. @d_jaishankar and I have a piece up for @WarOnTheRocks today. As others have also noted, even though Chinese foreign policy has been “assertive” for some time, what’s going on at the moment looks qualitatively different: warontherocks.com/2020/07/for-ou… 1/4
In discussions with experts (international and Chinese) in recent months there have been differing interpretations as to why China has opened up so many fronts at once - we lay them out in the piece (see Dhruva’s thread for a summary too):
There is a fair degree of convergence in the debates in many capitals on what a response to this latest variant of Chinese ”assertiveness” (even some European officials now just call it “aggressiveness”) should look like, regardless of how one interprets Beijing’s approach.
But there is certainly a difference in the likelihood of a course correction on Beijing’s part if the pushback/coordination /coalition on China becomes more serious (which evidently cannot be taken for granted) and whether Beijing will cool things down of its own volition anyway.
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A few quick thoughts on how China is likely to deal with the current situation in South Asia (since I am getting some questions along the lines of: "is the Chinese approach still the same as the one laid out in your book?" which is now more than ten years old...) 1/10
Fundamentals are the same as they have been for a long time: China supports Pakistan with military kit, diplomatic shielding, does not provide outright assistance to Pakistan in conflict scenarios beyond that. But lots of developments in last decade to note. 2/10
The Chinese kit is much better, and the balance of the weapons systems that Pakistan uses is now far more China-centric (also a byproduct of developments in US-Pak & US-India ties). Old version was low-end plus nukes / delivery systems; new version includes advanced platforms. 3/
The @ElbridgeColby quote on European willingness to sanction China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan reflects, IMO, a misunderstanding of what is at stake for Europe in this scenario, which is less about Taiwan and far more about relations w/the US politico.com/news/2023/03/0… 1/
In the event of a war between the US and the PRC as a result of PRC aggression over Taiwan, which is what we would be talking about, sanctions and other economic measures from Europe would be a bare minimum in the context of the transatlantic security relationship 2/
Even looking at this through the prism of the most cynical commercial actors on the European side, it is also clear what extra-territorial measures the US could deploy on national security grounds in these circumstances 3/
As soon as that Zhou Bo op-ed appeared - ft.com/content/f05fef… - I suspected that China had now figured out how to use the Russian threats of nuclear weapons use to its advantage, and Xi’s statement today exemplifies this 1/12
Zhou Bo’s op-ed was ostensibly about Russian nuclear weapons use being a “red line” for China. But one always takes his op-eds with a pinch of salt 2/
More notable (to me) in his op-ed was - a) his claims of “huge influence” on Russia (which China doesn’t actually believe it has), without any suggestion that it would be used beyond a UNSC vote 3/
Jumping off from Xi's remarks (and to respond to a couple of comments on this tweet) a quick thread on how the security of Chinese personnel issue hangs over the Pakistani PM’s visit to China 1/
Back in the late 2000s, Pakistan was dubbed the most dangerous overseas location to be a Chinese worker. The Pakistani authorities put a whole array of measures in place to fix that. They largely worked. 2/
At the time, the Chinese government had even privately threatened to pull all of their workers from Pakistan if the security problems weren’t addressed. 3/
The fact that China clearly supports Russia would not preclude them taking a mediation role. Beijing typically does this precisely when it’s sympathetic to one side but thinks they’ve gone too far. But there are other reasons I doubt this will happen 1/
There is plenty of precedent for this if “mediation” is defined expansively - from the DPRK six-party talks (where China hosted and actively mediated) to cases such as Kargil in ’99 (China didn’t mediate but conveyed disapproval to Pakistan and coordinated closely w/the US) 2/
The cases where China has played a helpful role to any degree are precisely the ones where it can lean on its friends - Sudan, DPRK, Pakistan, to a lesser extent the Taliban - but where its friends trust that Beijing has their security interests at heart 3/
Reading another article saying that the Sino-Russian joint statement "doesn't mention Ukraine" as a sort of "ah ha!", I'm curious whether Russia even asked for that. What Moscow certainly wanted - and received - was support for its entire stance on the European security order 1/4
The joint statement is not vague on this - China supports "the proposals put forward" by Russia, which FWIW, certainly mention Ukraine. They call for a huge buffer zone, including NATO removing any troops or weapons from countries that joined the alliance after 1997 2/4
These proposals, rather than a Ukraine-specific set of positions, were what Russia was pushing in the period leading up to Putin's visit. China would have seen the shocked reaction to the proposals in Europe and the US. And still chose to put Xi's personal stamp on them 3/4