Editor, Strategic Survey & Senior Fellow for Russia & Eurasia, IISS. Wilson Center Fellow, '21-22. Fmr UK Ambassador to Belarus. Film-maker. Views mine.
Oct 23, 2022 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
Shoigu’s round of calls with US, UK, France and Turkey, claiming Ukraine planning to use a ‘dirty bomb’ is v worrying. We’ve seen nothing like this intense military diplomacy since war began. Its substance is even more worrying. /1
Of course, Ukraine has neither ability nor need to use dirty bomb. It’s Russia that’s losing. Nor will anyone believe Shoigu anyway –esp Ben Wallace, who was lied to during his pre-invasion visit to Moscow./2
Oct 15, 2022 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Belarus, Russia,Ukraine: Three lessons for a Postwar Order. My latest piece in @SurvivalEditors
2020 #Belarus uprising, first stage of a violent transformation of the region, offers wider lessons: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… /11. Highly personalistic rule is prone to error. But: 2. It can suppress consequences through tight control of elites and institutions.
Not just authoritarian strength, but specifically personalistic domination, enabled Lukashenka to bend arc of history back on itself. /2
Sep 25, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Mobilisation is an act of desperation the Kremlin has done everything until now to avoid. And it is no quick fix. Russia has left it late, and conditions are far less favourable now. /1 iiss.org/blogs/analysis…
Regime now struggles to articulate goals and muster means. Harder than ever to believe time on its side. Strategy rests on two hopes. But both will stoke domestic fear and resistance... /2
Jun 29, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Poll of Russian public opinion on war in Ukraine, by group of independent sociologists:
Since start of war, support up from 59% to 64%, opposition down from 22% to 9%.
Those most opposed: under 34 and greater users of online media. /1
65% of Russians would not stop the war if they could. 22% would.
51% not ready to take part in it, 39% are ready (esp. 39-58 year-olds)
71% say they understand the goal, but not all can say what is. Answers vary: destruction of Nazism, fascism; then saving Russia from NATO./2
Jun 7, 2022 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
My latest piece just out.
Some argue that Western and Ukrainian interests differ. A serious argument, but wrong. A compromise peace with Russian gains wd be disastrous for Western interests. themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/07/we-…
West faces inescapable choice:
Either a negotiated outcome that strengthens Russia, weakens Ukraine, harms Western security and undermines the rules-based order.
Or a fully-resourced commitment to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s invasion./2
Mar 25, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Unprecedented mass corporate exit from Russia tells us much about transformation of political risk. Thread. /1
Most of this exit not forced by sanctions compliance but response to public opinion. A private sector boycott now amplifies state sanctions. Previously, companies complied (sometimes minimally) with, while lobbying against, sanctions. So this is new. But… /2
Feb 11, 2022 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
War seems more likely every day. If so, why is Putin choosing this? /1 iiss.org/blogs/analysis…@IISS_org
For 4 months Putin has been using compellence = threat of force + demand for change. This is new for him. His past uses of force changed facts on the ground quickly, not adversaries’ policies thru’ pressure. /2
Apr 3, 2021 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
Some thoughts on Russian build-up near Ukraine’s border. /1
Some portray as “sending signal/intimidation” (don’t worry) vs “preparation for conflict” (worry). This is a false distinction. Russia will probe and test West’s political will. If it meets effective resistance it won’t escalate. If it doesn’t, well…./2
Dec 23, 2020 • 11 tweets • 6 min read
As promised, short summary of my piece in @SurvivalEditors “Belarus and Russia Policy: patterns of the past, dilemmas of the present” tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…. Explores Russia’s interests and options in Belarus crisis. /1
Ever since Russia strong enough >1815 to intervene in Central & Eastern Europe, it has suppressed national & liberal movements. A constant across tsarist, Soviet, post-Soviet leaders. Only exceptions: Gorbachev’s optimistic laissez-faire and 1990s weakness. /2
Oct 3, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Western states have now all announced sanctions on #Belarus. UK and Canada on 29 Sept, EU and US on 2 Oct. What do they tell us? Thread / 1
All sanctions are on individuals, not companies, sectors or institutions. UK and US sanction 8, Canada 11 and EU 40. They consist of asset freezes and travel bans on senior officials of repressive organs --and (except UK) on Central Election Commission. /2
Sep 16, 2020 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Curious judgements from Trenin. Much to disagree with. 1. Putin will see Merkel's novichok statement as "stab in the back", as he places high value of "personal relationships with foreign leaders". But nothing in his past treatment of her suggests this.
1. Putin wants to stop, not manage, change by keeping Lukashenko in power. And, like him, rejects Co-Ordinating Council as legitimate —and thus any meaningful dialogue. /2
Aug 24, 2020 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
“A dam-burst of protests swept across the country, changing the moral and psychological landscape of Belarus forever”.
“Lukashenko has made preparations for a fresh and more severe crackdown. He has ruled out anything but confrontation. On 22 August he set an ultimatum.”
Aug 14, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
What does official Belarus say about protests? Here's an interview with Interior Minister Karaev: sb.by/articles/zaymi… /1
Karaev on "role of law enforcement organs in current events". Expresses regret only that some people "accidentally" detained. Nothing abt astonishing brutality of organs under his control. Claims they "always act as gently as possible". And... /2
Aug 7, 2020 • 4 tweets • 6 min read
My piece on #Belarus elections for @TheNatlInterest nationalinterest.org/feature/why-be…
"The election is neither free nor fair, and the result will be rigged. But this is the country’s most unpredictable moment for over twenty years."
"Across Eurasia, only Cambodia’s Hun Sen and Tajikistan’s Emomali Rakhmon have been in power longer than Lukashenko’s twenty-six years. Belarusian 'democracy' has meant one person, one vote, once."
Jul 27, 2020 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
Amid confusion caused by U.K. reimposing #quarantine on arrivals from #Spain, what wd best practice be? Let’s look at how #Estonia does it #bestpractices /1
Every Friday, Estonian MFA posts list of countries and their #COVIDー19 infection rates. If you arrive from a country with rate >16 per 100,000, then you must self-isolate for 2 weeks. /2
“Russia wishes to be treated as a great power”. The Russia report goes far beyond this relatively benign view of Russian policy. And merely being a great power does not entail the destructive spectrum of actions the report charts /2
Jun 30, 2020 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
My reply to Putin's article in National Interest on WW2, also in National Interest: nationalinterest.org/feature/what-v…
I looked into b/g of Putin's WW2 article. Why did he write it? He was esp concerned abt European parliament resolution in 09/19. Has mentioned it many times. So I looked at this, the debate on it, and how MEPs voted. The results, I promise you, will surprise.
May 30, 2020 • 11 tweets • 4 min read
Tectonic Politics (Brookings/Chatham House, 2019) is one-year old! Perfect lockdown reading on political risk amazon.co.uk/Tectonic-Polit…@BrookingsInst@BrookingsGlobal@ChathamHouse@IISS_org
Chapter 1 “The Softness and Hardness of Political Risk”: how political risks rising more than any others, impacting more companies in more sectors and countries, than ever. But understanding and managing them remain neglected and ineffective.
May 28, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
If interested in Russia, I recommend you spend 5 minutes on this remarkable statement by 21-yr old Yegor Zhukov at end of his trial last December, here transl. by @mashagessennewyorker.com/news/our-colum… via @NewYorker
"We have become a nation that has unlearned responsibility. We have become a nation that has unlearned love."
"The only social policy the Russian state pursues consistently is the policy of atomization."
Apr 22, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
So much wrong with this. Let’s start with systematic repression of intelligentsia during this “pragmatic” period. Here’s Paul Gregory, a pre-eminent authority: independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_13…
Then perhaps talk abt how “pragmatic” NEP was only grudgingly adapted after horrors of war communism, incl. massacre of Kronstadt sailors, once devout Bolsheviks, for daring to reject it. C. 2,000 executed or sent to labour en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kronstadt…
