Prediction: The #SCOTUS ruling in #Bostock will become the central case in law school classes teaching the meaning of "but-for" causation. The entire decision comes down to applying but-for causation analysis! /1
'In the language of law, this means that Title VII’s “because of ” test incorporates the “‘simple’” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation. Nassar, 570 U. S., at 346, 360. That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome...' /1
'...would not have happened “but for” the purported cause. See Gross, 557 U. S., at 176. In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.
This can be a sweeping standard. ...' /2
'...Often, events have multiple but-for causes. So, for example, if a car accident occurred both because the defendant ran a red light and because the plaintiff failed to signal his turn at the intersection, we might call each a but-for cause of the collision. ...' /3
'...When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. ...' /4
'...So long as the plaintiff ’s sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law. ' /END
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Thanks! As I mentioned in my review, in claiming that imagination plays the primary role in aspiration, not reason, I follow in the footsteps of Richard Rorty. Though he doesn't mention aspiring to new values explicitly, I think the intent is clear. Here are a few examples. https://t.co/PB3LnHCZRd
@FHaruspex Here are some examples of Rorty substituting an X that is different from (opposed to, even) Y.
A 🧵...
@FHaruspex 'This substitution of objectivity-as-intersubjectivity for objectivity-as-accurate-representation is the key pragmatic move, the one that lets pragmatists feel they can have moral seriousness without "realist" seriousness.'
@FHaruspex 'Nagel can reasonably rejoin that he isn't interested in "something different, something describable." Rather, he is interested in preventing people from substituting the effable for the ineffable, for the intrinsically ineffable.'
I was hoping to channel Rorty's unflappability in writing my response to this essay by one of his former colleagues, but I will fall short in this one-line summary: I found it to be an almost sickening caricature of Rorty's philosophy and of philosophical pragmatism.
visceral reaction out of the way, I will now try to channel Rorty's patience, tolerance, and charity in the remainder of my comments in this thread.
I will say one complementary thing about the essay before addressing my criticisms: Edmundson's personal descriptions of Rorty are
wonderful.
There's lots to disagree with in the essay*, but I will limit myself to highlighting three fundamental caricatures of pragmatism: 1. Truth vs truthfulness 2. The hoary "Nazi Question" 3. Pragmatism as anti-idealism
I came across a wonderful book, "The Moral Psychology of Hope", which is somewhat misnamed in that it is also about the philosophy of Hope. I'm stunned how relatively neglected the concept of hope has been in philosophy (and apparently also in psychology). I have the feeling that
this is due to it being relegated to theology.
I found in it an essay touching on some of the themes I'm addressing in creating my "radically new kind of hope": "Pessimism and the Possibility of Hope". What the author labels "pessimism" isn't what I would call "pessimism". There
isn't a good word for it AFAIK: neither the belief that things are getting ever better nor the belief that they're getting ever worse. Neutralism? She makes the case that one can be hopeful despite not believing that things are getting ever better. I am attempting
@carl_b_sachs I think interpreting Wallace's "centrifugal governor" metaphor (CGM) as a model for natural selection generally is a misreading of the full passage in context. He's applying the CGM to a very specific phenomenon-a supposed balance between highly vs deficiently developed
I googled ["a deficiency in one set of organs always being compensated by an increased development of some others"] and there is virtually no discussion of this 'balance of organ development' hypothesis (BoODH) by Wallace. I think the CGM has been
@carl_b_sachs largely ignored because the BoODH simply not true.
Virtually all of those who reference the CGM part of the passage OMIT the BoODH part. They (including Bateson and CH Smith) misread Wallace as claiming the CGM as applying generally to NS instead of specifically to the
Bingo! I'm hard at work developing a pragmatism that can be awe inspiring. It's very hard to make a LACK of foundation & direction inspiring! I recently realized that the key is to forge a radically new kind of hope, which redefines & clarifies the muddy concept of
Michael Oakeshott's description of political activity is a perfect description of pragmatism:
'[Humanity sails] a boundless and bottomless sea: there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination.'
What kind
of hope does such a journey inspire? What does meliorism mean in such a context?