Statistics from 226599 DNS-over-HTTPS requests made to an upstream load-balanced group of 8 #DoH servers over Tor, by a DoHoT proxy, including responses served from local cache.
This includes what the proxy sees, not only what the user experiences.
More than 25% of requests are served back to the user from the cache.
In the event that the request needs to be sent upstream, the median response time back to the user is 241ms.
If we *remove* locally-cached responses, this is closer to what the raw proxy experiences:
So if you're just doing raw DoH over Tor and are round-robin-ing a pool of servers without caching or tracking response time, the median request time will be around 453ms and p90 will be 1153ms.
tl;dr - caching + load-balancing + tracking-speed, is essential.
ps: according to DNSCryptProxy's tracking, the fastest servers from the pool have been as follows (count = number of times has achieved first place)
For anyone who is like "ZOMG YOU ARE GIVING ALL YOUR DNS LOOKUPS TO CENTRALISED CAPITALIST SERVERS", chill: it's over Tor, stripped of TLS session-ids, and "anonymity loves company" - so come join the fun! medium.com/@alecmuffett/w…
/cc @kushaldas
Hot on the heels of #ChatControl and in the name of “identity” and “consumer choice” the EU seeks the ability to undetectably spy on HTTPS communication; 300+ experts say “no” to #Article45 of #eIDAS #QWAC alecmuffett.com/article/108139
If you would like to see more discussion regarding:
Regulation: EU Digital Identity Framework — including #eIDAS and #QWAC
When Signal and WhatsApp have fled the surveillance of the #OnlineSafetyBill, what app will still be around for politicans, journalists, and actual normal people to use, securely.
@JohnNaulty @matrixdotorg Let's be clear: we are talking about the evacuation of the entire Signal and WhatsApp userbase / niche, from the United Kingdom.
That's a lot of people.
WOW:
- No Signal
- No WhatsApp
- No iMessage
- No Facetime
@jamesrbuk called it #internexit; the UK will be extraordinarily isolated from the rest of the internet.
A big part of the the reason for the existence of that API was because the European Union wanted to enable people to access their data; so they created the problem, complained when the inevitable leaks happened, and are now reinventing it
Could be the attached, but my suspicion is that this is going to be another CYBER! DARKWEB! CYB3R! SYBER! CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA‼️BRAIN CONTORL! YOU SAW AN ADVERT AND SO A RUSSIAN ARTIFISHIAL INTELLIGENCE APP MADE YOU VOTE FOR UKIP! … thing.
Plucky spooks in Cheltenham but dressed for speed-dating in 2015-era Shoreditch, battle "Russian influence operations" that Nadine Dorries will soon cite as rationale for the #OnlineSafetyBill.
Token American subplots help sell the series to the US.
Back in 1991 I published an open-source password cracking tool which defined the state of the art for the next 5+ years, so much so that echoes of it can be found in all major password crackers of today.
Some folk criticised me for doing this, choosing words like these to do so:
I know that in general it's bad form to take a single quote out of context and use it to critique an entire essay (concerned.tech) — but I do feel that this time it's deserved.
The concerned-dot-tech essay has had extensive technical debunking, e.g.: