It's becoming a common refrain among some China watchers: Engagement was always stupid; those now coming around to tougher position on China should have seen it before; China's harsh trajectory was always obvious. Several good sources refute that notion ...
Iain Johnston's superb essay in @TWQgw is the best one-source response: China isn't resolutely against all rules or orders; its behavior toward post-war order has been mixed, not wholly negative; criticisms use straw man versions of engagement tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
We forget that the opening to China was a strategic gambit that had big geopolitical return. Phil Gordon's new essay in @WarOnTheRocks puts it brilliantly: "The benefits of not having [China] as an enemy have endured for so long they are now largely taken for granted"
Very nice video cases of US-China dispute resolution by @EvanFeigenbaum add two important points: (1) We will *need* to deal w/ China on big issues, and (2) Stable overall relations + personal ties = key to advancing US interests
Six Crises youtube.com/playlist?list=… via @YouTube
Some might argue we should have hedged more. But *we built all the tools required to deal with current Chinese trajectory* during the period of so-called feckless engagement: Alliances, partnerships , int'l rules, norms, institutions and standards ...
… continued strong defense investments + more. We weren't on the wrong track and what's needed isn't rocket science: Multilateral, norm-based answers to China's belligerence; strengthened tools of influence; key US domestic investments; willingness to work w/China where needed
The basis for such responses was firmly laid over the last 30 years, and our position is *stronger* b/c we engaged China. Mischaracterizing bipartisan policy of engagement as appeasement promotes a dangerous myth that will be used to fuel excessive reactions to the competition
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US policy re: Ukraine seems now to have unfolded in service of three principles 1. Correctly assessing that US vital interests did not justify a direct fighting role 2. Correctly concluding that criminal aggression + risk of emboldened aggressors demanded support for Ukraine
3. And then ... continually escalating the scale + character of that support to thresholds that place at risk Principle 1, without any reason to believe that these incremental steps will be decisive, and without any (real/persuasive) vision of the endgame they will produce
If US interests did not justify going to war in Feb 2022, they don't justify it today. Every escalatory step carries *some* risk of violating that principle.
Asserting that "Putin fears us + won't escalate" is simplistic + ignores the catalytic dynamic of action-reaction cycles
My argument that it doesn't make sense to pull back from Europe to go all-in on China: America is stronger in the rivalry when closely linked to Europe, in security affairs and otherwise
Lots of arguments that couldn't fit into the essay--here's one: foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
Tighter coupling with allies is a far more likely route to enhanced deterrent messaging over Taiwan in the next 3 - 5 years. Lots of reports show limits to system production capacity. Current budgets won't grow the Navy/USAF/Army much at all. There just nytimes.com/2023/03/24/us/…
isn't the military muscle to pile into the region to meet the (exaggerated) timelines of those who think we're on the verge of an invasion. But multilateral signaling--even from countries w/no intention of going to war themselves--can become much stronger + blunter in just months
My colleague and friend @TimSweijs and I make the case today in @WarOnTheRocks for the importance of middle powers in US strategy. It's a specific appeal to take them seriously, but also a broader argument about the essential focus of US foreign policy warontherocks.com/2023/04/mind-t…
Seems like a day doesn't pass without new evidence for the rising importance of middle powers and their independent, self-interested, often idiosyncratic stances /2 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Our argument suggests--as real as the China challenge is, as much as the US must compete vigorously--that making US statecraft all about the rivalry risks damaging long-term US influence. For the middle powers, we ought to be focusing on partnering with them, serving ... /3
If this is the flavor of emerging arguments vs a tough US approach to China, it'll do more harm than good. As someone highly sympathetic to the core idea--we're mistaking Chinese intentions in a systematically paranoid way--I found this slightly chilling nytimes.com/interactive/20…
The interview reflects the sort of national self-centeredness or egotism one sees from the PRC--constitutionally unable to take criticism on board in a real way, ignoring or eliding uncomfortable issues. Unintentionally, I'm sure, but sounds like a version of autocracy-speak /2
An increasingly striking--and worrying--trend is this essentially self-referential character of China's relations with the world: We have our rightful claims, we justify our actions in our own way, end of discussion (in general + in crises, when they often refuse to talk) /3
This risk has been hanging out there for many months--seemingly avoided b/o Putin's larger ambitions. But *if* Xi could convince Putin to cut his losses and offer a cease-fire at roughly current lines, it would put Ukraine + supporters in a bind bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Per Bloomberg: "The US is worried about being backed into a corner over the Chinese proposal. ... [D]ismissing it outright could let China argue to other nations that are weary of the war — and of the economic damage it’s wreaking — that Washington isn’t interested in peace" /2
Such an offer combined w/unilateral Russian cease-fire would allow Putin to say, "We got the Donbas back [he'll claim] and taught the West a lesson, now we go back to peace." Xi will claim a victory for Chinese statecraft. Much of Global South rejoices + urges all to accept /3
Well, Bret Stephens at least has the courage to stick with his war advocacy. But this essay is just ... unpersuasive, to put it politely. So many reasons: nytimes.com/2023/03/21/opi…
He denies that the war strengthened Iran, saying that the invasion scared them. But Iran gained huge (if fluid) influence in Iraqi politics, saw a key enemy deposed, built on anti-American reactions ... and is now a far bigger threat than in 2003 /2 brookings.edu/opinions/how-t…
He says the fact that Iraqis suffered under Saddam + from the insurgency absolves us of moral responsibility for harms of the invasion, which is a strange + perverse moral principle. When we invade a nation we are accountable for what happens next, including suffering /3