Re-upping my Asian Security article on the disputed India-China-Myanmar trijunction & how the 1967 India-Burma Boundary Agreement irked Beijing, eventually leading to the Nathu La and Cho La clashes later that year. 1/n
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
After branding the Burmese as "a cat’s paw of Indian reactionaries", China lodged diplomatic protests w/o much impact on Delhi's decision-making. Few months later, for multiple reasons, the PLA targeted Indian forces at Nathu La & Cho La & incurred huge losses. 2/n
When researching on the making of the India-Burma boundary agreement, it was apparent that big-power rivalries drive/condition decision-making. But domestic factors and local aspects are often more imp. in dictating timing & method of actions. 3/n
Outbreak of the Mizo insurgency in '66 played a big role in India's formalisation of boundary with Burma. But the memory of '62 & a desire to be seen as politically accommodative to other neighbours played a sizeable role in India's boundary formalisation w/ Rangoon. 4/n
Throughout this period, Chinese propaganda pushed the line that India couldn't solve any border dispute w/ neighbours & was a reactionary power seeking regional hegemony. Resolving disputes w/ Burma was viewed as an effective pushback. 5/n
As a senior Indian official then put it: “...by signing this Agreement with the Government of Burma we have given the lie to the Chinese accusation that India is not willing to formally delimit its borders with any of her neighbours in a peaceful manner.” 6/n
The boundary agreement underlined how imp. India's relations w/ its other neighbours are when dealing with China. Today, as Nepal tilts towards Beijing, this history is well worth revisiting. China can use India's neighbours to exert pressure on Delhi, but so can India. 7/n
For those who might not have access to this article via T&F website, please feel free to send me a DM. I will be happy to share pdf. 8/n
