Guess what --
China isn't on track to come close to meeting its Phase One purchase commitments. It isn't even on track to match its 2017 imports of U.S. goods.
(joint post with Dylan Yalbir)
cfr.org/blog/slouching…
China isn't on track to come close to meeting its Phase One purchase commitments. It isn't even on track to match its 2017 imports of U.S. goods.
(joint post with Dylan Yalbir)
cfr.org/blog/slouching…
The political disadvantage of putting such an emphasis on big purchase commitments is that it is obvious when China isn't meeting them ...
(I do think it is important to split out aircraft here, as the Administration excluded actual aircraft exports from the target)
(I do think it is important to split out aircraft here, as the Administration excluded actual aircraft exports from the target)
The analytical challenge here is saying something new -- and presenting the data effectively.
One semi surprising result is that if aircraft are excluded, we found that manufacturing exports are basically unchanged this year ...
One semi surprising result is that if aircraft are excluded, we found that manufacturing exports are basically unchanged this year ...
But that's largely because manufactures (ex aircraft, and ex cars, though cars are complex) weren't heavily impacted by China's retaliation (strange but true). It isn't clear that China is committed to any real policy changes that will raise U.S. exports here over time
Ag has to be the biggest disappointment.
China has increased its imports of poultry parts and maintained the pork imports that started this year. But it hasn't told the big state import companies to buy US beans like crazy ...
China has increased its imports of poultry parts and maintained the pork imports that started this year. But it hasn't told the big state import companies to buy US beans like crazy ...
China's oilseed purchases through May were on the low side by any measure ...
but the bulk of U.S. ag exports in any normal year happen in Q4, so it is possible to keep hope alive
(i.e. the disaggregation matters here)
but the bulk of U.S. ag exports in any normal year happen in Q4, so it is possible to keep hope alive
(i.e. the disaggregation matters here)
As for energy, well, I suspect the Trump Administration regrets including it in the deal.
It is a lost cause. The target was way too ambitious, and it wasn't expressed in volume terms.
It is a lost cause. The target was way too ambitious, and it wasn't expressed in volume terms.
China's oil imports picked up in May, so this chart doesn't look quite as bad as it did a month ago -- and China seems to have bought some more oil recently. But there is no way to make up for a slow start and the fall in price to $40 a barrel
