#qcx
> he lost roughly $28m on external exchanges
> $115m of the company’s revenue was conjured by Cotten
> $2m was pocketed by Cotten for his own luxury expenses
> $46m has been seized in court proceedings
> $23-24 million is unaccounted decrypt.co/32080/quadriga…
“The misconduct uncovered in relation to Quadriga is limited to Quadriga,” said the Ontario regulator, “and should not be understood as applying to the crypto asset platform industry as a whole.”
tbh if i was the dude managing Hyperliquid's 4 validators (or those fucking ghetto ass binaries on gh) I would be shitting my pants right now.
Hyperliquid dudes dont seem worried at all though so im sure its fine. 🫠
lol @ all you retards who think the risk is USG forcing Hyperliquid to freeze AAAAAAAAAAHHAHAHHHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHHAHAHHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHAHAHHAHAHHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAAHAHHAHAHAHHAHAHAHHAHAHAHA
Yall, DPRK doesn't trade. DPRK tests.🤦♀️
my offer from 2 weeks ago still stands @HyperliquidX
i'm still happy to do it async or via a call. i can even give you one of my super nice happy colleagues if you don't like me.
but a massive amt of harm will come to people if you don't harden your ass asap.
At some point prior to July 2024 the actual hackers landed a backdoor onto something that gave them some access to the WazirX multisig signers and/or their signatures.
We don't know what or who was compromised and it doesn't really matter.
Initial toehold was likely gained by tricking someone at WazirX or Liminal into installing malware -> escalated from there.
This access allowed the hackers to intercept/insert invisible, malicious payloads for signing in a way where none of the 3+ signers were able to notice.
With the recent sophisticated hacks fresh on everyone's mind, there's been a lot of talk about ✨fancy stacks and setups.✨
Yes, you should evaluate how—and with what—you sign txns.
But building a custom UI for your LAN Qubes OS AWS KMS everyday is not really the answer 😅
Background on the referenced hacks (feel free to skip):
1. Funds were stolen from each org's multisig.
2. Keys themselves were not compromised.
3. In Radiant and WazirX and maybe DMM, the keys backing the multisig were actually only on hardware wallets + actually controlled by distinct parties.
DMM Bitcoin - $305m in May
The least amt is known about DMM, including whether keys were cold vs hot. Early theories said address poisoning. It def wasn't that. Attached is rampant speculation (likely all wrong)
See also: x.com/mononautical/s…
Also, note, any organization that can implement / enforce EDR, etc. should do so. Full stop. End of conversation.
However, the crypto industry generally considers this a non-starter for all sorts of philosophical + practical reasons.