Amid confusion caused by U.K. reimposing #quarantine on arrivals from #Spain, what wd best practice be? Let’s look at how #Estonia does it #bestpractices /1
Every Friday, Estonian MFA posts list of countries and their #COVIDー19 infection rates. If you arrive from a country with rate >16 per 100,000, then you must self-isolate for 2 weeks. /2
But while list updated every Friday, new quarantine rules only kick in following Monday. So there is time to change plans if needed. Latest country list here: vm.ee/en/information… /3
So excellent balance of health security, real-time updates and consideration for travellers. Not for first time, @EstonianGovt one of smartest in world #bestpractices. And one more thing..../4
Although #Estonia has one of lowest infection rates in world, UK visitors still have to self-isolate for 2 weeks on return to U.K. Makes no sense at all. /end
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Shoigu’s round of calls with US, UK, France and Turkey, claiming Ukraine planning to use a ‘dirty bomb’ is v worrying. We’ve seen nothing like this intense military diplomacy since war began. Its substance is even more worrying. /1
Of course, Ukraine has neither ability nor need to use dirty bomb. It’s Russia that’s losing. Nor will anyone believe Shoigu anyway –esp Ben Wallace, who was lied to during his pre-invasion visit to Moscow./2
Shoigu also warned of ‘uncontrolled escalation’. It’s Russia that is escalating: attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, apparent attacks on Western connectivity infrastructure, and mining of Novaya Kakhovka dam. And playing with nuclear fire in Zaporizhzhiya for months. /3
1. Highly personalistic rule is prone to error. But: 2. It can suppress consequences through tight control of elites and institutions.
Not just authoritarian strength, but specifically personalistic domination, enabled Lukashenka to bend arc of history back on itself. /2
These contradictory lessons are now playing out on a much larger stage.
Russia is more autocratic (though not more authoritarian) than any time since 1953. What does this mean? /3
Mobilisation is an act of desperation the Kremlin has done everything until now to avoid. And it is no quick fix. Russia has left it late, and conditions are far less favourable now. /1 iiss.org/blogs/analysis…
Regime now struggles to articulate goals and muster means. Harder than ever to believe time on its side. Strategy rests on two hopes. But both will stoke domestic fear and resistance... /2
i. Throw in enough extra mass to stop Ukraine and permanently secure at least some additional land it can claim as a victory worth the enormous costs Russia has incurred; and… /3
Poll of Russian public opinion on war in Ukraine, by group of independent sociologists:
Since start of war, support up from 59% to 64%, opposition down from 22% to 9%.
Those most opposed: under 34 and greater users of online media. /1
65% of Russians would not stop the war if they could. 22% would.
51% not ready to take part in it, 39% are ready (esp. 39-58 year-olds)
71% say they understand the goal, but not all can say what is. Answers vary: destruction of Nazism, fascism; then saving Russia from NATO./2
Some argue that Western and Ukrainian interests differ. A serious argument, but wrong. A compromise peace with Russian gains wd be disastrous for Western interests. themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/07/we-…
West faces inescapable choice:
Either a negotiated outcome that strengthens Russia, weakens Ukraine, harms Western security and undermines the rules-based order.
Or a fully-resourced commitment to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s invasion./2
West’s choice depends above all on how it weighs large and predictable costs of compromise vs small and theoretical risks of nuclear escalation — a risk that Russia would not rationally initiate, but fears of which it assiduously stokes. /3