The @ElbridgeColby quote on European willingness to sanction China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan reflects, IMO, a misunderstanding of what is at stake for Europe in this scenario, which is less about Taiwan and far more about relations w/the US politico.com/news/2023/03/0… 1/ In the event of a war between the US and the PRC as a result of PRC aggression over Taiwan, which is what we would be talking about, sanctions and other economic measures from Europe would be a bare minimum in the context of the transatlantic security relationship 2/

As soon as that Zhou Bo op-ed appeared - ft.com/content/f05fef… - I suspected that China had now figured out how to use the Russian threats of nuclear weapons use to its advantage, and Xi’s statement today exemplifies this 1/12 Zhou Bo’s op-ed was ostensibly about Russian nuclear weapons use being a “red line” for China. But one always takes his op-eds with a pinch of salt 2/

Jumping off from Xi's remarks (and to respond to a couple of comments on this tweet) a quick thread on how the security of Chinese personnel issue hangs over the Pakistani PM’s visit to China 1/

https://twitter.com/ajwsmall/status/1587868185834946560

Back in the late 2000s, Pakistan was dubbed the most dangerous overseas location to be a Chinese worker. The Pakistani authorities put a whole array of measures in place to fix that. They largely worked. 2/

The fact that China clearly supports Russia would not preclude them taking a mediation role. Beijing typically does this precisely when it’s sympathetic to one side but thinks they’ve gone too far. But there are other reasons I doubt this will happen 1/

https://twitter.com/bueti/status/1500577910108958722

There is plenty of precedent for this if “mediation” is defined expansively - from the DPRK six-party talks (where China hosted and actively mediated) to cases such as Kargil in ’99 (China didn’t mediate but conveyed disapproval to Pakistan and coordinated closely w/the US) 2/

Reading another article saying that the Sino-Russian joint statement "doesn't mention Ukraine" as a sort of "ah ha!", I'm curious whether Russia even asked for that. What Moscow certainly wanted - and received - was support for its entire stance on the European security order 1/4 The joint statement is not vague on this - China supports "the proposals put forward" by Russia, which FWIW, certainly mention Ukraine. They call for a huge buffer zone, including NATO removing any troops or weapons from countries that joined the alliance after 1997 2/4

So this piece seriously doubles down on the "China didn't know Russia was going to invade" argument. As Yun Sun says, that would reflect some interesting things about the Xi-Putin relationship, Chinese intelligence etc. if true. But... 1/

https://twitter.com/Lingling_Wei/status/1498365620173389827

Even if one doesn't credit the account widely circulated in diplomatic circles (cited here bloomberg.com/news/articles/…) that Xi asked Putin to hold off any invasion until after the Olympics, there are alternatives that arguably fit the facts better than China getting "played" 2/

Yun Sun -“If Russia works with Chinese financiers, in order to block that channel, the US needs to increase the cost for China Eximbank and China Development Bank”: ft.com/content/bf930a… 1/3 Everyone following the China-Russia relationship expected this from the Chinese commercial banks: bloomberg.com/news/articles/… But read the @J_Jakobowski great recent report for details on how the Chinese policy banks swung in post-2014: osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/… 2/4

The messaging from various European governments to China on how it handles the crisis with Russia has sharpened up in the last few days, increasingly making it clear that it will have an impact on the relationship. Clearest was @ABaerbock yesterday:

https://twitter.com/noahbarkin/status/1494723307563847682

1/8 Today one of the toughest characterizations of China from a European Commission president, based on the joint Sino-Russian statement:

https://twitter.com/StuartKLau/status/1494963503895044096

2/8

It was hard this week not to think back to the CAI drama in December, when Germany/France jammed the agreement through in the window before the Biden administration took office, taking advantage of Xi's interest in pre-emptively spiking US coalition-building on China 1/

https://twitter.com/jakejsullivan/status/1341180109118726144

It was characterized by its advocates as a victory for "strategic autonomy". In numerous meetings at the time, the suggestion that waiting for consultations with the new US administration might be mutually beneficial was treated almost as an affront to European sovereignty 2/

A few snippets from the background briefing on AUKUS last night from senior US administration officials, specifically with reference to France, Europe and the Indo-Pacific 1/5 Considerable emphasis was placed on this being about bridging European and Asian allies and combining efforts in the Indo-Pacific. UK was framed as a European power... "The only states pivoting to the Indo-Pacific faster than the US are in Europe" 2/5

A lot of China-Taliban questions have come up this week. An incident worth highlighting (with excerpts) that may help to illustrate why China will remain nervous about security around their economic projects even with Taliban assurances 1/4 There was a pervasive belief back in the 2000s that the Chinese projects in Afghanistan had a protected status. Then this attack took place. 2/4

I can't post the full chapter from the book but a few disconnected snippets in this thread below capture the early China-Taliban interactions when they were last in power, and I hope provide some helpful context. Some of the central issues have not changed since. 1/4 2/4

Whatever schadenfreude China may be experiencing around the way the withdrawal from Afghanistan has been handled by the US, this is not the outcome that China wanted. I give context here: china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/episo… and here: ecfr.eu/article/after-… 1/5 Yun Sun gives a good feel for recent thinking in Beijing on Afghanistan / Taliban: warontherocks.com/2021/08/a-relu… though it doesn’t capture how far back these exchanges go (I wrote about this way back in 2013: foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why… and longer history here: amazon.com/China-Pakistan… 2/5

We - @gmfus and @GeorgetownLaw - have a new report out today on CPEC and the BRI. A few summary points from it in this thread, along with some of the photos for anyone who just wants to look at them instead… gmfus.org/publications/r… 1/17 The report tries to tell a story rather than just giving a single analytical snapshot, given that CPEC has been, and remains, a moving target. Significant momentum from launch to late 2017; then a major stalling and slowdown; now a modest revival 2/

. @d_jaishankar and I have a piece up for @WarOnTheRocks today. As others have also noted, even though Chinese foreign policy has been “assertive” for some time, what’s going on at the moment looks qualitatively different: warontherocks.com/2020/07/for-ou… 1/4 In discussions with experts (international and Chinese) in recent months there have been differing interpretations as to why China has opened up so many fronts at once - we lay them out in the piece (see Dhruva’s thread for a summary too):

https://twitter.com/d_jaishankar/status/1285182075591692288

I am slightly bemused that this article (not all of which I agree with) has elicited a wave of “actually, Brexit was good for the UK’s China policy, it has now been freed from the EU shackles” responses. A few points. nytimes.com/2020/07/03/wor… 1/12 There is nothing that the UK is doing with its China policy at the moment that it couldn’t have done as an EU member. On HK, China and other issues, the UK always worked through other groupings when it made sense to do so rather than “hiding” behind an EU position. 2/

A few points from my policy brief on Europe-China relations in and beyond the pandemic, which you can read here: ecfr.eu/publications/s… 1/10 When the pandemic hit, many European leaders assumed that China would behave as it had during previous crises. This wasn’t just “naive” - it was a product of repeated experience, including during the Xi era. 2/10

A few samples from the last 24 hours alone of how the Chinese COVID-19 propaganda in Europe and its instrumentalization by various EU-unfriendly actors (Orbán, Vučić et al) has catalyzed active and open pushback from European officials and politicians

https://twitter.com/pierrebri/status/1242833202957484032

We already appear to be moving to a stage where China's propaganda in Europe is either actively harmful (blame Italy) or so heavy-handed that it is liable to backfire (Huawei supplying face-masks) A few samples below.

https://twitter.com/DSORennie/status/1241631482105466880

There are clearly more important things going on at the moment but since I (like many) am fielding questions every day on Sino-European dynamics and “Chinese leadership” during and beyond the COVID-19 crisis, here is a quick thread of my scattergun initial thoughts 1/ Behavior during a crisis of this scale does, of course, affect these relationships - developments during the sovereign debt crisis, such as China’s acquisitions spree in Southern Europe, hang over Sino-European relations to this day. Big differences from the last crisis though 2/

This Sunday Times story on the UK Huawei decision has several interesting details (taking with a pinch of salt the claim that Trump "suggested to Johnson that Britain and America build an alternative to Huawei together"): thetimes.co.uk/article/angry-… "[UK] Security officials insist they have received assurances from US spy chiefs that they will not cut off intelligence, despite the threats to do so by Trump and his political team."