Thread by @nickwallis

Just reading the Fujitsu letter to parliamentary inquiry. VERY shifty. Q&A’s follow:

#PostOfficeScandal

Q:How many bugs, errors and discrepancies have been logged for each year since they began to be recorded?

A: The incident management system captures incidents logged, and includes matters raised by a sub-postmaster as well as incidents raised by Fujitsu monitoring...

… The system has recorded thousands of incidents since the inception of Horizon, as would be expected of a system of this complexity and size….

… However, in respect of material incidents, Mr Justice Fraser highlights 29 bugs, errors and defects, some of which had the potential to impact a sub-postmaster local branch account.

[Inquiry chair didn’t ask how many Fraser J highlighted...

… Fujitsu are implying here that the 29 bugs with material impact that were dragged out of them during the litigation were the only ones...

… Suspect Fujitsu and possibly the PO have knowledge of far more bugs with a material impact that in their time-limited disclosure-curtailed investigation, the independent experts were able to find.]

[Only Fujitsu and possibly PO know anything like the full extent. I mean, it COULD be just 29, but it’s important to state these were just the bugs identified over a very short period of time by independent experts leading up to a trial. Fujitsu don’t make that at all clear]

Q: Can you provide a breakdown by error type and its implications for the integrity of a local Horizon terminal and for the system as a whole?

A: In the Appendices to his judgment in Bates v Post Office Ltd, Mr Justice Fraser provides significant...

... detail on the history of Horizon and a summary of bugs, errors and defects since the inception of Horizon in 1999 including those that had the potential to impact a sub-postmaster local branch account.

[Translation: “No.”]

Fujitsu stronger here:

Q: What lessons have you learnt from Horizon and how can you reassure my Committee that the type of issues detailed in Bates v Post Office Ltd will not happen again?

A:
The provision of witness evidence to support prosecutions under the direction...

… of the Post Office should not have been allowed to happen.
We have implemented the changes below, and will implement such further measures as may be appropriate following any related judicial processes or inquiries...

… Fujitsu has not provided any new witness evidence since the judgement.
􏰀 Fujitsu will not provide any witness evidence in the future to support Post Office led prosecutions of sub-
postmasters...

… We will provide information if requested by the Police or an appropriate judicial authority but only after such
request has been fully considered, and with the approval of a UK board director.

[Given the PO has given assurances to the government it no...

… longer intends to criminally prosecute its Subpostmasters (postofficetrial.com/2020/06/the-ho…), this is a bit late, lads]

Q: Have any Fujitsu staff been disciplined or dismissed as a result of the issues associated with Horizon and/or regarding the evidence they gave in Bates v Post Office Ltd?

A: In many cases key employees and decision-makers are no longer working at Fujitsu. If...

… it emerges that any current employee intentionally misled the court or otherwise failed to meet the standards expected from Fujitsu, then they will be dismissed.

[There’s a bloodbath coming then. The judge has already found that at least one existing Fujitsu employee tried to mislead him, and...

… he expressed deep concerns about a lot of the Fujitsu witness evidence under cross-examination

Par 282 Horizon Issues judgment: "Mr Andy Dunks is at IT Security Analyst at Fujitsu Services Ltd.”
Par 294.1 "Mr Dunks expressly sought to mislead me”]

@threadreaderapp unroll please