With all eyes on China-India, it was easy to miss today's important digital forum on BRI chaired by Wang Yi. Some sharp observations by @Igor_Denisov in a short thread 👇+ brief comments by yours truly 1/
2/ Russia's showing is illustrative for a precarious balancing act in Moscow's relationship with Beijing, and BRI in particular. FM Sergey Lavrov recorded only a short video, otherwise 🇷🇺 was represented by Ambassador Kirill Barsky, one of the best China hands at @MID_RF
3/ The message is simple: we want to partner with you, China, but we are not part of BRI and won't join the club of your junior partners. Instead Moscow is pitching to Beijing to have a video call between Wang Yi and FMs of Eurasian Economic Union to discuss EEU/BRI docking 对接
4/ What's also notable that FMs of four Central Asian nations (with exception of neutral Turkmenistan) were present. I agree with @Igor_Denisov that BRI might be loosing steam for now, but not in Central Asia that becomes increasingly dependent on China as direct result of COVID.
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What does a cabinet reshuffle in Russia mean for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties? It's about continuity, deepening, and long-term. Also, as Beijing and Moscow expand their defense industrial cooperation, Putin has elevated high-caliber professionals with China experience. 🧵
2/ Putin's government set to be appointed by Duma today is an old-new cabinet, with very few changes. This is a quite competent team that has worked together for 3+ years. They have weathered COVID, war, and sanctions - much better than Russian generals perform on the battlefield
3/ For 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties, this continuity is very important. Since Xi's state visit to Moscow in March 2023, the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai have invested serious effort in order to get senior officials on both sides to know each other well.
Is 🇺🇸 recent push to choke off 🇨🇳 supplies of dual-use goods to 🇷🇺 having an effect? It looks like it, according to the newest Chinese customs data. But I'm not holding my breath: over the last 2+ years Beijing and Moscow have found ways to adapt to U.S. sanctions. Short 🧵
2/ Newest customs statistics is out, and it shows that Beijing's exports to Russia continue to decline for a second month. April shipments to 🇷🇺 are $8.3b, down 13.7% compared to April 2023. This is bigger than yoy exports drop to 🇺🇸 (-2.8%) or 🇪🇺 (-3.6%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ Russian exports to China are growing ($11.5b in April), but the drop of imports is significant and it builds on nearly 16% drop in March - the first such decline of 🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 since summer 2022. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
🇷🇺⚔️🇺🇦🔭🇨🇳
What lessons are Chinese leaders learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine? They may be the opposite of those the @WhiteHouse wants them to learn. Some thoughts from a @WSJopinion piece, in a short🧵 wsj.com/articles/xi-ji…
2/ The demonstrative effect of Western reaction to Putin's aggression was very much on U.S. policymakers' mind very early on. Here is how @SecBlinken is talking about it last year in Helsinki. ru.usembassy.gov/secretary-blin…
The fact that 🇷🇺 will receive 28% less for its gas in 🇨🇳 than in Europe, but still seeks to expand gas sales to China, illustrates a dilemma Moscow faces in economic relations with Beijing. Simply put: amid war in 🇺🇦, there is no alternative to dependency on China. 🧵1/14
2/ According to this excellent story in @business, 🇷🇺 government expects to earn 28% less in 🇨🇳 market for same amounts of gas than in EU & Turkey. For example, in 2024 it's $257 vs $320 for 1,000 m2. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ This reality shouldn't come as a surprise. As my @CarnegieEndow colleague @SergeyVakulenk0 has established in the best to date study on 🇨🇳🇷🇺 piped gas pricing formula, a discount benefiting Beijing is nearly pre-programmed in the devil's bargain. carnegieendowment.org/politika/89552
The deepening of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 alignment is one of the most consequential geopolitical outcomes of Russia's war against Ukraine. How so, and why is this important? I wrote about it in a new essay for @ForeignAffairs. Some key takeaways in a🧵1/20 foreignaffairs.com/china/putin-an…
2/ Even before Crimea annexation in 2014 and February 24, 2022, Moscow and Beijing have been on a steady path to improve and deepen their ties. Driving forces include delimitation of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 border, economic complementarity, and deepening compatibility of the two political regimes.
3/ Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine has provided a qualitative leap to what has been an incremental qualitative improvement before 2022. China and Russia are more firmly aligned now than at any time since the 1950s. Why is that?
As I argue in my latest piece for @WSJ, in Russia, the war against Ukraine is now the organizing principle around which most decisions are made, and at the core of Russia’s domestic, economic and foreign policy. Short summary in a 🧵 wsj.com/world/russia/r…
2/ On the domestic front: in their recent in-depth research paper into attitudes toward the war, my colleagues @AndrKolesnikov and Denis Volkov showed that about 75% of the population support it. Most of Russia doesn’t look or feel like a nation at war. carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…
3/ The elites, too, have demonstrated remarkable cohesion and the inability to challenge the Kremlin’s course. Even the infamous mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny earlier this year only strengthened Putin’s grip on power. ft.com/content/0960e7…