With all eyes on China-India, it was easy to miss today's important digital forum on BRI chaired by Wang Yi. Some sharp observations by @Igor_Denisov in a short thread π+ brief comments by yours truly 1/
2/ Russia's showing is illustrative for a precarious balancing act in Moscow's relationship with Beijing, and BRI in particular. FM Sergey Lavrov recorded only a short video, otherwise π·πΊ was represented by Ambassador Kirill Barsky, one of the best China hands at @MID_RF
3/ The message is simple: we want to partner with you, China, but we are not part of BRI and won't join the club of your junior partners. Instead Moscow is pitching to Beijing to have a video call between Wang Yi and FMs of Eurasian Economic Union to discuss EEU/BRI docking ε―Ήζ₯
4/ What's also notable that FMs of four Central Asian nations (with exception of neutral Turkmenistan) were present. I agree with @Igor_Denisov that BRI might be loosing steam for now, but not in Central Asia that becomes increasingly dependent on China as direct result of COVID.
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Is China distancing itself from Russia economically, as the West urges Beijing to do amid war in Ukraine? Not really, if you look at this week's travel of Ding Xuexiang, one of Xi's top economic lieutenants. 1/15
2/ This year πΊπΈ has invested a lot of effort to choke off Chinese support for the Russian war machine, including threats of sanctions against π¨π³ banks involved in trade, and tightening the screws against landmark projects like Arctic LNG-2. Is it working?
3/ π¨π³customs statistics shows that breakneck pace (+26.3%) of π¨π³π·πΊ trade growth in 2023 has slowed down to just 1.8% in Jan-June 2024. Key here is a visible drop in π¨π³ exports to π·πΊ by 0.8% (imports have grown by 3.9%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249β¦
Why is China not attending πΊπ¦ Peace Summit inπ¨π? What may be π¨π³ plan for diplomacy around the war started by Xi's partner Vladimir Putin? Some thoughts in a new @ForeignAffairs piece, and more details in this𧡠foreignaffairs.com/china/why-chinβ¦
2/ Roots of π¨π³ decision to skip π¨π summit can be traced back to last August, when Xi's special envoy Li Hui ζθΎ appeared in Jeddah, which sparked expectations that Beijing is ready to engage in multilateral diplomacy based on @ZelenskyyUa peace formula. wsj.com/articles/with-β¦
3/ However, after Li sat through the discussion and had brief conversation with @JakeSullivan46 & Toria Nuland, China's conclusion was that it shouldn't engage in next rounds. The agenda is set by @AndriyYermak, the peace formula doesn't change to include π¨π³ suggestions, and...
What does a cabinet reshuffle in Russia mean for π¨π³π·πΊ government-to-government ties? It's about continuity, deepening, and long-term. Also, as Beijing and Moscow expand their defense industrial cooperation, Putin has elevated high-caliber professionals with China experience. π§΅
2/ Putin's government set to be appointed by Duma today is an old-new cabinet, with very few changes. This is a quite competent team that has worked together for 3+ years. They have weathered COVID, war, and sanctions - much better than Russian generals perform on the battlefield
3/ For π¨π³π·πΊ government-to-government ties, this continuity is very important. Since Xi's state visit to Moscow in March 2023, the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai have invested serious effort in order to get senior officials on both sides to know each other well.
Is πΊπΈ recent push to choke off π¨π³ supplies of dual-use goods to π·πΊ having an effect? It looks like it, according to the newest Chinese customs data. But I'm not holding my breath: over the last 2+ years Beijing and Moscow have found ways to adapt to U.S. sanctions. Short π§΅
2/ Newest customs statistics is out, and it shows that Beijing's exports to Russia continue to decline for a second month. April shipments to π·πΊ are $8.3b, down 13.7% compared to April 2023. This is bigger than yoy exports drop to πΊπΈ (-2.8%) or πͺπΊ (-3.6%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249β¦
3/ Russian exports to China are growing ($11.5b in April), but the drop of imports is significant and it builds on nearly 16% drop in March - the first such decline of π¨π³ exports to π·πΊ since summer 2022. bloomberg.com/news/articles/β¦
π·πΊβοΈπΊπ¦ππ¨π³
What lessons are Chinese leaders learning from Russiaβs war on Ukraine? They may be the opposite of those the @WhiteHouse wants them to learn. Some thoughts from a @WSJopinion piece, in a short𧡠wsj.com/articles/xi-jiβ¦
2/ The demonstrative effect of Western reaction to Putin's aggression was very much on U.S. policymakers' mind very early on. Here is how @SecBlinken is talking about it last year in Helsinki. ru.usembassy.gov/secretary-blinβ¦
The fact that π·πΊ will receive 28% less for its gas in π¨π³ than in Europe, but still seeks to expand gas sales to China, illustrates a dilemma Moscow faces in economic relations with Beijing. Simply put: amid war in πΊπ¦, there is no alternative to dependency on China. π§΅1/14
2/ According to this excellent story in @business, π·πΊ government expects to earn 28% less in π¨π³ market for same amounts of gas than in EU & Turkey. For example, in 2024 it's $257 vs $320 for 1,000 m2. bloomberg.com/news/articles/β¦
3/ This reality shouldn't come as a surprise. As my @CarnegieEndow colleague @SergeyVakulenk0 has established in the best to date study on π¨π³π·πΊ piped gas pricing formula, a discount benefiting Beijing is nearly pre-programmed in the devil's bargain. carnegieendowment.org/politika/89552