Philipp Heimberger Profile picture
Aug 10, 2020 17 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Commission announced: 1) EU fiscal rules remain suspended in 2021; 2) focus of reviewing the rules is on reducing reliance on output gap estimates. A thread on why changing these output gap estimates is essential to promote recovery from 2022 onwards: /1

ft.com/content/d7c41c… Image
The European Commission’s potential output model is the core technical backbone of EU fiscal surveillance. Model-based estimates are used for evaluating and supervising member states’ fiscal performance and underlie recommendations related to medium-term budgetary objectives. /2 Image
Given the importance of model-based estimates in the EU’s fiscal rules – avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal tightening in the near future will require that policymakers’ hands are not tied by overly pessimistic views on the development of potential output. /3
Past research provides in-depth analysis on revisions in potential output estimates in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Countries most affected by the crisis suffered the largest downward revisions in potential output – and vice versa. /4 Image
Via the institutionalization of structural balances in the EU’s fiscal regulation framework, downward revisions in potential output increased fiscal consolidation pressures especially in the countries with the largest downward revisions. /5 Image
I use the example of Italy for illustration. Before the COVID-19 shock hit, the Commission estimated that the Italian fiscal deficit would come in at 2.2% of GDP in 2019. Given small official estimates of the output gap, the ‘structural’ deficit was estimated to be large. /6 Image
However, alternative estimates of the output gap pointing to a higher degree of resource underutilization would have reduced the fiscal consolidation pressure on the Italian government. Recommendations for lower government expenditures would have been obsolete. /7 Image
Especially in the period 2010 to 2014, the reliance on pessimistic views of potential output triggered pro-cyclical adjustments in fiscal policy with negative economic growth effects: intereconomics.eu/contents/year/… /8 Image
Fiscal consolidation caused hysteresis effects, leading to successive rounds of downward revisions in potential output that partly validated the original pessimistic potential output forecasts and, in turn, caused further fiscal consolidation requirements. /9 Image
How will the COVID-19 shock affect the European Commission’s potential output estimates ? In its recent forecast, the Commission systematically reduced its PO forecast to a larger extent in countries that are also predicted to suffer from a larger drop in actual output. /10 Image
One additional percentage point in predicted losses of actual output is associated with a loss in potential output of about 0.6 percentage points, suggesting that the revisions in PO-model estimates are strongly related to changes in economic activity. /11
The problem with immediate downward revisions in potential output is that pessimistic initial views have proven to be self-reinforcing during the Euro Crisis as they reduce fiscal space exactly in those times when it is most needed. /12
Downward revisions in potential output translate into higher ‘structural’ deficits, which will again become important once the temporary suspension of the EU’s fiscal rules is lifted. Commission has announced that rules will not apply in 2021. But problems will not disappear. /13
Once the suspension is lifted, model-based assessments of excessive ‘structural’ deficits will force the EU countries concerned to implement fiscal consolidation measures that may hinder economic recovery. Essential that we avoid a repeat of "output gap nonsense"! /14
Importantly, the PO-model would need to better consider the presence of hysteresis effects. Properly accounting for hysteresis should make economic policies more aggressive, especially during large negative cyclical events – and COVID-19 certainly falls into this category. /15
There are several approaches that have tried to come up with better estimates of potential output to improve policy-making. Here are a couple of links:

ineteconomics.org/research/resea…

brookings.edu/bpea-articles/…

ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps…
So let's continue the technical discussion - but never forget that all of the technical stuff is politically important, and we should therefore have a thorough public debate concerning the implications for policymaking: researchgate.net/publication/33…

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More from @heimbergecon

Apr 17
How far from full employment? Our paper in European Economic Review: based on unemployment-vacancy data, we find full employment episodes in EU countries during the 1970s. Labour markets became tighter when recovering from COVID-19, but few countries hit full employment. Thread: Image
Based on contributions by Michaillat/Saez, we apply a full employment concept derived from the unemployment-vacancies relationship to European countries. We use the Beveridge (full employment-consistent) rate of unemployment (BECRU) to study labour markets over 1970-2022. Image
We find full employment episodes in EU countries in the 1970s. The European unemployment problem emerged in 1980s and 1990s. Slack in labour markets initially increased during the pandemic. Labour markets became tighter recovering from COVID-19; few countries hit full employment. Image
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Aug 17, 2023
Do higher public debt levels reduce economic growth? My meta-analysis is out in the September issue of Journal of Economic Surveys. By analysing 816 estimates, I find
- publication bias in favour of negative growth effects
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Summary 🧵 Image
Reinhart/Rogoff (2010) had an impact on the policy debate; policy-makers used their results (threshold in public-debt-to-GDP of 90% beyond which growth slows) to argue for austerity. But what does the evidence tell us about growth effects of higher public debt? /2 Image
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May 6, 2023
How did Italy become the Eurozone's Achilles heel, the monetary union's most vulnerable spot? In a new working paper, we answer this question by reassessing Italy's long decline in the context of European integration and globalisation 🧵 Image
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We use a new structuralist framework to synthesise different supply-side and demand-side explanations for Italy's decline. Image
Read 9 tweets
Apr 6, 2023
We need to promote public debate on fiscal policy and EU fiscal rules. Yesterday, I did a presentation in Vienna on climate investment in the context of public investment needs and EU fiscal rules reform. I stressed three main points (short thread):

1. If policymakers are serious about meeting the climate goals, they will need to significantly increase public investment for climate and energy. We are talking about *additional* public investment of at least 1% of EU GDP per year. Image
2. The European Commission has published EU fiscal rules reform orientations that were welcomed by EU finance ministers. Tough political negotiations ahead, but what's on the table will not sufficiently increase the scope for public climate investment.

Read 5 tweets
Mar 22, 2023
The European Parliament requested me to write a study assessing the European Commission's orientations on reforming EU fiscal rules, with a focus on Debt Sustainability Analysis as an anchor for bilateral negotiations and surveillance.

Here is a summary of my main results 🧵
The Commission’s (COM) orientations (published in November 2022) were welcomed by the conclusions of the Council of the EU on March 14th 2023. COM proposes an enhanced role for debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in assessing fiscal risks. Focus: bringing down public debt ratios.
Reform orientations:

- COM conducts a DSA for each member state projecting the public-debt-to-GDP ratio over >10 years.
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Read 9 tweets
Jan 16, 2023
Let's introduce a permanent EU investment fund for climate and energy bringing additional public investment of 1% of EU GDP per year. In a new study, @alichtenberger_ and I argue this would promote the green transition and strengthen the EU economically and politically. Thread🧵
Meeting the climate goals requires additional investment. The share of public funding for climate investments needs to be significant. Additional of green public investment of at least 1% of EU economic output is need annually, which would help mobilise further private investment
The Covid-19 recovery fund (“Next Generation EU”) could serve as a model for a permanent EU investment fund. EU Commission would issue bonds and distribute money based on conditionality of supporting climate/energy goals. Member states would not be individually liable.
Read 6 tweets

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