It's becoming a common refrain among some China watchers: Engagement was always stupid; those now coming around to tougher position on China should have seen it before; China's harsh trajectory was always obvious. Several good sources refute that notion ...
Iain Johnston's superb essay in @TWQgw is the best one-source response: China isn't resolutely against all rules or orders; its behavior toward post-war order has been mixed, not wholly negative; criticisms use straw man versions of engagement tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
We forget that the opening to China was a strategic gambit that had big geopolitical return. Phil Gordon's new essay in @WarOnTheRocks puts it brilliantly: "The benefits of not having [China] as an enemy have endured for so long they are now largely taken for granted"
Very nice video cases of US-China dispute resolution by @EvanFeigenbaum add two important points: (1) We will *need* to deal w/ China on big issues, and (2) Stable overall relations + personal ties = key to advancing US interests
Six Crises youtube.com/playlist?list=… via @YouTube
Some might argue we should have hedged more. But *we built all the tools required to deal with current Chinese trajectory* during the period of so-called feckless engagement: Alliances, partnerships , int'l rules, norms, institutions and standards ...
… continued strong defense investments + more. We weren't on the wrong track and what's needed isn't rocket science: Multilateral, norm-based answers to China's belligerence; strengthened tools of influence; key US domestic investments; willingness to work w/China where needed
The basis for such responses was firmly laid over the last 30 years, and our position is *stronger* b/c we engaged China. Mischaracterizing bipartisan policy of engagement as appeasement promotes a dangerous myth that will be used to fuel excessive reactions to the competition
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My argument that it doesn't make sense to pull back from Europe to go all-in on China: America is stronger in the rivalry when closely linked to Europe, in security affairs and otherwise
Lots of arguments that couldn't fit into the essay--here's one: foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
Tighter coupling with allies is a far more likely route to enhanced deterrent messaging over Taiwan in the next 3 - 5 years. Lots of reports show limits to system production capacity. Current budgets won't grow the Navy/USAF/Army much at all. There just nytimes.com/2023/03/24/us/…
isn't the military muscle to pile into the region to meet the (exaggerated) timelines of those who think we're on the verge of an invasion. But multilateral signaling--even from countries w/no intention of going to war themselves--can become much stronger + blunter in just months
My colleague and friend @TimSweijs and I make the case today in @WarOnTheRocks for the importance of middle powers in US strategy. It's a specific appeal to take them seriously, but also a broader argument about the essential focus of US foreign policy warontherocks.com/2023/04/mind-t…
Seems like a day doesn't pass without new evidence for the rising importance of middle powers and their independent, self-interested, often idiosyncratic stances /2 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Our argument suggests--as real as the China challenge is, as much as the US must compete vigorously--that making US statecraft all about the rivalry risks damaging long-term US influence. For the middle powers, we ought to be focusing on partnering with them, serving ... /3
If this is the flavor of emerging arguments vs a tough US approach to China, it'll do more harm than good. As someone highly sympathetic to the core idea--we're mistaking Chinese intentions in a systematically paranoid way--I found this slightly chilling nytimes.com/interactive/20…
The interview reflects the sort of national self-centeredness or egotism one sees from the PRC--constitutionally unable to take criticism on board in a real way, ignoring or eliding uncomfortable issues. Unintentionally, I'm sure, but sounds like a version of autocracy-speak /2
An increasingly striking--and worrying--trend is this essentially self-referential character of China's relations with the world: We have our rightful claims, we justify our actions in our own way, end of discussion (in general + in crises, when they often refuse to talk) /3
This risk has been hanging out there for many months--seemingly avoided b/o Putin's larger ambitions. But *if* Xi could convince Putin to cut his losses and offer a cease-fire at roughly current lines, it would put Ukraine + supporters in a bind bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Per Bloomberg: "The US is worried about being backed into a corner over the Chinese proposal. ... [D]ismissing it outright could let China argue to other nations that are weary of the war — and of the economic damage it’s wreaking — that Washington isn’t interested in peace" /2
Such an offer combined w/unilateral Russian cease-fire would allow Putin to say, "We got the Donbas back [he'll claim] and taught the West a lesson, now we go back to peace." Xi will claim a victory for Chinese statecraft. Much of Global South rejoices + urges all to accept /3
Well, Bret Stephens at least has the courage to stick with his war advocacy. But this essay is just ... unpersuasive, to put it politely. So many reasons: nytimes.com/2023/03/21/opi…
He denies that the war strengthened Iran, saying that the invasion scared them. But Iran gained huge (if fluid) influence in Iraqi politics, saw a key enemy deposed, built on anti-American reactions ... and is now a far bigger threat than in 2003 /2 brookings.edu/opinions/how-t…
He says the fact that Iraqis suffered under Saddam + from the insurgency absolves us of moral responsibility for harms of the invasion, which is a strange + perverse moral principle. When we invade a nation we are accountable for what happens next, including suffering /3
A brilliant essay by my colleague Jim Mitre making what I think is a conclusive case--and not one that accepts all the admin's talking points--on why a bold response to Russia doesn't threaten US deterrence goals re: China. It strongly supports them warontherocks.com/2023/03/how-th…
As Jim argues, the US response to the Ukraine war has spurred defense innovation, sparked an urgently-needed rethink of defense industrial base issues, strengthened security cooperation tools overall, bolstered US credibility and ability to lead a multilateral coalition /2
I would add that the shock of unexpected aggression has notably strengthened the democratic world's sensitivity about aggressive war, leading to stronger signaling to China over Taiwan. The assumption of needing to help the US somehow in the event of conflict is rising /3