With @BillGates warning that a bioterror attack involving a pathogen with a high death rate “is kind of the nightmare scenario” & potentially the next big global threat, we asked five top thinkers to what extent the CT community needs to revisit the threat ctc.usma.edu/a-view-from-th…
One of our panelists, @JCZarate1, assessed that "the severity and extreme disruption of a novel coronavirus will likely spur the imagination of the most creative and dangerous groups and individuals to reconsider bioterrorist attacks."
Juan Zarate (@JCZarate1) added: "The threat of a pathogen unleashed wantonly on the world—or worse yet, a genetically engineered bioweapon designed to maximize transmission and lethality—has always loomed large in the nightmares of every counterterrorism official."
Lieutenant General (Ret) Michael Nagata, who previously served as the senior CT strategist at NCTC, put it this way: "The U.S. counterterrorism community has long held that the use of a biological agent of some kind for a major terrorist attack is not a matter of if, but when."
LTG (Ret) Nagata warned that: "the likelihood of a future terrorist using a highly potent, clandestinely produced, difficult to detect/identify/track, easily transportable and dispersible, and quite lethal biological weapon is rising significantly."
Another of our panelists @Ali_H_Soufan put it this way: "Although the barriers to entry for terrorists to get their hands on bio weapons remain high, they are gradually being lowered due to technological advances and the democratization of science."
Ali Soufan (@Ali_H_Soufan) added "The threat of bioterrorism ... has intensified because of miniaturization, proliferation, and the manipulation of genetics, all of which diminish the probability of detection and enhance plausible deniability for potential attackers."
And @akcronin warned: "With the ability to alter DNA through easily accessible tools like CRISPR/Cas9, individuals can change known bacterial or viral pathogens to make them more dangerous. Far more people have access to the means to do this, much more rapidly than ever before."
Audrey Cronin (@akcronin) summed it up thus: "Synthetic biology is moving quickly, and we are way behind."
With regard to bioterror @MagnusRanstorp noted that though it'll remain beyond the capability of most terror groups "new technology is emerging on multiple fronts, and it is essential to analyze how ideas spread within/between terrorist groups ... in this new post-COVID-19 world"
Magnus Ranstorp (@MagnusRanstorp) also noted that: "Preparedness for pandemics will inevitably raise the capability for most states on bioterrorism preparedness in the post-COVID-19 period."
With regard to the bioterror threat moving forward, LTG (Ret) Nagata assessed that we can "operationally assume that terrorists are likely to provide early warning by failing several times in the process, despite improved technologies or capabilities."
LTG (Ret) Nagata has this powerful message: "I believe U.S. national security leaders should err on the side of believing terrorists can be proficient in bioterrorism. It seems to me far better we assume this and discover that we didn’t need to, rather than the other way ‘round."
For @MagnusRanstorp one key area of focus for the CT community needs to be "understanding how COVID-19 may have changed the calculus of use of bioterrorism by rogue states (using non-state actors as a delivery mechanism and plausible deniability)."
And @Ali_H_Soufan notes: "As [@akcronin] has pointed out in her excellent book [Power to the People], we now live in an “age of lethal empowerment,” where individuals and small groups seeking to do harm can have outsized effects unlike most other eras in human history."
Moreover @Ali_H_Soufan notes "when we take into account the human ability to advance technologically and the difficulty with which governments, legislation, and global governance have keeping up with technological innovations, the future of this threat becomes even more ominous."
There is thus serious concern over bioterror. @JCZarate1 stresses that "the good news is that addressing such threats looks much like what we need to do to restore our ability and confidence to respond to and recover from the COVID-19 crisis and prepare for future pandemics."
The full 14,000 word @CTCWP Sentinel discussion on COVID-19 and counter-terrorism is available here: ctc.usma.edu/a-view-from-th…
In concluding this thread on the bioterror threat it is fitting to give the last words to Lieutenant General (Ret) Michael Nagata, long one of the smartest thinkers in U.S. counter-terrorism...
"We should confront the question of whether the U.S. counterterrorism community, our policymakers, congressional representatives, and the American people are informed and aware enough of the trajectory we are now on? I believe the answer is a resounding “no.”" - LTG (Ret) Nagata
Nagata: "During my career as a CT operational practitioner, all the way through my final years as the senior CT strategist at NCTC, the amount of energy, focus, and resourcing devoted to bioterrorism is a small fraction of what is still given today to more conventional threats."
"Like all things in life, we have choices to make about how prepared we wish to be. The question is, will we make them today before a disaster happens or be forced by catastrophe to make them tomorrow?" - LTG (Ret) Michael Nagata
