Finally had the opportunity to read @e_sarotte's excellent article in @Journal_IS, about NATO's enlargement. Here's a link to the full text: belfercenter.org/sites/default/…. Some views here.
First, let me try to summarise Sarotte's argument. In the article, she tries to stand back from the "Manichean" argument over whether NATO enlargement was good or bad by focusing on "how" NATO was enlarged. 
What does Sarotte mean by a "spectrum of enlargement possibilities"? On close reading, this seems to be a reference to the Partnership for Peace. Sarotte, following @SecDef19, argues that PfP was a way of keeping the Russians happy.
Much of the article describes how PfP, with its uncertain timeline of NATO's "phased" enlargement, was rapidly abandoned in favour of a do-it-now approach, "above all," because of Clinton's electoral defeat in the midterm elections in 1994.
I generally agree with her narrative but it's important to remember what the PfP meant for the Russians: it entailed an indefinite suspension of enlargement, and it was seen as a *substitute for* enlargement, not a vehicle for "phased" enlargement.
This was exactly how Yeltsin understood it when Christopher first presented the idea to him in October 1993. Christopher's reservation to the effect that enlargement would still happen went completely over Yeltsin's head (this is not in Sarotte's article but see @JimGoldgeier).
In other words, PfP was not seen as a "how" of enlargement by the Russians (or indeed probably by its proponents in the Pentagon), so in this sense, embracing *just* the PfP would entail an indefinite suspension of enlargement.
And if PfP is an alternative, does this not return us to the basic choice: enlargement or no enlargement? (Enlargement in the remote future does not count, as it is tantamount to no enlargement). This is what I found difficult to come to grips with in the article.
Another issue I found just a little difficult is where Sarotte stands on assigning blame. Hasty enlargement was not a good idea, okay. A phased approach would have been better, okay. But here comes Putin:
If we blame Putin for the downturn in relations with the West, then wasn't it a good idea that enlargement was well underway by the time Putin got into power? And so on. There are these difficult policy questions that probably have no good answers.
What the article does extremely well is spell out the debate in the Clinton administration, showing how there was no real agreement on enlargement, though there were early advocates (but also fierce opponents, especially in the Pentagon).
Definitely worth your time, folks. Give it a read. Very much in the spirit of Sarotte's superb scholarship. There's one particular document there that I had not seen before that I was much entertained by - will do a separate thread later. Penned by @strobetalbott, who else!
