foa and I have argued, e.g., autocracies now rival the economic might of democracies for the first time in over a century.
With China seemingly emerging from COVID-19 faster than the U.S., this massive geopolitical shift may speed up.
According to some historians, the Black Death caused the end of serfdom in much of Western Europe.
It’s imaginable that COVID-19 could bring about similarly vast changes. But if so, they will probably be too counterintuitive for us to predict them.
Rather, the death toll so depleted the labor force that serfs were put in a stronger bargaining position—a consequence that contemporaries utterly failed to predict.
I do not in any way mean to downplay either that magnitude or the suffering it will continue to cause.
Humanity will survive this pandemic. In its aftermath, we will, as after so many other disasters, learn to thrive anew.
And although the world we then inhabit will be different, it won’t be unrecognizable.
[End]