Reader in IR @soaspolitics | Security | History | South Asia | Author: India's Near East: A New History (Hurst, 2024); My Enemy's Enemy (Hurst, 2017)
Apr 11, 2022 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
The possibilities of progress in otherwise tormented India-Pakistan bilateral relations in context of @CMShehbaz becoming prime minister of Pakistan. Always good to be cautious on this front. But here’s a quick thread. 1/n
Trust: New Delhi has relatively more (if loaded w. caution) trust in the intent & interests of Sharif Bros. & Gen. Bajwa, both of who seem to understand the need for Pakistan to diversify ties in relation to China. Their rhetoric on RSS, & India has been measured unlike IK. 2/n
Aug 30, 2021 • 7 tweets • 4 min read
Afghan migrants in India struggle for refugee status, are often on limited visas that require renewal ~6-months, & struggle to find work & make a living. They're not the only conflict-generated migrants who face such problems in India (or elsewhere). Short thread. 1/n
As @ConstantinoX mentions (& as @1_of_many_rias's book is likely to unpack in detail): offering asylum is a deeply (geo)politicised process in India. It's not just about religion &/or intra-community politics, its also about strategic calculations. 2/n hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-n…
Aug 28, 2021 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Recent statements by Taliban on India are curious. Going by this translation 1. TB wants to “improve” all-around ties w/ New Delhi. 2. Wants Afghan traders to access Indian markets via Pak (Pindi refused in the past), 3. Seeks a “bilateral” resolution of Kashmir. Thread. 1/n
Why all this? Senior Taliban figures (esp. Stanekzai) didn’t want India to shut the Kabul embassy. But he couldn’t guarantee protection w/ LeT & JeM in town & Haqqanis running the city. In need for legitimacy & aid, they need India (& others) back in Kabul. All expected. 2/n
Aug 14, 2021 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
50yrs after losing East Pakistan (‘71), Pindi has, in its mind, achieved a strategic “win” it deeply desired. This needs acknowledgment, esp by India. Time will tell if it’ll be a Pyrrhic victory, but it has come at huge human cost (mostly Afghan, but also Pakistani). Thread. 1/n
Now that TB victory is assured in Kabul, it might be a good moment for Pindi to rethink its relns w/ TB. There’s no comparison b/w Afghan Islamists & Bangladeshi nationalists, but India’s experience w/ Mukti/Mujib Bahini should, ironically but seriously, be instructive. 2/n
Aug 3, 2021 • 8 tweets • 5 min read
.@arzandc there is such wealth of literature on this subject that it'll be difficult to identify a single/even a small set of readings. But, here's a short list of readings on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations (not comprehensive, so plz. add more) 1/n
Let's start w/ Lt Gen Kamal Matinuddin's "The Taliban Phenomenon-1994-97"; couple this w/ works by Ahmed Rashid ("Taliban"), Md. Yousaf ("Bear Trap"), & Steve Coll ("Ghost Wars") & one gets an accurate view of the 1990s Taliban-Pakistan relations. 2/n amazon.in/Phenomenon-Afg…
1. The UK's preemptive offer to recognise Taliban regime even if they grab power by forcibly ousting Ghani demonstrates the depth of leverage Pakistan has over London's subcontinental policies. No wonder, India & UK never got along on these issues. Quick thread.
2. It shows London's ability to adapt, but also some haste. The FCO advocated talks w/ Taliban in 2008, long before many were ready for it. London understood that the Afghan war was a lost cause, even if DC took its time. No wonder, it has *already* accepted the Taliban's rise.
Jun 10, 2021 • 14 tweets • 5 min read
Thanks to @suhasinih for the opportunity to share my thoughts on India's outreach to the Afghan Taliban. Here is a quick thread on why India is at ease w/ this information being in public, why now, & a short history of bilateral mistrust b/w both sides 1/n thehindu.com/news/national/…
Challenge: As the US leaves, India can handle outreach to Taliban w/o compromising reln w/ Kabul. But can Taliban handle talks w/ India given its dependence on Pindi? Taliban's refutation of @Rezhasan's report sounds hollow after MEA's ~confirmation. 2/n pajhwok.com/2021/06/09/tal…
Mar 28, 2021 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
1. Why is India supporting the Tatmadaw? It has calculated that returns from an anti-junta stand are ltd, and the risk of dislocating connectivity is high. Past experience of failed interventionism (1988-93) guides this approach. It *might* be the wrong lessons learnt? A thread.
2. Northeast: No, India is not dependent on the Tatmadaw (a suboptimal partner at best) for its COIN in NE. It’s a powerful myth which requires revisiting. India countered insurgents (esp. NSCN-K) *despite* the Tatmadaw, extraditions notwithstanding.
1. The 1988 coup triggered an armed response too. The All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) was created, & it waged multiple battles (some futile) against the junta. This time round, the character (not the nature) of armed pushback *might* be different. Some thoughts:
2. Parochialism (to borrow @pstanpolitics' term): Unlike ~late80s/early90s, & regardless of the CRPH's broad leadership & recent warning, armed pushback is *likely* to be more diffused w/ fewer & weaker leaders this time. This might, ironically, make it more effective.
Feb 4, 2021 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
1. There is an argument that S-G Min Aung Hlaing’s personality clash w/ Suu Kyi triggered the coup. I partly agree. But no lasting mil. coup occurs w/o some consensus among the top-brass. This is a “conservative revolt” within the Tatmadaw & requires unpacking. A quick thread:
2. The Tatmadaw is a deeply insular & expectedly conservative organisation. Viewed by many (a silent majority?) as a well-oiled machine that offers social mobility in the relative absence of similar avenues elsewhere. Like most militaries, it reflects Myanmar’s social realities.
Jan 29, 2021 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
1. How *might* Myanmar's South Asian & northern neighbours react *if* the Tatmadaw ousts Suu Kyi in a coup? This is an imp ques given the state of the world at the moment, & many a geopolitical "plate-fulls" for most big powers. A quick, admittedly speculative, thread:
2. China: Unlikely to be happy w/ it, & might even view it as antithetical to its interests in the short term. The coup would reflect the limits of Beijing's influence in & conflict resolution capacities in its own neighbourhood. Why?
Jan 13, 2021 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
1. NSA A. Doval in Kabul in 2021 reminds me of former-R&AW chief A.K. Verma’s visit in ‘88. He was sent by R. Gandhi to assess the ‘sustainability’ of the Najibullah regime. Verma returned upbeat: (paraphrasing) “w/ Soviet support, Najib will remain in power for years”.
2. Najib did last *exactly* till Soviet aid poured in, & then was ousted in ‘92. Today, N. Modi must be asking the same ques. from Doval about the Ghani govt. (incl. intra-govt. allies & adversaries alike): ‘how long can they last?’.
Jan 11, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
1. This is India’s way of saying: “we hope that a ceasefire is attained & talks at Doha deliver a sustainable agreement. But we’re not counting on either of that for now, & will side w/ Kabul if the situation worsens”. Short thread.
theprint.in/diplomacy/indi…2. India’s mil. support to Afghanistan has never been huge. But it’s symbolically potent, & provocative for Pakistan. Given how stretched India is militarily, what it offers Kabul won’t change the mil. tide in Af. But it *might* offer a lifeline to India’s allies.
Dec 21, 2020 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
1. The ISI seems to be truly sharpening (& exercising) its covert assassination programme against dissidents abroad. Of course, no one can point the finger on the org. forensically given the nature of the ops, but the signalling is breathtaking. A quick thread:
2. The ISI is not new to covert assassinations on foreign soil. Much to the contrary. But, *where*, *when*, & *against whom* it carries out such ops is critical. Select Asian (& its a big continent!) countries have been preferred over others.
Dec 2, 2020 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
India’s decision to invite U.K. PM Boris Johnson as chief guest for Republic Day 2021 is incredibly well timed & strategically smart. Four, among other, issues to watch out for:
1. Brexit & FTA: This will be tough sell for London (easy capital flows but restricted labour flows?), but GoI is likely to be welcoming of such agreements, esp. having said no to RCEP. Still a long way to go, but both countries have an economic incentive to get serious.
Dec 2, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
This @SKalyvas interview is brilliant. Apart from delving into the field of pol. violence & it’s development over the years, it unpacks imp. dilemmas that academics face on a routine basis. 1/n
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11…
As someone who is deeply wedded to specificities (instead of generalisations), & who puts a premium on high-quality empirics & deep historical inquiry, I’ve struggled w/ the systemic push for theory building & w/ quantitative methods. 2/n
Oct 14, 2020 • 27 tweets • 6 min read
Some thoughts on the M. Yusuf interview by K. Thapar. It's timing, content esp. re Af & secret wars, style, reactions & implications. I agree with @iamthedrifter that this will strengthen his credentials in Pak estb., even if there's much to disagree from an Indian perspective.
1. Timing: Excellent! In the middle of the intra-Afghan process in Doha, Sino-Indian standoff, continuing violence at LoC, a never-ending pandemic, IK's domestic travails, & Modi's internal/regional eco., & mil. challenges.
Aug 22, 2020 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Couple of quick thoughts, @pstanpolitics a) China has offered shelter to various NE insurgents for some time, w/o letting them operate kinetically. b) P. Baruah is one, but H Tangkhul, T R Calvin, and some other N-IM cadre still operate from Yunnan 1/n
c) There has been an (expected) uptick in violence in Manipur recently, & acc. to some Indian officials there is indeed a "link to China". But, it is unclear whether this link is to Beijing, or to the illegal arms bazaar wherefrom Chinese-made weapons can easily be bought. 2/n
Aug 18, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
This is indeed a great piece by @MohanCRaja that offers imp. policy advise. And like most good pieces, its raises questions about contemporary Middle East & India's engagement therein. 1/n indianexpress.com/article/opinio…
Do people in the region identify with a "moderate (& sovereign?) Arab centre"? Unlike 1950s when Arab nationalism was on an upswing, today we see little hope for pol. movements of that sort, esp. with SA & UAE (or even Egypt) at its centre. Can MBS be considered moderate? 2/n
Jul 29, 2020 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
Random thoughts on India’s East: It’s astounding how Burma’s self-imposed isolation & discriminatory citizenship laws dislocated India’s eastward thrust and outreach. Even more astonishing is how little this is acknowledged in existing literature. 1/n
From being critical to India’s Non-Aligned strategy, & economic connectivity w/ SE Asia —& long before Look/Act East were coined— Burma’s (erroneously, if understandably) strategic value in N. Delhi was vastly reduced. Isolation cost Burma much, but it cost India a lot too. 2/n
