Thread by @tanvi_madan

🧵 1/ @IndiaToday has a set of essays on "Resetting India's China Policy." I was asked to write about the China-India boundary crisis's impact on US-India relations. A few things that the piece highlights...
indiatoday.in/magazine/cover…

2/ I note that the impact of 🇮🇳🇨🇳 crisis on 🇺🇸🇮🇳will depend on:
- how the border crisis plays out
- Washington’s responsiveness &, over time, its China’s policy
- whether or not India can overcome the hesitations of history that have dogged its relationship with the US

3/ Recent Indian PMs (ABV, MMS, NM) hv seen the strategic logic in managing China thru a closer partnership w the US, which helps all 3 elements of India's China strategy:
- engaging 🇨🇳 (leverage)
- internal balancing (bldg capabilities)
- external balancing (network of partners)

4/ But there remains reticence in India, slowing the US-India partnership vis-a-vis China. I unpack concerns:
- it'll provoke China
- US will use India as frontline state
- US fuels 🇨🇳🇮🇳 problems
- Russia will be 😠
- strategic autonomy
- US reliability & China policy consistency

5/ Unpacking the Indian reasons for reticence about a US-India partnership/alignment vis-a-vis China, I argue that some are more valid than others.

6/ a. Reason for reticence: provoking China. But look at prev crises:
- 2013 Depsang: during/post lull in US-India rels
- 2014 Chumar: before Modi deepened ties w 🇺🇸 & while he was wooing 🇨🇳
- 2017 Doklam: time of Indian uncertainty about the Trump admin

6/ b. Reason for reticence: provoking China. But look around, and note that China is also acting assertively vs:
- Japan, which has been seeking to engage China
- Philippines, which had been abt to abrogate the US-PH visiting forces agreement

7/ Reason for reticence: US fuels Sino-Indian strains. But look at 🇨🇳🇮🇳 problems:
- boundary dispute
- Brahmaputra waters sharing
- trade deficit
- ltd mkt access
- 🇨🇳-Pak ties
- 🇨🇳 activities in 🇮🇳's 'hood
- 🇨🇳 vs 🇮🇳 in NSG, UNSC
Which of these is due to the US?

8/ a. Reason for reticence: Russia will be upset. Yes, 🇷🇺 important to 🇮🇳 cuz military equipment, parts, tech + int'l orgs + hope for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 split. But, 🇷🇺 also been
- deepening defence, tech ties w/ 🇨🇳
- promoting 🇨🇳 interests on global stage
- joined 🇨🇳 in rejecting Indo-Pacific

8/ b. Reason for reticence: Russia will be upset.
Delhi won't give up on Moscow, but shld ask same questions it wld of other partners:
- Is dependence on 🇷🇺 constraining 🇮🇳?
- Is 🇷🇺 reliable?
- Will close Sino-Russian partnership hinder 🇷🇺's willingness & ability to help 🇮🇳?

9/ More valid reasons for 🇮🇳's graduated approach to partnering w 🇺🇸 on 🇨🇳:
- takes time to build trust, habits of coop; overcome history/memory
- not wanting its interests to become geopolitical football btwn 🇨🇳🇺🇸
- concerns re 🇺🇸 reliability & consistency of US 🇨🇳 policy

10/ 🇮🇳 concerns re 🇺🇸 reliability will be greater cuz of elections. It'll 👀: will...
- Biden cont. competition w 🇨🇳, w more emph on allies/partner, or prioritize coop w 🇨🇳?
- Trump II be more of same or dismantle alliances?
- how will COVID affect US commitment/presence in Asia?

11/ a. Final reason for 🇮🇳 reticence re 🇺🇸: impact on strategic autonomy. My point:
- Partnerships can shape countries’ decisions
- e.g. US policies on Iran affect India
- but then Delhi, too, expects Washington to not do certain things with Pakistan.

11/ b. reason for 🇮🇳 reticence re 🇺🇸: impact on strategic autonomy.
- India has been able to bolster its freedom of action by enhancing (i) its capabilities and (ii) diversifying its portfolio of partners
- US partnership precludes neither -- and could even help both

11/c. reason for 🇮🇳 reticence re 🇺🇸: strategic autonomy. I argue
- Delhi shld think less defensively.
- Instead of asking what can the US partnership do *to* India, ask what can it do *for* India?
- Ask, how can India use this alignment to strengthen itself & even its autonomy?